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
The State of  
Urban Safety  
in South Africa  
**REPORT**



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# REPORT

# 2017



**urban safety**  
reference group

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
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# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<b>AFUS</b>	African Forum for Urban Safety	<b>LDAC</b>	Local Drug Action Committee
<b>AU</b>	African Union	<b>MAN</b>	Mangaung Municipality
<b>BCM</b>	Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality	<b>MDG</b>	Millennium Development Goals
<b>BMZ</b>	German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development	<b>MSU</b>	Msunduzi Municipality
<b>CBF</b>	City Budget Forum	<b>NDMP</b>	National Drug Master Plan
<b>CBO</b>	Community-based Organisation	<b>NDP</b>	National Development Plan
<b>CoJ</b>	City of Johannesburg	<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental Organisation
<b>CoGTA</b>	Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs	<b>NHW</b>	Neighbourhood Watch
<b>CPF</b>	Community Policing Forum	<b>NMB</b>	Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality
<b>CPT</b>	City of Cape Town	<b>NUA</b>	New Urban Agenda
<b>CPTED</b>	Crime Prevention through Environmental Design	<b>SACN</b>	South African Cities Network
<b>DoCS</b>	Department of Community Safety	<b>SAFA</b>	South African Football Association
<b>EKU</b>	Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality	<b>SAPS</b>	South African Police Service
<b>ETH</b>	eThekweni Municipality	<b>SDG</b>	Sustainable Development Goal
<b>GBH</b>	Grievous Bodily Harm	<b>Stats SA</b>	Statistics South Africa
<b>GIS</b>	Geographic Information System	<b>TSH</b>	City of Tshwane
<b>GIZ</b>	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit	<b>UN Women</b>	UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
<b>HDI</b>	Human Development Index	<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>IDP</b>	Integrated Development Plan	<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>IFP</b>	Inkatha Freedom Party	<b>Unicef</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>IRPTN</b>	Integrated Rapid Public Transport Network	<b>UNODC</b>	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
<b>IUDF</b>	Integrated Urban Development Framework	<b>USRG</b>	Urban Safety Reference Group
<b>JCSS</b>	Joburg City Safety Strategy	<b>VCP</b>	Violence and Crime Prevention Programme
<b>JHB</b>	City of Johannesburg	<b>VPUU</b>	Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading
		<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organisation



# FOREWORD

It is our great pleasure to present the second edition of the *State of Urban Safety in South Africa Report*. Produced by members of the Urban Safety Reference Group (USRG) hosted by the South African Cities Network (SACN), with the support of the GIZ-Inclusive Violence and Crime Prevention (VCP) Programme, this report is an update of the state of crime and violence in South Africa's major cities, and a review of knowledge generation and sharing among city safety practitioners over the past year. It is the second in a series of annual reports that aim to present, analyse and assess city-level trends incrementally, to enable better urban safety planning and strategy development.

In existence since 2014, the USRG is a platform for structured collaborative learning, exchange and advocacy on urban safety issues among city practitioners and national government stakeholders. It continues to be the only institutionalised forum in South Africa for enabling evidence and practice-based learning that informs urban safety and violence prevention policy, planning and management. The USRG's position is that cities must have a clearly defined and resourced urban safety role, and that spatial and sectoral approaches are needed.

The USRG's advocacy is emboldened by the New Urban Agenda (NUA) and the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), whose priorities identify cities as central actors. SDG no. 11 is about *making cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable* and is reinforced in the NUA, which is a 20-year roadmap for making cities sustainable and equitable for all. The importance of cities is mirrored locally, in Chapter 8 of the South African National Development Plan (NPC, 2011) and in the national Integrated Urban Development Framework (COGTA, 2016), which was approved by Cabinet in 2016.

In this regard, we have actively explored the substance of 'a city's role' and what value can be added to the existing work of local authorities to bring about safer cities. The exploration has further included:

- understanding structural and systemic problems, and how they could be addressed; and
- promoting outreach and advocacy with the partners and audiences that can support the safer cities agenda.

The devastating reality of violence and crime in South Africa is that 18673 people were murdered during 2015/16, or 51 a day. These statistics show that cities are places not only of opportunity but also of inequality and high levels of violence and crime. Cities are where the majority (63%) of South Africans live (with this figure set to continue to grow) and where most crime and violence are concentrated. The Mexico Citizens Council for Public Security's annual global ranking includes four South African cities among the top 50 most violent cities in the world.<sup>1</sup>

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
<sup>1</sup> Bender, J and Macias, A. The most violent cities in the world: Latin America dominates list with 41 countries in top 50, *Business Insider*, Monday 25 April 2016 via The Independent at <http://ind.pn/1T97wB0>

In addition to engaging with issues that arose from the first report, this edition of the report updates the data presented last year based on the national crime statistics released in September 2016. In so doing, it continues to build an evidence base, aggregated to city level, that can be used to inform policy and practice, and to strengthen the case for improved fiscal allocations to city urban safety functions. In the current climate of low economic growth, cities need to do more with less, and quality data may make the difference, allowing local governments to use existing resources efficiently.

Last year's report highlighted the need for data to be compiled at city and sub-city level, and to identify urban 'hotspots' that contribute disproportionately to crimes figures. In response, this year's report includes research into 'hotspots' piloted in three cities: Cape Town, eThekweni and Johannesburg. The research also responds more directly to the dearth of city-level crime data, the readability of police data together with other relevant measures (e.g. household income, education, geography, employment), and the lack of data showing the distribution of crime within cities. Going forward, the focus will be on applying knowledge generated and shared over the past two years and on expanding the hotspots research across member cities.

One of the USRG's objectives is to share knowledge and experience among members and with other stakeholders. To this end, we were asked by the City Budget Forum (CBD) to present on issues of urban safety at their quarterly meetings. Chaired by the Deputy Director-General for Intergovernmental Relations at National Treasury, the CBF considers intergovernmental finances from the perspective of the eight metropolitan municipalities and may make recommendations to the Budget Forum or the Medium Term Expenditure Committee (MTEC). During the year, four presentations were made based on four policy briefs (see Annexure C) that we believe are equally interesting for other municipalities and cities in South Africa.

The enthusiastic and dedicated participation and contributions of our members are integral to achieving the USRG's objectives. As the two convening partners, the SACN and the GIZ VCP Programme extend our deepest appreciation to the USRG members and look forward to continuing, in a spirit of solidarity and collaboration, our joint endeavour towards making South African cities safer, liveable and inclusive for all.



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**Sithole Mbanga**  
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## INTRODUCTION

The debate on the role of cities in ensuring safer environments for their residents continues to evolve. As cities throughout the world face the challenge of balancing limited budgets with the requirement to deliver multiple lines of service and infrastructure, the critical aspect of safety is not always a focus, particularly in the developing world. This is often because the responsibility for delivering a safer environment has lain with the national authorities, despite safety's being one of the highest demands by citizens.

Compared to rural areas, urban and metropolitan regions carry a disproportionate burden of crime and violence – the nine cities considered in this report are home to about 40% of the country's residents but record about half of all murders, two-thirds of aggravated robberies and three-quarters of vehicle thefts and carjackings.

During 2016, government adopted policies that highlight the role of safety in urban development. The Integrated Urban Development Framework (IUDF) includes urban safety as one of three cross-cutting issues and streamlines issues of safety, and violence and crime prevention in all nine policy levers. The White Paper on Safety and Security reflects recommendations made in the previous State of Urban Safety in South African Cities Report (SACN, 2016), as it underlines the importance of integrated approaches and community participation, as well as an evidence-based approach. However, the role of cities remains vague and the distribution of resources is not yet aligned to the new policies, while data collection and availability are limited.

As highlighted in the previous report, cities need to have access to regular, reliable and context-specific data if they are to implement effective crime and violence prevention policies. Understanding the complex correlations between risk factors and high crime and violence levels is vital for the effective implementation of safety strategies. Some progress has been made in developing data for the 21 indicators presented in last year's report. These indicators were used to develop a new crime and fear index that could compare the nine cities. The index groups the indicators into interpersonal crimes of violence, violent property crimes, non-violent property crimes and fear of crime, as these are four broad areas that may be of particular interest to city residents and planners.

Another aspect highlighted in last year's report is the importance of disaggregating perceptions and data to city level, in order to provide a more comprehensive picture of crime and violence at neighbourhood level. To this end, this report includes research into hotspots in three sample cities.

After providing an update on the state of crime and safety in cities (Chapter 2), Chapter 3 describes the safety strategies of two member cities and institutional engagements of the past year. An overview of the global, regional and national evolution of urban safety topics is given in Chapter 4, with the aim of encouraging city officials responsible for community safety to create their own cross-sectoral initiatives based on existing policies (and, in so doing, to close the gap between policy and implementation). Chapter 5 highlights the work done by the USRG to encourage greater learning, exchange and cooperation around safety issues, while Chapter 6 proposes some recommendations that will assist South African cities to address the cross-cutting factors that drive violence and crime. These recommendations expand on some of the recommendations made in last year's report and include some new proposals for the way forward.







## THE STATE OF CRIME AND SAFETY IN CITIES

The 2016 State of Urban Safety in South Africa Report highlighted the lack of useful data at city level, which hampers the implementation of effective, evidence-driven urban safety interventions. Such interventions require an understanding of the trends and roots of each city's specific crime and safety challenges. This section describes some of the limitations when interpreting crime statistics as well as the methodology used for this report. Thereafter follows a description of the 21 indicators that are used to analyse crime trends and risk factors in South Africa and nine major cities over the last 11 years. Finally, a new crime and fear index is presented and used to compare the cities, which leads into a discussion of a framework for crime and violence indicators.

### Interpreting Crime Statistics

When interpreting crime statistics, several challenges need to be overcome. The first is that not all criminal incidents are reported to or recorded by the police. Much depends on the police and community motivations, which can differ from precinct to precinct. Communities that trust and have high expectations of the police tend to have higher reporting rates, while communities that have poor relations with the police see little incentive in reporting crimes. This variation in crime reporting and recording introduces distortions into the data, and makes it difficult to determine whether a change in the official crime statistics is due to a real change in the crime rate or to social, political

and institutional factors. For example, the relatively wealthy are likely to have insured goods and so are more likely to report even minor thefts to the police. This could give the impression that wealthier areas are disproportionately targeted for property crime, which is not necessarily the case. As reporting rates are so variable and context-specific, crime statistics should always be read in the context of other independent data, especially from large-scale, representative surveys.

Another challenge is that national-level crime statistics obscure the immensely skewed distribution of crime within a country, city or neighbourhood. The rates of most crimes, especially property crimes, are significantly higher in urban centres than in rural areas. The nine large, urban municipalities analysed in this report are home to about 40% of the residents of South Africa, but record about 77% of the carjackings, 74% of the vehicle thefts, 64% of the aggravated robberies, 58% of the residential robberies and 47% of the murders. Within cities and neighbourhoods, people living just a few kilometres apart, or living side by side but occupying different social spaces because of, for example, their gender, age, disability or employment status, experience entirely different worlds of crime risk. Understanding the extent and root causes of these differences is crucial to the development of effective crime reduction and prevention policies.


Lastly, despite being disproportionately affected by many crimes, South African cities do not have access to regular, reliable, context-specific and real-time crime data. Therefore, city authorities are typically making safety and security decisions without accurate data, which undermines the effectiveness of the crime reduction and prevention interventions. In addition to the lack of collection and analysis of data at city level, SAPS does not provide city-specific crime data that can be used without major reconfiguration and recalculation, as explained in the following section.

## Methodology Update

The methodology used is basically the same as the one used in the 2016 report, with the addition of population estimates for each year (as opposed to a static population from the 2011 Census), which allow for a better comparison over time. The geographical boundaries of SAPS police precincts do not correspond with, overlap and often arbitrarily cut across municipal boundaries, which makes it difficult to track and compare crime statistics. Figure 1 shows an example in the Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality, where the Gonubie police station falls within the municipal boundaries (demarcated in green), but its precinct (blue lines) extends beyond the city limits.



**Figure 1:** Overlap of municipal and relevant police station boundaries in part of Buffalo City



Therefore, the first step is to identify the police precincts<sup>2</sup> that fall within municipal boundaries. Then, using geographic information system (GIS) technology, the spatial boundaries of the police precincts (available from the SAPS website) are overlaid with the spatial boundaries of the municipalities. Only police stations that have more than 50% of their precinct within the relevant municipal boundaries are included. In the case of Gonubie, more than half (62%) of the precinct falls within the municipal boundaries, and so crimes recorded at this police station are included in the city's total. The crime figures for these police stations in each municipality are added up, to give the total crime figures (by type of crime) for each municipality over the last 11 years.

The next step is to determine the number of people living within each area in order to be able to compare crime totals for municipalities of different sizes. Using GIS technology, the precinct boundaries are overlaid with the small geographic units used by Stats SA and associated headcounts from the 2001 and 2011 Censuses. The headcounts are added up for each municipality, to allow the city crime rates to reflect the changes in population growth, which vary considerably between cities. For example, between 2005 and 2016, Johannesburg's population grew by 37%, whereas Buffalo City's population increased by just 7%.


Finally, to understand the intensity of crime experienced by people, the cities' crime totals are divided by their population figures for each of the last 10 years. In this way, the crime rates take into account changes in city population over time. The population figures are derived from the population estimates and growth rates per city published by Stats SA, which are based on the Census 2001 and Census 2011 data.

<sup>2</sup> Precinct refers to the geographical area for which a police station is responsible.



Figure 2 shows the importance of comparing crime figures based on population. For example, compare Buffalo City and Johannesburg. If only raw figures are considered, Buffalo City appears to have less of a murder problem than Johannesburg. However, once the population sizes are allowed for, Buffalo City's murder rate is nearly 50% compared to 30% for Johannesburg.

**Figure 2:** Raw murder figures compared to murder rates per 100 000 (2015/16)



While the methodology now takes into account the change of population over time, it does not include any shifts in population since 2011 because there has been no subsequent census. Therefore, precincts that have seen major growth/shrinkage since 2011 will not be accurately represented. Furthermore, the methodology uses the residential population, which means that it does not consider precincts that may have many non-residents passing through daily. For instance, commercial areas will generally have a higher daytime population than their residential population, which will tend to swell their crime figures.


This report uses the crime statistics that SAPS released in September 2016, not the interim statistics released in February 2017 that cover the period April to December 2016. This is because the quarterly figures cannot be compared meaningfully to anything.

## The Indicators Database

The 21 urban safety indicators were developed from an extensive literature review and first used in the 2016 report. The aim is to standardise the measurement and assessment of the state of safety across South African cities, and thereby assist city governments to identify the key determinants and mitigating factors of crime and violence, and so be able to develop appropriate crime prevention policies and strategies.

The many factors that contribute to urban crime and safety are conceptualised as an 'onion' of three interlinked layers, as shown in Figure 3. The inner layer includes both crime and violence statistics (objective factors) and people's perceptions of their safety (subjective factors), while the second layer refers to some of the social/structural factors that might contribute to crime and violence. These include urbanisation factors (population growth and density, and social incoherence), marginalisation factors (related to poverty, unemployment and inequality of income and services) and social and physical factors (inadequate housing and infrastructure, condition of schools and access to alcohol and drugs). The third layer covers existing and potential policing, crime and violence prevention programmes that are measured qualitatively, not quantitatively.

**Figure 3:** The 21 selected indicators of crime, key drivers of crime and crime control policies



\* The measure of strengthening the security by increasing the required effort to commit crimes to or at an object. [http://securipedia.eu/mediawiki/index.php/Measure:\\_Target\\_hardening](http://securipedia.eu/mediawiki/index.php/Measure:_Target_hardening)

For some of the indicators, the data exists and is available at municipal level, but for others additional research is required. The data for the social/structural risk factors (nos. 11 to 21) is taken largely from the South African Cities Open Data Almanac (SCODA)<sup>3</sup> or from Stats SA data (especially from Census 2011 and the 2016 Community Survey<sup>4</sup>).

### **Indicator 1: Murder rates**

The murder rate is considered a good indicator and even proxy for general levels of violence, as it is readily measured and relatively well-reported. It can be supplemented by data from mortuary reports should there be accuracy concerns. The rate is per 100 000 people in the residential population.

### **Indicator 2: Assault rates**

This is the rate of assault with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm (GBH). The indicator should be interpreted with care, as victim surveys suggest that only about half of the assaults in South Africa are ever reported to the police (Stats SA, 2015: 62). In the absence of city-level data on what proportion of crimes is being reported to the police, the patterns in the recorded rates of most crimes must be interpreted with some caution. The rate is per 100 000 people in the residential population.

### **Indicator 3: Robbery rates**

As for assault, not all robberies are reported to the police. Therefore, this indicator should also be interpreted with care. The rate is per 100 000 people in the residential population.

### **Indicator 4: Property-related crime rates**

Property-related crime includes burglaries and thefts of, for example, motor vehicles or stock. Again, reporting of this crime varies considerably, depending on whether or not the household is insured. The rate is per 100 000 people in the residential population.

### **Indicator 5: Sexual offences rates**

Sexual offences are particularly poorly reflected in official police statistics. Data remains limited, although there has been some improvement, through differentiating the types of sexual offences. To make sense of the officially recorded rates of sexual offences, large-scale specialised surveys are needed (Vetten, 2014). Patterns and trends in recorded rates of sexual offences should therefore be interpreted with extreme care.

### **Indicator 6: Public/collective violence rates**

Comprehensive data for this indicator is not yet available on a national or city level but is currently under development.<sup>5</sup> The nature of public or collective violence is also context-sensitive, and so further research is necessary at city level.

### **Indicator 7: Police activity**

Police-detected crimes may include the illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, drug-related crime and driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Here, the indicator covers driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs per 100 000 people in the residential population. Police activity rates are related to police capacity and motivation, and (unlike the other objective indicators of crime), lower numbers signal that police are failing to get out on the street and prioritise these crimes. Nevertheless, this indicator is not a perfect measure of police

3 Data available on the SCODA data platform <http://scoda.co.za>

4 Data available on the Statistics South Africa Nesstar data platform <http://interactive.statssa.gov.za:8282/webview/>

5 See e.g. <https://www.issafrica.org/crimehub/public-violence>

activity levels, as it does not reflect, for example, the quality of investigations and station-level performance. This indicator overlaps somewhat with Indicator 21 (access to alcohol, drugs and firearms), as it also reflects the extent to which people are driving under the influence.

#### **Indicator 8: Experience of crime/violence**

This is the proportion of respondents in each municipality who said that their household had been a victim of any crime in the last 12 months. Data comes from the most up-to-date research from Stats SA, the 2016 annual Community Survey.

#### **Indicator 9: Feelings of safety/fear of crime**

This is the proportion of respondents in each municipality who said that they would feel either “a bit unsafe” or “very unsafe” walking alone in their neighbourhood during the day or at night. The data is from the 2016 Community Survey. This data is not currently available at city level but could be provided if the National Victims of Crime Survey were to be extended.

#### **Indicator 10: Perception of/satisfaction with law enforcement**

Residents’ perceptions of and satisfaction with law enforcement are an important part of subjective experiences of crime and safety. This data is not currently available at city level but could be provided if the National Victims of Crime Survey were to be extended.

#### **Indicator 11: Rapid population growth**

This is the projected annual population growth rate based on census data contained in SCODA<sup>6</sup>, expressed as a percentage of the base population, and is an average for the period 2010–2015. The rate of population growth (rather than population growth in itself) contributes to insecurity, as it can lead to cities’ being unable to provide necessary resources to deal with crime and violence in overcrowded areas.

#### **Indicator 12: Population density**

This is the average number of people per square kilometre living in the city, as recorded in the 2011 Census. High population density does not necessarily encourage higher crime levels but may indicate overcrowded conditions, which are often linked to higher crime levels. However, this is likely to be more significant at smaller geographic scales than at the city level.

#### **Indicator 13: Social incoherence/family disruption**

This is a composite of four measures from Census 2011: (i) the percentage of households in the municipality who had moved to their current address within the last five years; (ii) the percentage of households who rent, rather than own or are paying off, their property; (iii) the percentage of respondents who do not know whether their father is alive; and (iv) the percentage of woman-headed households. These measures have been used in the past to indicate (nuclear) family disruption and residential mobility (Breetzke, 2010) but are by no means perfect. Future reports should refine the selection and/or weighting of the components of this indicator.

#### **Indicator 14: Poverty**

This is the city Human Development Index (HDI), which measures key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and having a decent standard of living. The city HDI is a composite of life expectancy, literacy and gross value added per capita in 2013.

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6 Available at: <http://scoda.co.za>

**Indicator 15: Income inequality**

This is the city's Gini coefficient for 2013. The Gini coefficient is an international measure of inequality and is reflected as a value between 0 and 1, where 0 is perfectly equal and 1 is perfectly unequal.

**Indicator 16: (Youth) unemployment**

This is the city's youth unemployment rate from Census 2011. Although the relationship between unemployment and crime/violence is complex, youth unemployment is a useful indicator of urban insecurity. As the youth are particularly vulnerable to involvement in crime and violence, youth (especially male) unemployment often correlates strongly with levels of crime and violence.

**Indicator 17: Deprivation of services**

This is the percentage of city residents without piped water inside their dwelling, a flush toilet in their house or yard, or access to electricity, from the 2016 Community Survey.

**Indicator 18: Informal housing**

This is the proportion of city residents who are not living in formal dwellings, from the 2016 Community Survey.

**Indicator 19: Infrastructure**

The lack of infrastructure, such as street lighting, walkways or access to sanitation, increases vulnerability to crime and violence. However, no comparable city-level data is currently available.

**Indicator 20: School conditions and violence**

A good indication of the level of urban violence is whether children experience violence at school. Poor school conditions may drive poor socialisation and achievement, which in turn can drive crime. However, no comparable city-level data on this indicator is currently available.

**Indicator 21: Access to alcohol, drugs, firearms**

Although no comparable city-level data is currently available, a loose proxy is used. This is the total of police-detected crimes in 2015/16 (i.e. drug-related crime, driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and illegal possession of firearms and ammunition) per 100 000 people in the residential population. This indicator is not a perfect measure and should be interpreted with caution, as the high rates of these crimes could also reflect police priorities.




## Broader Trends

Murder is relatively consistently defined and well captured in official statistics, and the figures can be corroborated with mortuary reports and other data. Therefore, it is considered a reasonable proxy for violence and crime in general. Internationally, the gap is increasing between places with low levels and places with high levels of crime and violence. Murder levels in Eastern Asia and Southern and Western Europe are very low and declining over the medium to long term, whereas several countries in Southern Africa, Central America and the Caribbean have murder rates that are more than ten times higher (UNODC, 2013).

South Africa experiences some of the highest levels of violent crime in the world. According to the most up-to-date figures from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) database, South Africa's murder rates put it in the top 10 countries worldwide.<sup>7</sup> South Africa's 2015/16 murder rate of 34 per 100 000 people is more than five times the global average of 6.2 per 100 000. Nevertheless, South Africa has considerably reduced its murder rate over the past two decades, as Figure 4 illustrates.

**Figure 4:** South African murder rate per 100 000 people (1994/95–2015/16)



Today, the average South African is less than half as likely to be murdered than they were in 1994/1995, which is a major achievement. A few studies have examined the reasons for such a dramatic reduction in the murder rate between 1994/95 and 2011/12, and all conclude that it is primarily attributable to the introduction of more rigorous firearm controls with the Firearms Control Act (No. 60 of 2000), although causation could not be established (Abrahams et al., 2012; Matzopoulos et al., 2014). Further research in this area should be undertaken as a matter of priority.

<sup>7</sup> These figures are from the most recent year-on-year record for each territory reporting to the UNODC, taken from the database at <https://data.unodc.org/> [Accessed 5 September 2016]. The year is not the same for all territories and ranges from 2012 onwards.

However, of concern is that the national murder rate has increased for the fourth year in a row, representing a sustained upward trend and the first in the history of democratic South Africa. In 2015/16, over 3000 more murders were recorded than in 2011/12. Although fairly small in the longer context of decline, the murder rate increase since 2011/2012 is very concerning given the already high murder rate. These trends (long downward followed by recent uptick) in the murder rate are corroborated by independent mortuary figures (Kriegler and Shaw, 2016).

National trends in crimes other than murder are more varied. Table 1 and Figure 5 compare the changes in crime rates over the long-term (11 years) and over the short-term (1 year).

The general pattern is that interpersonal violent crimes such as assault have declined substantially over the longer term, although some of the more serious crimes have stabilised or even increased over the short term. The trends for violent property crime, such as robbery, are less clear, while house and business robberies have increased markedly. Most non-violent property crimes, such as burglary and vehicle theft, have declined steadily over the long term.

**Table 1:** Long- and short-term changes in national crime rates per 100 000 people

CRIME TYPE	CHANGE FROM 1994/95 TO 2015/16	CHANGE FROM 2014/15 TO 2015/16
Murder	-51%	3%
Attempted murder	-52%	2%
Assault with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm	-42%	-2%
Common assault	-43%	0%
Total sexual offences	-34%*	-5%
Common robbery	-7%	-3%
Robbery at residential premises	91%†	1%
Robbery at non-residential premises	199%†	1%
Carjacking	-18%‡	12%
Burglary at residential premises	-28%	-3%
Burglary at non-residential premises	-39%	-1%
Theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle	-63%	-4%
Theft out of or from motor vehicle	-48%	-6%


\* Earliest minimally comparable data point is 2003/04.

† Earliest minimally comparable data point is 2002/03.

‡ Earliest minimally comparable data point is 1995/96.




**Figure 5:** Long- and short-term changes in national crime rates per 100 000 people



## Latest City Trends


This section looks at some of the main crime types over the last 11 years and compares them to national and average metro trends.

**Figure 6:** Recorded murder rates per 100 000 by municipality (2005/06–2015/16)




As Figure 6 illustrates, over the long term, eThekweni has seen the greatest decrease in murder rates since 2005/06, followed by Buffalo City and Msunduzi. The murder rates in the three Gauteng metros (Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni and particularly Tshwane) have remained below the national average. In contrast, Cape Town has double the murder rate of the other cities and has seen its murder rate rise since 2009/10, increasing by 40% between 2011/12 and 2015/16.

**Figure 7:** Assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm (2005/06–2015/16)




As Figure 7 illustrates, the variation among cities is much less than for murder. Except for Msunduzi, which has among the lowest rates, all cities have seen a steady decrease in the rates of assault GBH, especially Nelson Mandela Bay, although the figures for Buffalo City and Mangaung remain high compared to the other cities.

**Figure 8:** Robberies at residential premises per 100 000 (2005/06–2015/16)




Johannesburg remains the clear leader in robberies at residential premises, with a rate that remains double the national rate. Between 2005/06 and 2015/16, Nelson Mandela Bay went from having the third-lowest rate to having the second-highest rate of robberies at residential premises. Over the 11 years, only Buffalo City remained below the national rate. Until 2011/12 Cape Town remained below the national rate but since then has seen its rate steadily climb to just behind that of Nelson Mandela Bay in 2015/16. Msunduzi’s rate has remained fairly even throughout the period, at or below the national rate since 2007/08.

**Figure 9: Robbery at non-residential premises (2005/06–2015/16)**




Compared with other municipalities, Msunduzi is something of an anomaly, with a much lower rate for robbery at non-residential premises since 2010/11. eThekweni is the only city (other than Msunduzi) to have a lower rate than the national rate since 2009/10. From being the city with the highest rate of robberies at non-residential premises between 2005/06 and 2009/10, Johannesburg had the third-highest rate in 2015/16, having been overtaken by Nelson Mandela Bay and Buffalo City. Cape Town saw a steady increase in robberies at non-residential premises until 2013/14, when the rate started to decrease. Over the 11 years, Mangaung has had the most variations, going from the lowest rate in 2005/06 to the second highest rate in 2008/09, the highest rate in 2012/13, before declining steeply to reach the second lowest rate in 2015/16.

**Figure 10:** Burglary at residential premises (2005/06–2015/16)



Burglary at residential places shows a different picture to that of residential robbery. Nelson Mandela Bay has seen a steep decrease in residential burglary rates, whereas its residential robbery rates have climbed over the past 11 years. Residential burglary rates have steadily declined in Tshwane (since 2009/10) and Buffalo City (since 2011/12) but remained stubbornly high in Cape Town and Mangaung (since 2008/09). The only two cities to have rates consistently below the national rate throughout the period were Ekurhuleni (except for 2009/10) and Msunduzi (until 2014/15).


**Figure 11:** Vehicle and motorcycle theft (2005/06–2015/16)



The theft of vehicles and motorcycles is mostly an urban crime, with the rates in almost all nine cities staying above the national rate for most of the 11 years, except for Buffalo City. All cities have seen a decline in this type of theft over the period. However, despite a steady decrease in rates, Johannesburg and Tshwane remain the cities with the highest rates of vehicle and motorcycle theft, whereas Cape Town and Ekurhuleni have both experienced a slight upswing since 2011/12.




**Figure 12: Carjacking (2005/06–2015/16)**



Nationally, carjacking rates either remained fairly constant or declined until 2011/12 when they began to increase. In 2015/16 they had reached the same level as in 2005/06. Johannesburg, eThekweni and Ekurhuleni experienced a decline in carjacking rates from 2008/09 (2009/10 for Ekurhuleni) but are still the top three cities for carjacking. Cape Town has gone from being below to well above the national rate, with a sharp increase in carjacking rates since 2013/14. Over the 11 years, carjacking rates in Buffalo City and Msunduzi have remained fairly steady and below the national rate.


**Figure 13:** Sexual offences (2005/06–2015/16)



Many barriers affect the reporting of sexual offences, which may also be influenced by trust (or not) in the police. Furthermore, the legal definitions of several sexual offences have changed over the past decade. Only from 2011/12 has SAPS provided sexual crimes detected as a result of police action as a separate category. With these caveats, Figure 13 shows sexual offences in the municipalities between 2005/06 and 2014/15.

Buffalo City and Mangaung have shown a similar pattern in sexual offences rates over the 11 years. Nelson Mandela had the highest rate in 2008/09 but has since seen a fairly steady decrease, almost reaching the metro average in 2015/16. Since 2009/10, Tshwane has seen the most dramatic decline in its sexual offences rate, from 145 to 65 in 2015/16.

**Figure 14:** Total crime detected through police actions (2005/06–2015/16)



Throughout the period, Cape Town has had the highest rate of crime detected through police actions, increasing steeply between 2005/06 until 2011/12, since when it has seemed to have reached a plateau. This increase was largely a result of the rise in drug-related crime. eThekweni also experienced a steady increase until 2015/16. Over the 11 years, only Mangaung has had rates below the national rate.

# The New Crime and Fear Index

This index provides a simple overview of the comparative extent of the crime problem in the various cities. It comprises four categories (violent property crimes, interpersonal crimes of violence, non-violent property crimes and fear of crime) that correspond to four broad areas, which may be of interest to city residents and planners.

## 1. Violent property crimes

This figure represents the average of the city's 2015/16 recorded rates per 100 000 of common robbery and robbery with aggravating circumstances. These are violent crimes but of an acquisitive nature, i.e. the violence is instrumental in transferring items of value. Common robbery involves threat or use of force, whereas aggravated robbery usually also involves the use of a weapon. Sub-categories of aggravated robbery include carjacking and home robbery. Some forms of robbery are believed to be highly organised and premeditated, suggesting that they may be relatively preventable by good policing (for example, by including crime intelligence and effective prosecutions), while others may be largely spontaneous and disorganised.

## 2. Interpersonal crimes of violence

This figure represents the average of the city's 2015/16 recorded rates per 100 000 of violent crimes, i.e. murder, sexual offences, attempted murder, assault with the intent to inflict GBH, and common assault. These crimes are often described as 'social fabric' crimes, as they are seldom premeditated and are believed to reflect socio-economic and cultural factors more than the effectiveness of policing. They often occur between people who know each other and involve the use of alcohol and/or other drugs.

## 3. Non-violent property crimes

This figure represents the average of the city's 2015/16 recorded rates per 100 000 of total property-related crimes. These include burglary at non-residential premises, burglary at residential premises, theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle, theft out of or from motor vehicle, and stock theft, as well as all theft not mentioned elsewhere (commercial crime and shoplifting). These crimes are much more common than crimes involving violence, i.e. more people are much more likely to be affected by them. They can also have a significant economic impact, as they may result in huge financial losses and may discourage investment. Despite being non-violent, one of these – burglary at residential premises – also has a disproportionate impact on fear.

## 4. Fear of crime

This figure represents an average of respondents in each city who said that they would feel either a bit unsafe or very unsafe walking alone in their neighbourhood during the day or at night, according to the 2016 Community Survey. Fear represents some of the subjective experience of crime. It harms quality of life and constrains freedom of movement. It imposes direct costs, as precious resources are spent on protection, as well as indirect costs, as people withdraw their involvement from their communities, education, free-time activities and the labour market. A complex range of factors drives fear, which may therefore be disproportionate to the actual levels of crime, thus reducing crime may not result in a reduction in fear. Whereas recorded crimes can easily be updated for different years (as official crime figures are released) to show changes over time, no up-to-date measures of fear at a city level are yet available, and so this item is static in the index.

To create an index, the city results for each of these four areas were converted into a score out of five, with five representing the highest scoring city. In other words, each score was assigned based on a comparison with the worst of these cities for that item. Figure 15 represents the index visually.


Although viewing cities at this level (in broad categories) may provide some interesting insights, it has two disadvantages: it may obscure important differences between crime types within each category, and it does not provide any causal and policy context that would assist in developing a more holistic understanding of the factors that influence crime and safety in each city (and in parts of the city).

Nevertheless, this simple visualisation may reveal several useful insights. For example, the worst scoring city for violent interpersonal crimes is Mangaung (5 out of 5), followed by Cape Town (4.2 out of 5) and then by Buffalo City (3.4 out of 5). This suggests that a national policy on reducing interpersonal violence in urban spaces would do well to focus on these three cities. Other points of interest are that Cape Town records the highest levels of both violent property crimes and non-violent property crimes, and that Johannesburg records higher levels than its Gauteng neighbours of Tshwane and Ekurhuleni for all categories besides non-violent property crime, in which it records fewer than Tshwane.

Comparing a city's score across categories may also be interesting. For example, Johannesburg's lowest score (3.1) is for non-violent property crimes but its highest score (4.3) is for fear of crime. This suggests the need to emphasise improving residents' perceptions and feelings about crime, over and above real crime levels. It is also worth noting that, although levels of crime vary considerably, the levels of fear vary less across cities. For example, Cape Town has about twice the level of non-violent property crimes compared to the lowest scoring cities, but its level of fear is only moderately higher than for Tshwane (the least fearful city).



**Figure 15:** Index of relative city scores for broad areas of crime and fear



# Towards a Framework for Crime and Violence Indicators

National crime statistics obscure the immensely skewed distribution of crime within a country, city, neighbourhood and even household. For example, the national murder rate is about 34 per 100 000, but the murder rates in major South African cities vary from almost twice (Cape Town) to about half (Tshwane) the national average. Cities need to understand better the violence and crime issues facing them, by improving the accuracy of crime statistics. The 21 indicators described earlier provide a starting point. This section takes the 21 indicators a step further, using them to create a comparative assessment tool for nine major cities in South Africa. Comparing the objective and subjective indicators helps to identify problems that should receive focus in each city relative to the other cities. The 21 indicators are also used as the basis for research into hotspot areas, which highlights the importance of disaggregating perceptions and data to city level and provides a more comprehensive picture of crime and violence at neighbourhood level.

## Rapid diagnostic

Tables 2 to 4 summarise the available city-level data for each of the 21 quantitative indicators, grouped into objective, subjective and social/structural indicators. Block colours indicate how each city fares compared to the others, with green for doing relatively well, yellow for average and red for doing poorly compared to the other cities. These colour comparisons are not an assessment of the significance of the indicator in driving crime in each city. For example, all nine cities have a high Gini coefficient (indicator 15: income inequality) compared to global standards. Therefore, a city that is shown in blue may have a lower Gini coefficient than the other eight cities, but that doesn't mean the measure is at an acceptable level. This diagnostic represents a modest first step in identifying the problems that each city should focus on.

City is doing relatively well compared to the other cities

City is about average compared to the other cities

City is doing relatively poorly compared to the other cities

**Table 2:** The objective indicators of crime (2015/16)

INDICATOR	JHB	CPT	ETH	EKU	TSH	NMB	MAN	BCM	MSU
1. Murder rate <sup>1</sup>	30	62	42	31	18	54	41	48	38
2. Assault rate <sup>1</sup>	353	319	271	279	268	338	493	516	277
3. Robbery rate <sup>1</sup>	445	498	315	318	346	403	241	306	206
4. Property-related crime rate <sup>1</sup>	1140	1805	1080	993	1267	1111	1305	1147	1078
5. Sexual offences rate <sup>1</sup>	72	105	81	72	65	108	150	147	99
6. Public/collective violence rate <sup>2</sup>									
7. Police activity <sup>3</sup>	380	207	164	192	95	183	85	239	76

Notes. <sup>1</sup> derived from SAPS data; <sup>2</sup> data not available; <sup>3</sup> proxy, derived from SAPS data; <sup>4</sup> infrequent; <sup>5</sup> city data



The murder rate is used internationally as a measure of overall rates of violence. Based on murder rates, the two most violent cities in South Africa are Cape Town and Nelson Mandela Bay, both of which have high levels of gang crimes, followed by Buffalo City. Buffalo City and Mangaung lead the cities for assaults and sexual offences but have relatively low robbery rates, unlike Cape Town, which has the highest rates for robbery and property-related crimes. Robbery is also an issue for Johannesburg, Nelson Mandela Bay and Ekurhuleni, whereas Msunduzi and Mangaung have the two lowest robbery rates of the cities.

The City of Tshwane has the lowest murder rate, assault rate and recorded sexual offences rate, while Ekurhuleni has the lowest property-related crime rate of all the cities (followed by Msunduzi). Johannesburg has the highest rate of police activity targeting people driving under the influence of alcohol and/or other drugs.

**Table 3:** The subjective indicators of crime

INDICATOR	JHB	CPT	ETH	EKU	TSH	NMB	MAN	BCM	MSU
8. Experience of crime/violence <sup>4</sup>	10%	11%	6%	8%	9%	8%	6%	8%	8%
9. Feelings of safety/fear of crime <sup>4</sup>	24%	28%	23%	22%	19%	26%	21%	27%	23%
10. Perception of satisfaction with law enforcement <sup>2</sup>									

Notes. <sup>1</sup> derived from SAPS data; <sup>2</sup> data not available; <sup>3</sup> proxy, derived from SAPS data; <sup>4</sup> infrequent; <sup>5</sup> city data

Across the nine cities, fear of crime seems to correlate well with only one crime type – murder. The three cities with the highest levels of fear (Cape Town, Buffalo City, and Nelson Mandela Bay) also have the highest murder rates.

Despite having the highest police activity (Table 2), Johannesburg’s residents experience relatively high levels of crime (second only to Cape Town), and have moderately high levels of fear of crime.

Residents of Tshwane are the least fearful, which may be because the city has the lowest murder, assault and sexual offences rates of all the cities. In contrast, Mangaung has the highest rate of sexual offences and second highest rate of serious assault, but its residents appear to be disproportionately unafraid of crime, having lower fear and experience of crime than residents of Ekurhuleni.

Msunduzi’s residents experience higher levels of crime than residents in eThekweni, Nelson Mandela Bay and Mangaung, but have moderate levels of fear of crime. This suggests a relatively low rate of reporting to the police, as a significant proportion of crime incidents do not appear in the official police crime statistics.

**Table 4:** The social/structural indicators

CATEGORY	INDICATOR	JHB	CPT	ETH	EKU	TSH	NMB	MAN	BCM	MSU
Urbanisation factors	11. Rapid population growth <sup>5</sup>	3.2%	2.6%	1.1%	2.5%	3.1%	1.4%	1.5%	0.7%	1.1%
	12. Population density <sup>4</sup>	2696	1530	1502	1609	464	588	119	298	976
	13. Social incoherence/ family disruption <sup>4</sup>	26%	22%	21%	23%	24%	19%	19%	21%	21%
Marginalisation factors	14. Poverty <sup>5</sup>	0.72	0.73	0.63	0.70	0.72	0.67	0.65	0.65	0.62
	15. Income inequality <sup>5</sup>	0.652	0.613	0.628	0.651	0.631	0.625	0.622	0.642	0.636
	16. (Youth) unemployment <sup>5</sup>	32%	32%	39%	37%	33%	47%	37%	45%	43%
	17. Deprivation of services <sup>5</sup>	18%	12%	17%	21%	16%	9%	23%	27%	21%
Social/physical environment factors	18. Informal housing <sup>5</sup>	18%	18%	13%	19%	17%	7%	12%	25%	8%
	19. Infrastructure <sup>2</sup>									
	20. School conditions and violence <sup>2</sup>									
	21. Access to alcohol, drugs, firearms <sup>3</sup>	843	1816	860	536	585	656	511	464	706

Notes. <sup>1</sup> derived from SAPS data; <sup>2</sup> data not available; <sup>3</sup> proxy, derived from SAPS data; <sup>4</sup> infrequent; <sup>5</sup> city data

Cape Town has a population that is growing more slowly than Johannesburg and Tshwane, and has the lowest level of poverty (as measured by the HDI), the lowest income inequality, and the second lowest youth unemployment rate of all the cities. And yet Cape Town has extremely high levels of crime. So, what is driving crime? An answer may lie in the disproportionate access to alcohol, drugs and firearms, which is more than twice that of any other city. This suggests that access to alcohol, drugs and firearms should be one of the more productive areas for crime reduction policy focus.

Johannesburg's indicators confirm the safety challenges highlighted in the previous State of Urban Safety in South Africa Report (SACN, 2016), i.e. rapid urbanisation and the related problems of homelessness and unemployment. The city ranks first among the cities for rapid population growth, population density, social incoherence/family disruption and income inequality. However, the city fares relatively well on measures of poverty and youth unemployment, as well as informal housing and service deprivation. This suggests that the city should focus much of its policy attention on reducing the negative effects of urbanisation and inequality.

Nelson Mandela Bay, Buffalo City and Mangaung are struggling with opposite challenges to Johannesburg, with relatively slow population growth, low population density, and high levels of social incoherence/family disruption and inequality. However, the three cities also have the highest youth unemployment rates, which may explain their violent crime levels. A study conducted in 63 countries found that inequality, followed by youth (male) unemployment, had the highest correlation to murder and assaults (Wood, 2006).

eThekweni's HDI is the lowest of all nine cities apart from Msunduzi, and only Cape Town rates higher on the access to alcohol, drugs, and firearms indicator. These two areas – human development and access to alcohol, drugs, and firearms – should receive considerable city focus for sustained crime reduction.

As noted, this diagnostic is a modest first step. Future reports should aim to refine these indicators, to improve their quality and usefulness, to begin to track their progress over time, and to focus on the statistical correlations that they may reveal at the city or sub-city level. More research is needed on the indicators for which data is not available at a city level, such as school conditions and violence, as well as crime reported during protests, marches and collective violence incidents.

## Research into Crime Hotspots

As previously mentioned, city-level data (where available) may often mask stark differences in crime and violence levels between different areas or neighbourhoods within cities. For effective city-wide crime reduction and prevention strategies to be planned and implemented, it is critical to have a better understanding of which locations within cities have the highest crime and violence rates. These locations can then be targeted with tailor-made interventions that respond to the specific drivers of violence and crime in those areas. Therefore, on behalf of the USRG, the University of Cape Town, Centre of Criminology undertook research into crime 'hotspots' or 'high priority neighbourhoods' in a sample of three South African cities: Philippi East in the City of Cape Town, KwaMashu in the City of eThekweni and Hillbrow in the City of Johannesburg. The state of crime and violence in these hotspots was assessed through the 21 urban safety indicators described in the previous section. This chapter provides the key findings from the research and relevant recommendations.



## Overview of the hotspots

The three hotspot areas represent types of neighbourhoods that are commonly found in numerous cities in South Africa:

- A low-income community with significant levels of violent crime, including gang and gun violence (Philippi East).
- A high-density inner-city neighbourhood with high levels of crime (Hillbrow).
- A densely populated township on the periphery of the city with excessive crime levels (KwaMashu).

**Map 1:** Location of the hotspot areas



**Philippi East** is a densely populated area with historically high levels of violent crime (one of the epicentres of violent protests against apartheid rule in the 1970s and 1980s) and an exceedingly high level of unemployment, particularly among the youth. Much of Philippi East contains informal housing (mostly shacks) and an inadequate street network and layout, as well as insufficient street lighting. It is an area where poverty undermines social cohesion and impedes the effective delivery of government services (DoCS, 2009). Philippi East is renowned for youth and gang-related violence, as well as drug-related crime, found at taxi ranks, in derelict buildings, streets and open fields. The wide perception is that people staying in the immediate area are typically responsible for perpetrating crime (ibid).

**Hillbrow** is an inner-city neighbourhood that was predominantly middle class during apartheid. However, since the 1990s, living conditions have deteriorated considerably, to the extent that certain areas within the neighbourhood could qualify as slums.<sup>8</sup> Over the past 20 years, Hillbrow has seen some major shifts in reported crime, particularly murder, which escalated between 2014/15 and 2015/16 (Quest Research Services, 2013). The area is notorious for high levels of drug-related crime and various types of robbery.

<sup>8</sup> According to UN-Habitat, urban slums are settlements, neighbourhoods or city regions that cannot provide the basic living conditions necessary for inhabitants to live in a safe and healthy environment <http://geography.about.com/od/urbaneconomicgeography/a/Urban-Slums.htm>.

**KwaMashu** was considered historically one of the most dangerous residential areas in KwaZulu-Natal (Marks, 2005) and, like many other marginalised communities on the periphery of eThekweni, is densely populated and has high unemployment rates. In the 1990s, KwaMashu was a flashpoint for political violence between supporters of the African National Congress and of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and station-level policing was widely viewed as inadequate and biased towards IFP interests<sup>9</sup> (Taylor, 2002). It still contains many large hostels that were built during the apartheid period to accommodate and control black male migrant labourers. The hostels were characterised by violent criminality, the possession of illegal firearms, and informal pro-violence patriarchal governing systems – formal government bodies exercised very limited authority, and the hostels were among the most dangerous places for the police to operate (Pienaar and Cloete, 2003). Although government policy since 1990s has been to transform, upgrade and integrate these hostels into the surrounding communities, progress has been ad hoc and sluggish.

## Definition of crime hotspots

Crime hotspots are ‘criminogenic places’ that are mostly located in urban areas and characterised by high levels of poverty and density, transient populations, dilapidated buildings and infrastructure, and mixed residential and commercial usage (Braga et al., 2012). Such spaces provide opportunities for crime and disorder, increased motivation for criminal actions, and are characterised by weakened social control (Stark, 1987).

Many of these high crime areas are urban and peri-urban ‘shadowlands’, where the authority of the state is not absolute. Some closely resemble war zones, wracked by fierce gang conflicts, e.g. KwaZulu-Natal towns of Richmond, KwaMashu and Inanda in the mid- to late-1990s; and the Cape Flats communities of Manenberg and Mitchells Plain of today. Furthermore, day-to-day police service delivery has often been negated by the overwhelming number of reported crimes and calls for service, combined with incidents of excessive use of force by SAPS members (Bruce, 2002; Hornberger, 2013).

Relatively easy access to firearms in crime hotspots significantly contributes to the persistent criminogenic nature of such places, as firearms may have a ‘priming’ or ‘instrumental’ effect. In other words, the presence of a firearm may lead to an increased possibility of aggressive behaviour (Berkowitz and LePage, 1967; Anderson et al., 1998; Lindsay and Anderson, 2000). In addition, firearms are more lethal than sharp- and blunt-force instruments when used during violent encounters, such as assaults and robberies.

Some studies have shown that hotspots tend to be clustered together (Sherman et al., 1989), but this is not a universal finding. The growing unanimity in the literature is that hotspots are in fact ‘micro places’ (segments of streets, blocks or clusters of buildings) with chronic concentrations of crime that are located in high crime areas (Sherman et al., 1995; Ratcliffe et al., 2011; Hegarty et al., 2014). These hotspots commonly contain hostels, minibus taxi ranks or bars and taverns (shebeens). Bars and taverns have considerable potential to sustain or further degrade the area because they present opportunities for would-be criminals. They have cash holdings and are frequented by patrons with cash and other valuables who can more easily be robbed when they leave the drinking establishment, especially in an inebriated state. Such businesses may even attract potential criminals as patrons (Frisbie et al., 1977; Roncek and Maier, 1991).

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9 Many of these stations had previously fallen under the authority of the KwaZulu Police, with many of the personnel retaining their posts after the creation of SAPS.

## Research data

The 21 indicators of crime and violence, which are explained in the previous section, were used to compare hotspot crime with the city average. For some indicators, data was not available for the hotspots, while additional data was obtained through a crime perception survey and focus group discussions at each hotspot, aimed at understanding how citizens experience, internalise and perceive crime and safety, and their perceptions of and satisfaction with law enforcement or police.

### Crime perception survey

The Citizen Research Centre (Vibrand) conducted the perception survey using field researchers who were supervised by UCT researchers. Approximately 250 adults in each hotspot were asked to complete a survey containing 24 multiple-choice questions that were mostly replicated from the Stats SA National Victims of Crime Study.<sup>10</sup> Each survey took about 15 minutes to administer. The sample selected was based on the area's demographics. Responses were captured in real time on mobile electronic devices, and the process was entirely anonymous. At the end of the survey, respondents were asked if they would be willing to participate in a follow-up focus group discussion, and their contact details, age, gender, and population group were recorded if they agreed. These details were recorded separately to their questionnaire responses, so that contact details could not be linked to questionnaire responses.

### Focus group discussions

Two focus group discussions were held in each hotspot. The first group consisted of 8 to 12 people randomly selected from survey respondents, while the second group comprised 8 to 12 pre-identified community safety role-players from the religious community, government, non-governmental organisations (NGOs)/community-based organisations (CBOs) and youth groups. The focus groups took place on Saturdays and Sundays to maximise participation. Open-ended questions were used to guide discussions. The second focus group took on a more flexible approach than the first group, as participants were encouraged to direct the discussions, while the facilitator ensured that the objectives of the focus group discussions were met. Participants collaboratively created a map to represent which parts of their community were considered safe and unsafe. Red markings or stickers depicted dangerous spaces or hotspots, and green markings or stickers were used to show relatively safe spaces.

### Study areas for the survey and focus groups

The following areas were included:

- Hillbrow:** Berea, Braamfontein, Hillbrow, End Street North Park, Doornfontein (an area incorporated because it is where the GIZ VCP Programme supports the city in a pilot project on safety and public open spaces, the specific park being located close to Hillbrow).
- Philippi East:** Island, Lower Crossroads, Marikana and Klipfontein, Acacia and Marcus Garvey.
- KwaMashu** KwaMashu A (KwaMashu CRU), Siyanda A and B, Emakhosini and Ezilwaneni.

<sup>10</sup> This survey is countrywide, household-based survey conducted by Stats SA throughout the year and published annually. It has three main objectives: to provide information about the dynamics of crime from the perspective of households and the victims of crime; to explore public perceptions of the activities of the police, prosecutors, courts and correctional services in the prevention of crime and victimisation; and to provide complementary data on the level of crime within South Africa in addition to the statistics published annually by the South African Police Service (SAPS).



## Overall research findings

The three hotspot areas had substantially higher safety indicators than the city average in most cases, as Table 5 illustrates.

**Table 5:** Indicators for hotspots areas compared to city averages

INDICATORS	EXPLANATION	JHB	HILLBROW	CPT	PHILIPPI EAST	ETH	KWAMASHU E
<b>Objective Indicators</b>							
1 <b>Murder rates</b>	Murder rate per 100k in 2015/2016	30	74	62	217	42	118
2 <b>Assault rates</b>	Assault GBH rate per 100k in 2015/2016	353	763	319	505	271	440
3 <b>Robbery rates</b>	Aggravated robbery rate per 100k in 2015/2016	445	848	498	843	315	386
4 <b>Property-related crime rates</b>	Property-related crime rate per 100k in 2015/2016	1140	1376	1805	704		606
5 <b>Sexual offences rates</b>	Sexual offences rate per 100k in 2015/2016	72	101	105	225	81	126
6 <b>Public/collective violence rates</b>	No data						
7 <b>Police activity</b>	DUI rate per 100k in 2015/2016	380	281	207	421	164	116
<b>Subjective Indicators</b>							
8 <b>Experience of crime/ violence</b>	Household crime victimisation in last 12 months – city data from Community Survey 2016, hotspot data from our surveys	10%	89%	11%	93%	6%	38%
9 <b>Feelings of safety/fear of crime</b>	Average of responses ‘a bit unsafe’ and ‘very unsafe’ to question of whether people felt unsafe walking in their area the during day and at night - City data from Community Survey 2016, hotspot data from our surveys	24%	57%	28%	73%	23%	69%
10 <b>Perception/satisfaction with law enforcement/ police</b>	Percentage satisfied with police services in area – national from 2014/15 National Victims of Crime Survey, hotspot from our surveys	57%	45%	57%	42%	57%	50%
<b>Urbanisation Indicators</b>							
11 <b>Rapid population growth</b>	The annual population growth rate refers to the rate at which the population is increasing or decreasing (negative sign) in a given year, expressed as a percentage of the base population. The rate is an average for the five-year period 2010-2015. from SCODA	3%		3%		1%	
12 <b>Population density</b>	Persons/km2 in 2011 – national directly from Stats SA 2011, hotspots from our calculations	2696	13819		9589		10235
<b>Marginalisation Indicators</b>							
13 <b>Social incoherence/family disruption</b>	Composite move in the last 5 years, not knowing if the father is alive, female headed households, rental income = 2011	26%		22%		21%	
14 <b>Poverty</b>	HDI 2013 from SCODA	0.718		0.731		0.631	
15 <b>Income inequality</b>	Gini coefficient 2013 from SCODA	0.652		0.613		0.628	
16 <b>(Youth) unemployment</b>	Unemployment rate 2011, from StatsSA (unemployed/ (total-not applicable)	18%	15%		23%		25%
17 <b>Deprivation of services</b>	2016 average of households with no water in the house, no flush toilet in house or yard, and no electricity	18%		12%		17%	
<b>Social &amp; Physical Environment Factors</b>							
18 <b>Informal housing</b>	Percentage informal housing - city data is 2016, hotspot data is 2011	18%	0.1%		11%		7%
19 <b>Infrastructure</b>	No data						
20 <b>School conditions and violence</b>	No data						
21 <b>Access to alcohol, drugs, firearms</b>	Police-detected crime rate per 100k in 2015/16	843	739		1861		814

Source: Stats SA (2011); South African Cities Open Data Almanac (SCODA)<sup>11</sup>

11 <http://scoda.co.za>



Compared to the city average, the three hotspots have significantly higher population densities (indicator 12). Unsurprisingly Hillbrow, an inner-city area, has negligible informal housing (indicator 18) compared to the other hotspots. KwaMashu and Philippi East surprisingly have lower informal housing than the city averages even though they are based in urban peripheries, where informality is tentatively higher. The informality of these two hotspots may explain the comparatively lower property-related crime rates in their areas. Unemployment is somewhat low in the formal site of Hillbrow, which could be attributed to licit or illicit economic opportunities. In Philippi East and KwaMashu, 23% to 25% of the youth are unemployed, compared to the city average of 16% to 18%. Residents in the hotspots reported that they experience higher levels of crime/violence, and feel less safe and less satisfied with the policing service provided by the SAPS than the city average.

Overall, the majority of residents are worried about running businesses from their homes. The fear levels associated with running a business from home are higher in Philippi East (57%) than in Hillbrow (23%), which can be explained by Philippi East's high informal economy compared to Hillbrow's more formal economy.

Not surprisingly, crime is a common subject of conversation, with 80% of respondents saying that they had discussed crime in the previous two weeks. Almost all of the residents (95%) surveyed in KwaMashu felt that violent crime and property crime had increased in their area in the last three years. This is significantly higher than Hillbrow (where about half the respondents felt violent crime and property crime had increased) and Philippi East (where 73% and 63% of respondents felt that violent crime and property crime respectively had increased). Nearly three-quarters (72%) of the females interviewed and two-thirds (66%) of males felt that crime had increased.

As Figure 16 illustrates, the fear of crime and perceptions of safety affect people's willingness to participate in public life and space.

**Figure 16:** Fear of crime stops citizens from participating in activities




## Individual hotspot research findings

### Hillbrow

As Figure 17 shows, between 1996/97 and 2010/11, the annual number of murder cases declined by almost 400%, approaching the city average of around 30%. However, since 2014/2015 the murder rate in Hillbrow has increased dramatically, with reported murder cases up by 77.6%. This increase is of concern, especially as the City of Johannesburg has invested considerably in CCTV resources in the area. Hillbrow has also experienced high levels of property and vehicular theft in recent years.

**Figure 17:** Hillbrow murder rates per 100 000 (2005/06–2015/16)



Crime is a key issue for 85% of the respondents, especially for younger people (18–35 years old) and people earning more than R2000 per month. It has resulted in numerous residents choosing to leave Hillbrow. Half (51%) of the people interviewed felt that crime had increased in the past three years. The main types of crime in Hillbrow include drug dealing (such as nyaope<sup>12</sup>), smash and grab robberies (especially in student areas), mugging, prostitution, murder, robbery, rape, underage drinking, hijacking of vehicles and buildings, and gambling.

Generally, recreational parks are considered dangerous places, where informal workers, hawkers, waste collectors, unemployed youth and citizens, and criminal groups congregate and where people deal in drugs and engage in public drinking and gambling. This creates a perception of insecurity, particularly at night. Most respondents said they were afraid of walking to work/town, going to open spaces or parks, and walking to the shops in their area, in part because of drug-related issues, as “drug lords hang out” in the nearby park and the fear of being mugged by the “nyaope boys under the bridge”. Over two-thirds (67%) of respondents felt very unsafe walking at night. Double the number of respondents in Berea than in other areas felt very unsafe during the day. The most dangerous of the five areas were seen to be Hillbrow and Joubert Park.

<sup>12</sup> Nyaope, also known as Whoonga, is a cocktail of dagga, heroin, antiretro-viral drugs, rat poison and acid. It is a uniquely South African street drug that is highly addictive and destructive. [www.mobieg.co.za/articles/addiction/types-of-drugs/nyaope-whoonga/](http://www.mobieg.co.za/articles/addiction/types-of-drugs/nyaope-whoonga/)

Nearly two-thirds (64%) of respondents had reported their most recent crime experience to SAPS, but over half were not satisfied with the police response. Reasons for not reporting crimes to the police included the belief that the police could or would do nothing about it. Foreign nationals do not report crime to the police, as some are undocumented and thus more vulnerable. Views of the police vary from “the police are taking bribes (tjotjo) everyday; they benefit from crime” to “we should be careful not to generalise against the police because I know a few police guys who are dedicated to their work”.

When criminal incidents occur, many private security officials do not intervene out of fear that they may be victimised or harmed. The majority (89%) of all respondents said that they or a member of their household had been a victim of crime in the past year. The percentage was significantly higher in Braamfontein (97%) and significantly lower in Berea (56%). To protect themselves, 8% of respondents said they carry guns and 12% carry knives.

Map 2 shows the areas within Hillbrow that community members perceive as crime hotspots (marked in red), and as safe (marked in green). The focus group discussion pointed out that crime patterns constantly change, as criminals move from one area to another. Areas that are deemed safe or places of refuge are government spaces, institutional buildings, shopping areas and student accommodation. The main reason given was that these places have natural surveillance, as well as some visible policing and other physical security measures.


**Map 2:** Hillbrow hotspots and safe areas



## Philippi East

Philippi East is the most violent of the hotspot areas in the study and has one of the highest murder rates in South Africa (217 murders per 100 000), as Figure 18 shows. However, reported levels of property crime and vehicle theft are relatively low, probably due to low income and asset levels in the area.

**Figure 18:** Philippi East murder rates per 100 000 (2005/06–2015/16)



In Philippi East, the education levels are substantially lower than in the other hotspots. This is most likely to have contributed to high unemployment and low household incomes. The area lacks community cohesion, in part because of the significant informal housing and population mobility (from outside Cape Town into the area). This lack of cohesion may explain why schools are vandalised for materials and bricks that can be sold for cash, and government vehicles (and delivery trucks) are hijacked and burnt.

A higher percentage of respondents in Philippi than in Hillbrow (93% compared to 89%) said that they or a member of their household had been a victim of crime in the past 12 months. Almost two-thirds of those interviewed had been personally affected by robberies. A tenth of respondents said they carry a firearm for self-protection. The main types of crime include house robberies, sexual assaults/attempted rape, murder, robberies, prostitution, theft and assault (by SAPS members). Foreign-owned shops are frequently targeted for robbery.

The main causes of violence and crime, as identified by community members, are extreme poverty (residents engage in criminal activities to survive), parents who are not active in their children's lives, peer pressure on young people to join gangs and engage in criminal activities, accessible alcohol (at taverns) and drug use (unemployed youth steal to get money to fund their drug habit). Some parents support and protect their children who commit crime because their criminal activities are a source of income for these families. Several shebeens and taverns contribute to substance abuse, underage drinking, storage of stolen goods, drug dealing and prostitution.



Community members and the police know who and where the criminals reside but do not intervene out of fear for their own well-being (and that of their families). Many respondents said they do not report crimes to the police because they fear retaliation from the perpetrators or the police. About a third (33.77%) do not report crime to the police because they feel that police can do nothing because of a lack of evidence. Some respondents believe that the police discriminate against isiXhosa speaking residents, take bribes and act with impunity. Males are more inclined to resolve issues themselves rather than report crimes to the police. In the Island (Heinz Park), mob justice is practised so “criminals tend not to come there and if they do they are in and out at haste”. Community role-players felt that oversight at the police station is ineffective – the Philippi East SAPS station has had a high turnover of competent station commanders, as those who are effective at fighting crime are subsequently promoted to other areas.

Map 3 shows the areas within Philippi East that community members perceive as crime hotspots (marked in red) and as safe (marked in blue). Lower Crossroads (where the police station is situated) is seen as the most dangerous area, while Marikana, Klipfontein, Island and Phola Park are perceived as slightly safer than other areas. Criminals use the “Bompas Bridge” as a typical escape route after robberies. Areas that were deemed to be safe are: transport areas, the police station, NGO spaces, schools and business parks.


**Map 3:** Philippi East hotspots and safe areas



### KwaMashu

KwaMashu contains a mixture of formal/RDP housing, informal/shack dwellings and hostel accommodation. According to community members, criminals are adept at using this complex urban terrain to perpetrate crime with relative impunity. At 120 murders per 100 000, KwaMashu’s murder rate is triple that of eThekweni (Figure 19).

**Figure 19:** KwaMashu murder rates per 100 000 (2010/11–2015/16)



Nearly two-thirds (64%) of respondents have had a conversation about crime in the previous two weeks. Nearly all of them (95–96%) felt that violent crime and property crime have increased over the past three years. Table 6 illustrates the types of violence, crime and illicit activities that commonly occur in KwaMashu’s six sectors.

**Table 6:** KwaMashu sector activities

KWAMASHU SECTORS	TYPES OF VIOLENCE, CRIME AND ILLICIT ACTIVITIES
Sector 1: hostel only	Refuge for murderers, killings, drug lords (amaphara)
Sector 2: Isolezwe and Siyanda , B, C, D	House break-ins, drugs
Sector 3: E, F	Hijacking and small criminal activities, robberies, sexual assaults, taverns, killings
Sector 4: G,H	Hijacking, drugs (whoonga/wunga) distribution, robberies
Sector 5: P,J	Drug lords, muggings
Sector 6: Siyanda A, K, Estairs	Murders, tavern sprawl, electricity theft (izinyoka), theft of metal



Overcrowding creates a scarcity of resources, resulting in conflict and further criminality, which is exacerbated by intense inter- and intra-party (political) rivalries. Community recreational areas are used for drug dealing and other criminal activities, while community members are of the view that foreign nationals bring drugs into the community. Of the males interviewed, 36% said they carry a knife and 7% carry a gun. People, especially women, are scared of going into forests/bushy areas, walking to fetch wood/water or running a business from home. They are also concerned about their children playing without adult supervision and walking to and from school, going to parks, walking to town/shops and using public transport.

Three-quarters (75%) of respondents had reported their more recent crime experiences to SAPS, but 41% were not satisfied with the police response. The main reason given for not reporting was the perception that the police would do nothing about it. Police corruption and collusion with criminals are considered to be very high, while some Community Policing Forum (CPF) members are targeted by criminals and even murdered.

Map 4 shows the areas within KwaMashu that community members perceive as crime hotspots (marked in red). People felt most unsafe at night and during the day in Emakhosini, and the least unsafe in Ezilwaneni and Siyanda A and B.

**Map 4:** KwaMashu hotspots



## Recommendations

To be effective in crime hotspots, any crime prevention strategy or programme needs to address the key contributing elements, which were identified from the survey and focus group discussions (Figure 20). These elements are as follows:

**Absence of 'capable guardian':** A person (or persons) whose presence and behaviour could deter possible offenders from perpetrating a crime. Examples include police, private security personnel, neighbourhood watch members, community members, and even family members and friends. CCTV (that is linked to a timely police response) could also act as a type of capable guardian.

**Motivated offenders:** Persons who, for a variety of reasons, are looking to perpetrate a crime. This typically relates to theft and robbery, but also to rape and sexual assault.

**Suitable target:** A person who is at significant risk of becoming a victim of crime, particularly theft and robbery, but also rape and sexual assault. Examples include individuals who are alone, particularly women and elderly persons, as well as individuals who are intoxicated or unobservant of their surroundings.



**Crime facilitators:** Resources that are fundamental to enabling the criminal actions of the motivated offenders. They typically include weapons, such as firearms and knives, but may also include the transportation mode used by the motivated offenders to access and exit the place of the crime.

**Absence of ‘intimate handlers’:** Persons who could exercise control over the actions of a motivated offender. Such persons include spouses and intimate partners, relatives and friends.

**Pro-crime spatial characteristics:** Places that are generally neglected (unkempt, overgrown and with large amounts of litter), containing inadequate or broken street lighting, derelict buildings and weak neighbourhood cohesion, and are more prone to criminal offending.

**Figure 20:** Crime hotspots – key contributing elements



### Hotspots policing (capable guardians and crime facilitators)

Criminologists refer to ‘hotspots’ policing (Weisburd, 2008) or ‘placed-based’ policing (Beck and Lee, 2002), or ‘situational problem-oriented’ policing (Braga, 2005). These terms refer to when police put geographical areas with high concentrations of crime at the centre of their crime reduction strategies and practices, rather than focusing exclusively on victims and perpetrators (Tilley, 2012). In other words, police must identify places where priority crimes are clustered and then concentrate their resources within these clearly defined areas, rather than evenly distributing the resources over their entire territorial jurisdiction (Braga et al., 2011). The philosophy is that such a focused police deployment escalates the apprehension risk for potential criminals (ChaNEY and Ratcliffe, 2005), and therefore reducing crime in hotspots has the potential to reduce the overall crime rate (Nagin, 2010).

Over the past two decades, evidence from experimental and quasi-experimental studies in the United States indicates that hotspots policing can result in a noticeable reduction in crime, particularly when more proactive policing approaches are pursued (Sherman and Weisburd, 1995; Weisburd and Eck, 2004; NRC, 2004). Hotspots policing operations have also been successful in disrupting illegal firearm markets, where brokers of such weapons were targeted, as was the case with Operation Ceasefire in Boston (Braga and Pierce, 2005). The operation also resulted in a reduction in firearm violence in the targeted areas through a strategy of clearly communicated threats of comprehensive police crackdowns on an entire gang if individual gang members were responsible for firearm offences – known as the ‘pulling levers’ approach (Kennedy, 1998; Ludwig, 2005; Rosenfeld et al. 2005).

Therefore, in major crime hotspot areas, law enforcement authorities should pursue a more thorough, evidence-based visible policing approach. Interventions should be flexible, geared towards appropriate problem identification and problem solving, and be subject to continual monitoring and review.

### Shebeen safety (crime prevention spatial characteristics)

Recent ethnographic research on shebeens in Sweet Home Farm, an informal settlement near Philippi (Cape Town), has suggested that shebeens “are not simple unidirectional drivers of crime and criminality. They are instead complex social spaces that form part of the constellation of risk factors for violence” (Herrick and Charman, 2013: 31).

Research has found that interpersonal violence can potentially be reduced and even prevented in shebeens that have certain design features, entertainment resources, social controls and selective entry criteria (Herrick and Charman, 2013; Charman et al., 2014). Actively discouraging violent norms and behaviours can reduce violence in shebeens (Sustainable Livelihoods Foundation, 2014). Figure 21 shows the signage that was developed for Sweet Home Farm in order to encourage safe practices and behaviour in shebeens.

Therefore, in crime hotspots, shebeen owners and managers should be actively consulted about implementing safety design features, protocols and social practices that have been shown to reduce violence in shebeens.

**Figure 21:** Safe shebeens – norm promotion



Source: Sustainable Livelihoods Foundation (2014)

## Urban upgrading (crime prevention spatial characteristics)

Globally, studies have shown that urban upgrading can contribute to reductions in violence and crimes, but these have not been undertaken in middle- and low-income countries (Cassidy et al., 2014). Recent research into a few neighbourhood-level township upgrading projects in Cape Town has presented mixed results, with some of the upgrading interventions yielding modest violence reduction impacts, but only in the specific physical locations where they were implemented. A study of urban upgrading programmes in three areas with high unemployment and levels of poverty – Freedom Park (Mitchells Plain), Sheffield Road (Philippi) and Monwabisi Park, (Khayelitsha) – found that “the long-term impact and sustainability of upgrading interventions is limited in the absence of targeted programmes aimed at addressing the structural factors which drive and sustain high levels of violence and crime.” (Brown-Luthango et al., 2016: 1–2). However, robberies declined significantly within Harare (Khayelitsha) following the VPUU business development upgrading and other crime prevention interventions in this small area (Krause and Shay, 2016). The VPUU approach applies participatory design methodologies to find solutions for specified contexts. The local community and stakeholders are pulled together to develop Community Action Plans that are prioritised based on the socio-political settings and budget for that area. In this regard, similar upgrading approaches and models could be pursued in hotspot areas.

## Community Police Forums and neighbourhood watch organisations

The traditional narrow view of CPFs and neighbourhood watches (NHWs) is that they are simply providing a supportive role to SAPS, i.e. they assist by reporting suspicious persons to the police and/or ensuring the identification and arrest of suspects of crime. However, CPFs and NHWs can make innovative and accountable contributions to improving safety (Centre of Criminology, Safety and Violence Initiative, 2016), by harnessing the capacities and resources of those within the community. This is a ‘whole-of-society’ approach to improving safety, which essentially recognises that the causes of crime are complex and diverse and therefore require multiple solutions.

Originally designed to promote community-police relations, CPFs have been found to serve as a conduit through which a diverse range of state and non-state entities from a community are mobilised to solve problems within the community. Similarly, NHWs can take on a diversity of roles as and when needed aside from a simple patrol function where they serve as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the public police or private security. For instance, in some communities, NHWs may become involved in solving problems at street level and providing solutions such as altering spaces, victim support, dispute resolution services or filling a guardianship role which may be lacking. This is particularly pertinent for identifying and resolving unsafe hotspots where the underlying causes are complex and may require flexibility in the proposed solutions.

Therefore, CPFs and NHWs should be encouraged to adopt a flexible, whole-of-society role within communities. Those CPFs and NHWs that are already fulfilling such a role could be incentivised to provide peer-to-peer, on-the-ground training. UCT’s Centre of Criminology is currently involved in a project funded by the Department of Community Safety, Provincial Government of the Western Cape, which is developing regulations to guide CPFs and NHWs based on a whole-of-society approach.

## Common themes from the focus groups and surveys

Each area has its specific problems and unique context and, as shown by the VPUU work in Khayelitsha, the affected community may often already have the solution to their problems. However, some common themes of what is needed emerged from the focus groups and surveys in the three hotspots.

## Education and information dissemination

A common theme to emerge across all hotspots was the need for education because the “lack of information creates ignorance in the community” (Philippi East participant). In particular, “Community Safety departments should educate people” so that they follow up on cases they have opened (Hillbrow participant), and “Correctional Services and the Justice System must come to the grassroots level to educate and make the ordinary people to be familiar with the laws” (Hillbrow participant). The community should be informed about community services and vocational opportunities, as well as employment-related interventions. “Many people do not work in the hostel; this makes people resort to negative ways of getting money” (KwaMashu participant).

## Youth programmes

Young people – particularly young men – are the majority of both perpetrators and victims of violence and crime, especially in areas of high unemployment. For example, a participant in KwaMashu noted that “young boys of 15 years would try to rob people”. Therefore, interventions that target the youth are important. “We need to run youth projects and include the local businesses to take initiative in getting the youths busy and out of the streets” (Philippi East participant). Some of the ideas proposed included after-school programmes, sport and cultural activities, a functioning and inclusive Youth Crime Prevention Desk, and diversion programmes for young unemployed males and recidivists.

## Infrastructure and connectivity

In common with most townships, the lack of connectivity and infrastructure (especially safe, regular public transport services) contributes to the socio-economic challenges that result in violence and crime. It starts with the environment, from clearing bushes and areas that could attract crime to addressing comments such as “there is nothing pretty in our area” (Philippi East participant) as well fixing streetlights and street names so the police can navigate to incident scenes quickly. In addition, economic centres, recreational facilities and information hubs/government departments are not easily accessible – “home affairs, traffic department must be closer [...] even social development offices are in town and far from the townships” (Philippi East participant). Also needed is “vukuzenzele”<sup>13</sup> (Philippi East participant) and greater research into KwaMashu informal economies. A concern raised was the difficulty in accessing information and skills development, as “the available resources of this kind have a lot of red tape” (Philippi East participant).

## Visible policing and law enforcement

Greater police visibility and the enforcement of laws can help deal with violence and crime. “We want more police visibility because *skollies*<sup>14</sup> move in numbers – we cannot win the battle on our own” (Philippi East participant). “Police visibility lacks in our area, they also take a long time to come when there is a crisis” (KwaMashu participant). Taverns and drug houses were highlighted as particular problems. “Liquor licence regulations must be adhered to by enforcing bylaws” (Hillbrow participant). “Illegal taverns must be removed [...] drug houses must be raided” (KwaMashu participant). More broadly, there is a need for investigations into organised crime, gangs and black market distribution networks. The participants from Hillbrow raised the need for CCTV and behavioural analytics for social intervention and information dissemination: “In each street there should be a camera” (Hillbrow participant).

<sup>13</sup> opportunities for being an entrepreneur

<sup>14</sup> South African term describing a petty criminal or a gangster.

## Community policing

Community policing must include reduction strategies, such as problem-oriented policing, hotspots policing and focused deterrence approaches, in order to be effective in crime prevention. A multi-stakeholder approach is needed: “SAPS and the Justice Department must be part of crime intervention interventions” (Hillbrow participant), as should the community because “police do not know the township the way we know[. However,] if we work together we can be more effective” (Philippi East participant). In addition, community members fear for their lives when they are on patrol: the neighbourhood watch cannot be expected to use “batons against guns”; we need to “work hand in hand with the police” (Philippi East participant), especially to get rid of guns. “There are guns all over our township. For every three people you meet one of them has an illegal gun with them” (Philippi East participant).

In KwaMashu, trust in the police was a significant issue for participants, with the general sentiment being that police need to be trained in people management and community relationships. “We need to reshape the look on the police, police need to be friendly to the communities instead of being looked at as enemies” (KwaMashu participant). Street committees were seen as effective, being on every street, but they have since “collapsed due to political changes and councillors” (KwaMashu participant). One suggestion was to engage private security companies to assist: “At Phoenix there is a group of security organisation that works better than police. I do not know if they pay for that kind of service but it works for them. If the government can help us with a service of that kind it would reduce pressure from the police” (KwaMashu participant).

## Police corruption

Police corruption and involvement in criminal activities need to be investigated and an anonymous reporting channel for citizens created. “They do many dealings with criminals; the community needs to know where to report the police. Not to report a corrupt police to another police because you cannot report SATAN to the DEVIL” (KwaMashu participant).

KwaMashu faces the additional problem of political infighting and intolerance, although some projects are already in process to address this issue, e.g. the establishment of Multi-Disciplinary Forums and the “5 Aside” Political Forum.

## Conclusion

The survey and focus group discussions in the three hotspots clearly demonstrate a number of trends that are consistent with literature on crime in South Africa. Identifying and understanding the determinants (and perceptions) of crime and violence - and the various correlations between these determinants - could assist in reducing the overall levels of crime in each city and improving the opportunities and safety of city residents. The three neighbourhoods observed (KwaMashu, Hillbrow and Philippi East) have particular contexts that create opportunities for intervention. The identification of the connections between crime and indicators across cities requires significant detail, analysis, juxtaposition and evidence. Unfortunately these are often lacking in the current system of data collection.

Comparing these cities, and the particular precincts within the cities, has proven difficult. KwaMashu is a relatively new precinct, with strong historical disenfranchisement, experiencing a fairly steady amount of crime and politically driven violence. Philippi East is by far the most violent precinct, within a more violent city dealing with high levels of informality and exclusion. The outlier is Hillbrow, which was previously a middle to upper class area that has experienced various shifts in its crime over the past 10 years – the last year saw a spike in murder and other crime types that reflect the area’s general development and interventions.

A measure of the sense of security is usually found in positive perceptions of the police, but this was only nominal in the three cities. Participants predominantly mistrust the police most of whom are thought to be corrupt or colluding with criminals. In addition, most participants have unsatisfactory service experiences with the police, with negative consequences for reporting crime rates. Participants felt that more visible and competently trained law enforcement could lead to more active public and community participation.

From a gender perspective, in the last 12 months, women were less likely than men to have experienced a crime. Males were also the greatest perpetrators of crime. Most households were of the view that violent crimes in their areas had increased in the past three years and that crimes were committed because of drugs.

Crime largely affects individuals in the middle of the income distribution of the sample, and this is true for crime in each city. However, this does not mean that crime predominantly affects the middle class. Because the income distribution (both in this sample and nationally) is skewed towards the lower end, crime principally affects the poor and lower portions of the middle class in these cities. This means that individuals with very low levels of income are less likely to be victims of crime, probably because they are less desirable targets for property crime. Individuals and householders that have very high levels of income are better able to protect themselves against crime (e.g. have sophisticated armed response systems) and are less likely to frequent areas most affected by crime.

What this research has highlighted is the need for more reliable city data collection as well as annual surveys conducted in high-risk areas in order to create targeted crime prevention strategies. This would go a long way to identify the nature and dynamics of unsafe and insecure neighbourhoods, with the aim of reducing high rates of crime and violence in South African cities.







## PRACTICES

An important part of the USRG's work is to share experiences and communicate with members and other stakeholders. To this end, over the past year, two member cities (Johannesburg and eThekweni) shared their safety strategies. The USRG informed city and national stakeholders about urban safety at quarterly presentations to the City Budget Forum (CBF) and organised an Infrastructure Dialogue on the theme of urban safety, focusing specifically on public spaces.

### City-wide Safety Strategies

The discourse on 'safe cities' has moved from focusing solely on crime and violence to looking at a multitude of factors that contribute to the well-being of city residents. It means looking at structural and social risk factors, mobility and transport-related considerations, and environmental and man-made hazards, in addition to crime and violence realities in the city. Therefore, safety cannot be simply a policing responsibility: it requires local government to play a critical role. This requires cities to develop city-wide safety strategies that link to their broader objectives of service delivery and integrated urban development. Johannesburg and eThekweni are two USRG member cities that have shared their respective city safety strategies, which are summarised below.



## The Joburg City Safety Strategy

The City of Johannesburg's first integrated safety strategy, the 2003 Joburg City Safety Strategy (JCSS) and its implementation plan, reflect a multi-disciplinary and multi-agency approach to addressing urban safety. The strategy was updated in 2006 and again in 2015, to reflect significant changes within the municipality and the broader city environment, as well as the renewed emphasis on the importance of the role of local government in implementing localised solutions to city safety.

The JCSS provides a framework to guide future interventions and planning. The revised JCSS aims to support the further institutionalisation of city safety by drawing on specific safety-related insights that have emerged from practice within the City of Joburg (CoJ). This ensures interventions are founded on accurate, real-time data, thus strengthening key inter-agency initiatives. Other actions needed are the shifting of the image of Johannesburg as an unsafe city, tackling the underlying causes of poor safety and the improvement of citizens' experience of city safety and delivery by safety-related role-players.

In revising the JCSS, a comprehensive process was followed: (i) an independent assessment of the JCSS implementation in relation to the CoJ strategic initiatives, and delivery commitments, priorities and approaches; (ii) research into legislation, policy and strategies, as well as best local and international practices; (iii) a series of roundtable discussions involving senior practitioners and officials from the city's departments and external parties immersed in the field of safety, such as advocacy groups, delivery agencies, researchers and NGOs.

The growth of a safe city hinges on the involvement of role-players from multiple sectors – the responsibility does not rest with the CoJ alone. Similarly, within the CoJ itself, safety is not solely the domain of traditional 'safety' service providers such as Public Safety (covering the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department, Emergency Management Services and Disaster Management). This is because the city's safety-related mandate draws on a range of functions and competencies, as Figure 23 illustrates.



**Figure 23:** The CoJ’s safety-related mandate – as local government



Such a mandate requires an integrated approach with strong inter-departmental and intergovernmental cooperation. While the areas of accountability detailed in Figure 23 may not be new, the key question is how the CoJ can deliver on its duties in a way that fundamentally shifts the experience of city safety (e.g. when addressing roadblocks, enforcing speed limits, enforcing by-laws and responding to development applications).

Although some of the approaches and mechanisms included within the original JCSS remain valid, the analysis highlighted various needs:


- To focus on city safety strategy, operational practices and resources in a way that accommodates and appropriately addresses emerging priorities and changing urban safety realities.
- To base cross-city planning processes, decisions and resource allocations relating to safety issues on accurate and current statistics, insights and analysis.
- To target operational ‘safer city’ efforts at geographically specific priorities.
- To establish a common foundation from which all role-players can address challenges in a holistic and integrated manner for maximum impact, given the multifaceted nature of ‘unsafety’.
- To emphasise priorities that have a fundamental impact on citizens’ quality of life and sense of safety experienced daily (e.g. high levels of street crime and aggravated robberies. These short-term interventions can be ‘quick-wins’ and provide a tipping point for a safer city.

In determining what should be included or excluded from the JCSS, two key questions emerge:

- What are the areas to which the CoJ, as local government, can contribute directly to improve city safety?
- In which ways can the CoJ play a support, facilitation, coordination and advocacy role with others, to build a safer city?

The revised JCSS calls for the progressive realisation of city safety. Building on the insights from engaging with stakeholders, the analysis of the city's status quo and the emerging areas of focus, the revised JCSS targets three key outcomes (Figure 24).

**Figure 24:** Key outcomes for the revised JCSS



The institutionalisation and implementation of the JCSS will depend on a range of key enablers, as illustrated in Figure 25. The Research into Crime Hotspots (Chapter 2) features two of these aspects: geographically specified solutions and integrated safety planning via meaningful community engagement.

**Figure 25:** Enablers for implementation and institutionalisation of the JCSS



The sustainable implementation of the revised JCC requires several key steps, including establishing institutional mechanisms, with strong internal support from the City Manager, other role-players and a pool of external stakeholders over time. This support base must foster excitement, build confidence in the ability of all role-players to deliver, and convey the message that city safety is a non-negotiable priority for all.

## The Durban Safer Cities Programme

The eThekweni Municipality established the Safer Cities project in 2000 in collaboration with UN-Habitat. Since 2011, the municipality has fully institutionalised the safer city approach, by integrating its Safer Cities unit into the main budget of the Council and creating a dedicated Department of Safety. This department is housed within the Safety and Security cluster and is directed by a Deputy City Manager.

The city’s long-term objective for safety is that all those who live, work and play in Durban feel and are safe in private and public spaces. Its short-, medium- and long-term targets are to reduce violent crime by half by 2020, by 75% by 2050 and by 90% by 2060.

The Durban Safer Cities Programme advances its core objectives through a mix of activities that are based on the broad and integrated strategic objectives of effective policing, targeted social crime prevention, urban safety and built environment management, crime mapping and analysis, and community involvement. Activities include research, facilitation, urban management, coordination of crime prevention initiatives, community safety and social development initiatives. The rigorous crime profiling/diagnosis done at the beginning of Durban’s Safer Cities project, right down to ward level, continues to be instrumental in the city’s prevention activities.

In accordance with the eThekweni Municipality Safety and Crime Prevention Strategy, the Safer Cities Programme has identified strategic objectives and outcomes, as illustrated in Figure 26.

**Figure 26:** Key objectives and outcomes for the Durban Safer City Programme



The overall programme is implemented through several city departments, Metro Police, tertiary institutions, NGOs, SAPS and various provincial government departments, alongside the political championship of the Executive Mayor.

The programme adopts an area-based management approach within five geographical areas:

- INK (Inanda, Ntuzuma and KwaMashu), which has a population of 700 000;
- the South Durban Basin with around 400 000 residents;
- iTRUMP (Inner Thekwini Regeneration Urban Management Programme) located in the inner city, where students are the main residents and 600 000 persons are in transit daily;
- KACHOMENA with a population of around 300 000;
- a rural area containing 37% of the Durban population (around one million people).

An Area Manager coordinates each of the five zones, while the 15 members of the Safer Cities team work as facilitators, coordinating the strategy, collecting data and analysing crime statistics. The Safer City team works with implementation partners that are mainly NGOs and active local associations or institutions. In addition, the Safer City team guides and encourages collaboration, generates opportunities to co-create methodologies and set priorities, and provides training and capacity building.

The crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) approach has been used in iTRUMP and South Durban Basin, with the addition of social crime prevention and participation aspects. In other words, CPTED is not used simply as an instrument to discourage crime through environmental design, but challenges historical segregation and embeds community participation as a core element of urban development. A good illustration of this approach is the Warwick Junction Project, which is located in the iTRUMP area. This urban renewal project began in 1996: the existing traditional markets were retained and the transport terminal was upgraded. The results included: greater citizen, business and visitor confidence; a return of business investment; improved conditions for women small-scale traders; increased property demand in the surrounding area with the knock-on effect of increased demand for services. Formalising the space has turned it into an attraction for tourism, an educational space for scholars and an example of better organisation of a busy part of town. The space now incorporates a reception centre for street children and municipal and community courts.

The Durban Safer City Programme is a cross-cutting programme that coordinates permanently with other city departments including planning and design, as well as legislation and finance. For instance, the INK area development (construction of commercial buildings and infrastructure) is financed by different departments and other Safer City partners (NGOs, business associations, civil society groups etc.). The programme strategy – “Planning for Safety and Promoting Ownership of Public Spaces” – intends making a valuable contribution to achieving the objectives of the New Urban Agenda. The programme’s long-term approach, aligned to the city’s long-term development planning approach, could benefit especially from the NUA’s additional emphasis on spatial targeting in city crime prevention and urban safety strategy formulation. The programme emphasises the rights of the vulnerable, among them women, children, youth and people with disabilities, and their prioritisation through inclusive urban design (e.g. Warwick Junction project that was achieved through a participatory process). Social justice is also a core aspect and is ensured through an emphasis on open and accessible public spaces.

## USRG Policy Briefs

In 2014/15, the USRG was invited to present on a quarterly basis to the City Budget Forum (CBF), to inform city and national stakeholders of urban safety, in particular the role of cities and challenges they face in fulfilling the safety function.

In 2016/17, the USRG presented four urban safety briefs to the CBF:

- *More bang for the buck? Effective budgetary investments for crime prevention*
- *High time for policy rehabilitation. Local government and substance use problems*
- *Local government safety functions and the question of unfunded mandates*
- *Improving crime statistics for local government*

These briefs are designed to distil the state of current knowledge of urban safety and related topics for a policy and planning audience. A summary of each brief is provided below. The full briefs can be found as Annexure B at the end of this report.

### Urban Safety Brief no. 1/2016: More bang for the buck? Effective budgetary investments for crime prevention

Crime imposes tangible and intangible costs on national and local governments, on taxpayers, victims and their families, offenders and their families, businesses, and so on. Fighting crime is understandably a priority for most governments and leaders, but which investments are most cost-effective? The brief considers the cost of crime and finds that the cumulative costs of crime are incredibly high. Therefore, even marginally effective crime prevention can make financial sense.

The brief proposes three principles against which expenditure should be tested:

- More is not necessarily more:* Focus on the quality and appropriateness of the strategy in question, not simply its quantity.
- Narrower is stronger:* Proactively target specific crime problems in specific places and/or among specific people.
- Direct is nimbler:* Have strong capacity for monitoring and flexibility, which will tend to mean a fairly short, direct link between the expenditure and the expected policy outcome.

The brief recommends that a rapid diagnostic be conducted of the eight metros based on these principles. In addition, specific support requirements should be identified, particularly in relation to budget allocations and the link to the growing safety-related functions of cities.

### Urban Safety Brief no. 2/2016: High time for policy rehabilitation. Local government and substance use problems

In South Africa, alcohol and other drug use is serious and has worsened over the past 20 years. The World Health Organisation (WHO) estimates that 15% of the population has a substance abuse problem. The country is now considered to host the largest and most diversified African market for illegal substances, both for transshipment purposes and domestic use. Substance abuse imposes a range of costs on communities and city governments. The brief reflects on appropriate local government roles and responsibilities around substance abuse problems. It refers extensively to the National Drug Master Plan 2013–2017 (NDMP), which has had limited impact, especially locally, with cities yet to take up several of its recommendations.

The NDMP mandates Mayors to establish Local Drug Action Committees (LDACs) that meet NDMP recommendations, and the municipal council must determine the LDAC's policy principles, participants, meeting schedule and budgetary allocation. LDACs must be composed of the concerned municipal departments, NGOs, CBOs and faith-based organisations, and commit to evidence-based policy measures, encourage cooperation between city leaders, ensure good and up-to-date knowledge (research), and have a balanced policy approach.

Cities can be creative leaders in shaping policies around illegal drugs. The three policy approaches that should be considered are:

- i. Demand reduction: reducing the need or desire for the substance, by creating alternatives and raising awareness.
- ii. Supply reduction: reducing the availability of substances by enforcing existing regulations and having all actors work together to reduce availability.
- iii. Harm reduction: reducing the negative impact of the substances already being used, through treatment centres and measures that allow for safer use of alcohol and other drugs.

## Urban Safety Brief no. 3/2016: Local government safety functions and the question of unfunded mandates

Local government in South Africa is under significant pressure to deliver an array of services but is limited by both its mandate and its financial capacity, even if communities see these services to be a priority. Defining exactly what are unfunded mandates has been the subject of much discussion and debate. The brief deliberates the question of whether or not local government's provision of safety and security services is an unfunded mandate. Such an unfunded mandate would exist if local governments were obliged to deliver safety services, such as policing or social crime prevention programmes, in addition to what has been legislated as their functions and where they do not have the resources to do so.

The brief recommends that local government community safety policy makers:

- i. Seek to define more clearly the role of local government in social crime prevention, in relation to national or provincial government. This should include a clearer understanding of which level of government deals with which forms of social crime prevention.
- ii. Engage with national and provincial policy makers on the issue of boundary alignment, as a key prerequisite for local governments to perform their designated functions effectively in coordination with other levels of government.
- iii. Emphasise to national and provincial government that, if local government is to take on a meaningful coordination role for community safety, other entities (most notably SAPS) must align with the local community safety and crime prevention priorities.
- iv. Focus on implementing and assessing the costs and benefits of current or future social crime prevention programmes, including analysing current levels of crime in specific areas and targeting those most susceptible to local government intervention.



## Urban Safety Brief no. 1/2017: Improving crime statistics for local government

Reliable crime statistics can help cities deliver more effective services and target areas and programmes where resources could be most useful. However, the management structures of South African cities do not have access to regular, reliable, context-specific and real-time crime data. This means that city authorities make decisions related to safety and security without accurate data, which not only undermines the effectiveness of policy decisions and interventions, but also makes monitoring and evaluation virtually impossible. The brief considers what local governments can do to improve the quality and usefulness of crime data, which could improve the effectiveness of all essential city services.

Although cities are not directly responsible for many of the more formal policing aspects of ensuring their residents' safety, they can invest in developing urban crime data, including improving the usefulness to cities of existing SAPS statistics.

The brief makes the following recommendations to city authorities:

- i. Lobby the Minister of Police and the Statistician-General to request that city-level crime data is provided quarterly for each city (and each ward within each city).
- ii. Develop data collection techniques and templates (in consultation with Stats SA and local universities) that will generate more detailed, regular and reliable ward-level data on crime and safety complementing SAPS data.
- iii. Establish partnerships with reputable CBOs and NGOs, hospitals/clinics and private security companies that collect (or have the capacity to collect) crime-related data.
- iv. Investigate the suitability of existing technology and software for gathering and analysing crime data.
- v. Establish partnerships with local universities to develop predictive statistical models on crime and safety that will ensure more effective decision-making and monitoring and evaluation.

An exciting outcome of the USRG's interaction with the CBF is the proposal to create a working group to focus on the issue of urban safety. This idea, which CBF members must still discuss and conceptualise in greater detail, emerged following the discussion about substance abuse and the role of cities.



# Infrastructure Dialogues

The Infrastructure Dialogues are convened by the SACN, together with the National Business Initiative, the Development Bank of Southern Africa, the Economic Development Department and the Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Department in the Presidency, with Engineering News as Media Sponsor.

The SACN/USRG (with support from the VCP) organised the 41st Infrastructure Dialogue that looked at safety in public spaces. After exploring what is meant by 'quality public spaces' and 'precinct management', it looked at the importance of community involvement and the role of infrastructure and technological development in improving the safety of public spaces. The Dialogue ended with some of the aspects to be considered when developing public spaces.

## SAFETY IN PUBLIC SPACES

**PUBLIC SPACES are COMMUNAL SPACES**  
shared centres of community life and generators of social inclusion

Quality public spaces are safe, inclusive, accessible, green and family-friendly.

Safety is about citizen involvement, interaction and social cohesion.



### DEVELOPING PUBLIC SPACES

Community engagement and participation  
(from planning, design, implementation to  
maintenance and management)



Community TRUST, empowerment and ownership



Sustainable, safe public spaces

Technology and human intelligence working  
together (technology effectively combined with  
actions and enforcement)

Walkability in public spaces creating  
inclusivity and social inclusion



### PRECINCT MANAGEMENT

Public spaces designed and  
developed based on where  
people work, and where and how  
they live and play

Guiding principles: mixed used,  
transit oriented development,  
walkability, inclusivity and density

Involvement of public, private  
and civil society actors

Community and user input from  
the start building trust and a  
sense of ownership, and  
ultimately safe spaces

Building trust leading to building  
pride in areas that potentially  
bring people together in safe and  
communal spaces

PRIORITISING SAFETY OFFERS QUICK WINS THAT CAN  
TRANSFORM PUBLIC SPACES INTO DYNAMIC SOCIAL HUBS

## Promoting quality public spaces

South Africa's vision for cities and human settlements is aligned with that of the United Nations (UN), which identifies several desirable characteristics of cities and human settlements. These include prioritising safe, inclusive, accessible, green, quality and family-friendly public spaces. Quality public spaces are founded on participatory and inclusive infrastructure development, maintenance and management. They require accessibility, accountable police services and effective law enforcement.

The Integrated Urban Development Framework (IUDF) defines public spaces as shared centres of community life and generators of social inclusion and cohesion. During the discussion, the issue of 'private' versus 'public' spaces was highlighted, and how these terms may disengage the communities. It was agreed that 'communal' spaces would be a better term, as communities would be more likely to take ownership. Such communal spaces include not only parks, libraries and playgrounds, but also roads, streets and pavements.



## Designing and managing precincts

Precinct management considers where people work, where and how they live and play, in the design and development of human settlements and public spaces: it is part of the urban development value chain and occurs in targeted areas called precincts. An integral part of designing and managing a precinct is ensuring safety.

Precinct management takes place through different legal entities and occurs mostly outside government and between public, private and civil society actors. The role of government is important to understand. Cities can manage their areas at two levels: a portfolio level (looking at their portfolio of emerging, established and declining nodes) and at a precinct level (focusing on several strategic functions). National Treasury (through the Neighbourhood Development Programme) funds and supports municipalities to establish precinct management plans. It has also established Safe Hubs, a partnership with South African Football Association (SAFA), whereby the hubs are funded 50/50 by Treasury and the private sector. Treasury's five guiding principles are: mixed used, transit oriented development, walkability, inclusivity and density.

Developing public spaces within settlements is important in cities like Johannesburg, where the density of living is increasing at an alarming rate because of urbanisation and migration. People need spaces where they can get together, relax and play sports, in order to encourage social cohesion, social justice and equality. However, as inner cities densify, open spaces are contested, and fewer are available.

The End Street North Park case study is an example of how to design a precinct effectively.



End Street North Park is in the inner city of Johannesburg and was used to test a methodology for compiling a safety strategy. People from communities surrounding the park were invited to participate in workshops, and posters were put up in parks, so people unable to attend the workshops could still submit comments. Planners used the problems and information provided by the community to design a park that would enable activities, ensure public safety and have an impact on pedestrian safety in the area. The top five community requirements were: functional and well-maintained toilet facilities, access to water, free access to the park, soccer and other sporting activities, and free Wi-Fi. People are now using the park, which has become an area for social activation and inclusivity, preventing illegal activities and crime, while promoting public safety.

## Involving the community

Infrastructure design and safety are closely linked, and it is important to include users of the public space in the process of developing ideas and finding solutions. Having community and stakeholder engagement from the start of the project builds a foundation of trust and engenders community ownership.

The Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) programme works in low-income urban areas to improve the quality of life in Cape Town and the Western Cape. In 2006, an unused and unsafe area in Harare, Khayelitsha, between the railway station and informal settlement was identified as a space that could be transformed into an urban hub comprising business and retail facilities, as well as a house of learning, a youth centre, a post office and a public square for parking. The needs identified by the community informed the integrated infrastructural planning and implementation. Completed in 2013, the urban hub is an example of a well-designed, well-managed, safety-centric and internalised public space.

Taking the right approach when providing basic infrastructure can have a ripple effect. An example given was the installation of a simple tap in an informal settlement, which may result in improved productivity, social activity and enhanced quality of life for residents, provided the community is consulted. The first tap was installed using a typical engineering layout but without any consultation with community – it did not serve the community's needs and was soon broken. After extensive consultation, the second tap was installed and incorporated community needs (different height, with surrounding platform). As a result, residents now use the tap and own the space.

## Owning public spaces

An important aspect of safety in public spaces is community ownership. While infrastructure upgrading and technology may play a role in promoting safety in public spaces, sustainability comes through community empowerment, ownership and equity. Obtaining community input occurs in 'invented spaces' (where communities create structures from within), not 'invited spaces' (where business and/or government set the agenda that does not allow the communities to provide input). An important aspect of safety is ownership and management of public spaces, which is not the same as participating in the planning of infrastructure. A lack of ownership will lead to public space projects failing. The Yeoville project highlights the importance of building trust through collaboration and engagement from the start.



The upgrading of Yeoville Park and Yeoville Recreation Centre is an example of what happens when there is no community buy-in and ownership. Despite a successful upgrade, by the Johannesburg Development Agency, a decade later the recreation centre is a wreck and the park is unsafe. Over time different agencies, each with their own approach, were involved in making decisions about and managing the space. However, community participation was not well planned nor well organised, and infrastructure design was not based on comprehensive input from the community.

## Developing public spaces

When developing public spaces, the following aspects are important:

- *Community involvement.* Safety is not about security but about citizen involvement, interaction and social cohesion. People take ownership when they identify with the infrastructure and activities taking place in a specific space. Community ownership also helps with managing and maintaining the public spaces. Developing semi-private or semi-public spaces provides opportunities for improving public safety and public areas, and creates additional value for businesses. An example of these spaces is when a coffee shop spills out onto the pavement, and so a private entity now owns a 'public' space.
- *Technology and human intelligence.* Technology has a role to play in developing safe public spaces, such as through collecting information and observing human behaviour, and analysing and comparing crime patterns. However, technology is only effective if combined with timely action and enforcement activities, and so human interaction is necessary. Technology can be 'central and top down', such as surveillance by cameras, or 'diffused and bottom up', which is relatively inexpensive and makes people feel more empowered. A smart city can enable bottom-up solutions through small-scale implementation, such as free Wi-Fi in public spaces, so people can use a tracking application on their smart phones.
- *Walkability in public spaces.* Connecting people and communities through a network of walkways, walkable places and walkable neighbourhoods creates inclusivity and social cohesion. National Treasury's Neighbourhood Development Programme has identified and supports 22 areas that have the potential to be walkable precincts. These precincts are either emerging (township hubs), established (suburban areas such as Sandton) or declining (typically central business districts).



What emerged from the Dialogue was that prioritising safety offers quick wins that could transform communal areas into dynamic social hubs. However, when trust breaks down between community members and those designing and building public spaces, the result is that the community feels limited ownership and therefore a lack of will and agency to protect and take pride in such spaces. What is needed is to ‘get back to basics’, by building trust leading to pride in areas that can potentially bring people together in a safe and communal space.

A full report on the Urban Safety Infrastructure Dialogue is available<sup>15</sup> on the SACN website and on the SaferSpaces portal. A further article on the Dialogue appears on Engineering News.



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15 Infrastructure Dialogue: Safety in our public spaces: Can infrastructural, social or technological Interventions save us, and in what balance, November 2016  
[http://www.infrastructuredialogue.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/20161116-ID\\_41th-Safety-in-our-public-spaces\\_final.pdf](http://www.infrastructuredialogue.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/20161116-ID_41th-Safety-in-our-public-spaces_final.pdf)





## GLOBAL, REGIONAL AND NATIONAL POLICY TRENDS

This chapter provides an overview of the global and regional evolution of urban safety topics, with a focus on community safety and crime and violence prevention. It looks at the status of safety issues in international urban agendas and considers the latest regional and South African policy developments.

Dedicated research institutions, international violence and crime prevention initiatives, and state leaders all recognise the need for a specific focus on community safety in urban areas. The UN has stated that a safe urban environment is essential for sustainable social, economic, environmental and cultural development of cities and nations. Urban areas can unlock their potential if they are well planned and managed, and address the specific risk factors conducive to violence and crime. For example, reducing inequality or improving access to basic services can provide urban dwellers with sustainable prospects of living.

Cities have taken a more prominent role globally and have been important drivers of change. They have the potential to harness resources, commitment and capacities from different stakeholders (public, private or civil society) for safer public spaces, inclusive upgrading processes or other creative social and institutional crime prevention measures.

The first State of Urban Safety in South African Cities Report (SACN, 2016) acknowledged the many policy strategies and frameworks that already promote an inclusive violence and crime prevention approach in South Africa. A huge gap remains when it comes to implementation. Therefore, this chapter also seeks to encourage city officials responsible for public safety to create their own cross-sectoral, multi-actor prevention initiatives based on existing policies. In so doing, local governments could show that they are willing and able to assume necessary tasks, if supported by all spheres of government.

## Community Safety in the International Urban Arena

Urban development is a highly complex subject. In an increasingly globalised world, cities face ever more challenges concerning their design, overall performance, and social progress as well as economic and sustainable development. Despite the intention of many local governments to slow down migratory flows, young people in particular are attracted to cities. Cities offer young people opportunities for higher education, personal development, employment and cultural exposure. This is especially true for women, for whom the urban environment generally symbolises a less traditional (and much less patriarchal) society that offers more gender equality as well as access to jobs.

### UN Conference on Human Settlements: Focus on controlling urbanisation

In 1976, the first UN Conference on Human Settlements took place in Vancouver, Canada and was dominated by the cold war conflict. UN member states affirmed that the problems and challenges of human settlements could not be isolated from the social and economic development of countries but needed to be seen in the context of existing unjust international economic relations. Taking central stage was the issue of growing human settlements in places where access to essential basic services was difficult. The focus was on housing, health services and employment. Urbanisation was perceived as uncontrolled, resulting in “overcrowding, pollution, deterioration and psychological tensions in metropolitan regions” (UN-Habitat, 1976: 1). The missing urban-rural connection was considered a key challenge for most developing countries, compounded by the unintended consequence of increasing migration into cities. The topics of community safety and crime and violence prevention were not yet on the international human settlements development agenda. Reflections on safety and security were associated with labour conditions or social security systems.

In 1978, as a result of the conference, the UN General Assembly created the UN Commission on Human Settlements, which several years later turned into UN-Habitat, an independent UN programme that since 2002 has been working on human settlements and sustainable urban development.

### Habitat II: Cities as engines for growth

In 1996, the second Habitat conference in Istanbul, Turkey, recognised cities as engines for growth, and urbanisation as an opportunity. While basic service delivery, housing and decent shelter for all remained central topics, new issues, such as urban governance, emerged. The topic of community safety featured prominently in the Istanbul Declaration, the final outcome document of Habitat II. UN member states committed to promoting crime prevention through social development, by supporting local governments in dealing with factors that undermine community safety.



The approach was people-centred, focusing on the creation of liveable spaces. Better education and raising of awareness were seen as being central to mitigating crime and violence while strengthening society. Member states also agreed on the need for close cooperation and collaboration between public and private actors as well as civil society. Women, youth and children were acknowledged as having dominant roles in joint prevention initiatives.

Importantly, Habitat II recognised the need for joint preventative approaches. Equally significant was that, for the first time, national governments and NGOs worked together on the outcomes document – marking one of the first steps towards a long-time engagement between the UN, different nation states and NGOs.

## The 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development

In January 2016, the 2030 Agenda with its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) officially came into force. The principal idea of these goals, which were adopted by UN-member states in September 2015, is to build on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), completing what has not yet been achieved, and at the same time setting new sustainability goals. Supported by all UN member states, the SDGs constitute a new, universal agenda, and local governments will need to play an important role in achieving the targets of the different goals.

As Table 7 shows, the prevention of violence and crime, and urban safety feature prominently in several goals, in particular Goal 5 on gender equality, Goal 11 on cities and Goal 16 on peace and justice. These topics also appear indirectly in several goals, such as Goal 1 on ending poverty, Goals 3 and 4 on good health and quality education, and Goal 10 on reducing inequalities.

**Table 7: The 2030 Agenda goals and targets that address urban safety**

GOALS	TARGETS	DIRECTION
<p><b>GOAL 5</b> Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls</p>	<p>5.2 Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation</p> <p>5.3 Eliminate all harmful practices, such as child, early and forced marriage and female genital mutilation</p>	<p>Directly addressing safety aspects for children, women and girls</p>
<p><b>GOAL 11</b> Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable</p>	<p>11.1 By 2030, ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services, and upgrade slums</p> <p>11.2 By 2030, provide access to safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable transport systems for all, improving road safety, notably by expanding public transport, with special attention to the needs of those in vulnerable situations, women, children, persons with disabilities and older persons</p> <p>11.3 By 2030, enhance inclusive and sustainable urbanisation and capacity for participatory, integrated and sustainable human settlement planning and management in all countries</p> <p>11.7 By 2030, provide universal access to safe, inclusive and accessible, green and public spaces, in particular for women and children, older persons and persons with disabilities</p>	<p>Directly addressing urban safety and the prevention of violence, as well as risk factors</p>
<p><b>GOAL 16</b> Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels</p>	<p>16.1 Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere</p> <p>16.2 End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children</p> <p>16.3 Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all</p> <p>16.4 By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime</p> <p>16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels</p> <p>16.10 Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements</p>	<p>Directly addressing safety and security aspects</p>
<p><b>GOAL 1</b> End poverty in all its forms everywhere</p>	<p>1.2 By 2030, reduce at least by half the proportion of men, women and children of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions according to national definitions</p> <p>1.3 Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable</p> <p>1.4 By 2030, ensure that all men and women, in particular the poor and the vulnerable, have equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of property, inheritance, natural resources, appropriate new technology and financial services, including microfinance</p>	<p>Addressing risk factors that may trigger violent and criminal behaviour</p>



GOALS	TARGETS	DIRECTION
<b>GOAL 3</b> Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages	3.5 Strengthen the prevention and treatment of substance abuse, including narcotic drug abuse and harmful use of alcohol	Addressing risk factors that may trigger violent and criminal behaviour
<b>GOAL 4</b> Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all	4.2 By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys have access to quality early childhood development, care and pre- primary education so that they are ready for primary education 4.7 By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture's contribution to sustainable development	Addressing risk factors that may trigger violent and criminal behaviour
<b>GOAL 10</b> Reduce inequality within and among countries	10.2 By 2030, empower and promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status 10.3 Ensure equal opportunity and reduce inequalities of outcome, including by eliminating discriminatory laws, policies and practices and promoting appropriate legislation, policies and action in this regard 10.4 Adopt policies, especially fiscal, wage and social protection policies, and progressively achieve greater equality 10.7 Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies	Addressing risk factors that are related to violent and criminal behaviour

The UN recognises that “Cities are where the battle for sustainable development will be won or lost”.<sup>16</sup> Given that over half of the world’s population already lives in urban areas, local governments will have a much more prominent role in implementing the SDGs than was the case in the early 2000s with the MDGs.

## Habitat III and the New Urban Agenda

In 2016, the third UN Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development, Habitat III, emphasised the need for climate change adaptation and mitigation, confirming the agreements made at COP 21 in Paris. The South African government actively participated in the negotiations that led to the drafting of the conference outcome, the New Urban Agenda (NUA). The NUA is a roadmap for building cities while protecting the environment. It seeks to make cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable, and promotes an integrated, people-centred approach towards urban development. Prominent in the NUA are the concept of ‘leaving no one behind’ and the calls for effective, innovative and sustainable municipal financing frameworks and fiscal systems. The NUA also raises the need to integrate extremism and terrorism into violence prevention measures, and gives specific attention to the rights of refugees, migrants and internally displaced persons in cities.

<sup>16</sup> ‘Our Struggle for Global Sustainability Will Be Won or Lost in Cities,’ Says Secretary-General, at New York Event, SG/SM/14249-ENV/DEV/1276-HAB/217, 23 April 2012, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sghsm14249.doc.htm>

The NUA considers safety in the context of public spaces, urban mobility, inclusive peaceful societies and ending violence against women. It puts a greater emphasis on cross-sectoral approaches than Habitat II. For example, creating safe public spaces requires connecting urban safety with other objectives such as urban environmental design, health, resilience and mixed use for liveable and sustainable urban areas.

## Looking to the future

Although UN member states officially agreed to both the 2030 Agenda and the NUA, these resolutions are not legally binding on national governments. It is up to national governments to integrate overall ideas and concepts into national law.

**Figure 27:** UN conferences on urban development relevant to community safety, and violence and crime prevention




While community safety is now inherent in the urban agenda for sustainable development, less known (and sometimes not considered at all) are global crime and violence prevention integrated concepts and strategic measures (e.g. on potential risk factors for violence and crime in the context of urbanisation and urban development). This was evidenced at the Violence Prevention Alliance Annual Meeting, which took place in Cape Town in September 2016, where the upcoming Habitat III conference and potential levers were not discussed.

With the resounding, global support for the SDGs, different international institutions might consider joining forces to address community safety and violence and crime prevention. The UNODC, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Children's Fund (Unicef) have each published several research reports on urban violence and prevention mechanisms. Together with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which works in different countries on citizen security and prevention mechanisms, they could become major contributors to achieving targets related to each SDG. Other important actors are the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) and the World Bank, which publishes regularly on the topic in its annual World Development Reports. The World Bank also offers virtual training modules and online courses on theory and practice on violence in cities.



**Figure 28:** UN organisations working on community safety, citizen security, crime and violence prevention



## Global Challenges for Community Safety

Cities generate 80% of the worldwide gross national product and are crucial for achieving national, regional and global Sustainable Development Goals. All levels of government have started to recognise the role of cities and local governments in dealing with global governance challenges.<sup>17</sup> These challenges are interlinked, from global economic interdependence to increased urban sprawl often running parallel with rising inequalities. Globalisation has also fostered the emergence of international networks of transnational organised crime. All these factors have an enormous impact on community safety in urban areas. Crime and especially gun violence are on the rise in many cities globally, while illicit flows of drugs, weapons and other illegal commodities have a profound impact on local security, local economies and social cohesion.

These illicit flows affect cities in the global North and South, but cities in the global South have the added burden of high levels of inequality and weak governance structures. This means that they are often less able to respond in terms of effective law enforcement, well-capacitated police and justice sectors, an operating penal system, rehabilitation and reintegration measures, as well as social crime prevention initiatives. These conditions favour the rise of criminal governance, where transnational criminal networks and their allies undermine or threaten legal systems and executive government structures. Cities are often weakly placed to respond because of their limited ability to influence national or regional policing priorities.

<sup>17</sup> Over the past two decades, international local government associations and city networks have gained substantial influence in international debates.

In addition, parallel systems of criminal governance become rapidly entrenched. Well-organised criminal structures use existing (or create new) area-based criminal gangs, which first take physical control of neighbourhoods before setting their own rules and regulations. Consequently, they may take control of basic services or even deliver specific services. At this stage, the city government withdraws completely or needs to negotiate with these criminal non-state actors. This is the reality in many marginalised neighbourhoods in Latin America, Eastern Europe and Africa.

International organisations and think tanks, such as UNODC or the Global Initiative against Transnational Crime, work intensively on this kind of urban fragility. However, many of the global challenges for community safety in cities are still not sufficiently understood and addressed. As city officials in nearly every metropolitan municipality have reported, substance abuse and gang-related violence are increasing, particularly in certain hotspots (see Chapter 2). The USRG has also raised this problem quite frequently in recent meetings. Research work by the United Nations University suggests that many medium-sized cities are increasingly facing these challenges but are often off the national radar and have less capacity to address the challenges effectively.

For a long time, all government spheres in South Africa have underestimated the consequences of transnational networks involved in the international drugs and arms trade. Strategies have been aimed at addressing mainly policing services, such as the anti-gangsterism strategic police units in Western Cape, and do not seem to be aligned to other local, provincial or national programmes that work towards a more holistic prevention of violence and crime.



# Urban Violence and Crime Prevention: New Initiatives/Dynamics at the Regional Level

Different UN organisations work on community safety, citizen security and violence prevention. However, only UN-Habitat runs a programme dedicated to urban safety and security: its Safer Cities Programme promotes urban safety and security as part of the overall UN-Habitat good urban governance approach. The programme was launched in 1996 partly at the request of several African mayors, who wanted to join efforts aimed at reducing urban crime and violence. South African mayors became an active part of the initiative, hosting two International Forums of Mayors for Safer Cities in Johannesburg (1998) and eThekweni (2003).

Although an initiative of African mayors, the Safer Cities Programmes takes a global approach. It supports local authority leadership and responsibility, promotes crime prevention partnerships and encourages local authorities to collaborate with civil society, the criminal justice system and the private sector. The programme also advocates for the creation of city networks for knowledge exchange and sharing of expertise and good practices, which can be replicated by others. A successful example of such a network is the USRG in South Africa, which was initiated by SACN with the support of the GIZ Inclusive Violence and Crime Prevention Programme.

In 2016, cities in Africa and the UN-Habitat Safer Cities Programme established the African Forum for Urban Safety (AFUS), which was launched in Durban (eThekweni Municipality), South Africa.<sup>18</sup> The creation of AFUS is a step in the right direction and should help to raise awareness among politicians, national governments and other key stakeholders of the different aspects of urban safety.

At a regional level, national governments act through the only inter-governmental body: the African Union (AU), an association of 53 member states. In 2013, at the 50th birthday of the Organisation of African Unity (the predecessor of the AU), the AU adopted the Agenda 2063, which calls for an “integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa”. The Agenda 2063 consists of seven ambitious aspirations: prosperity through inclusive growth and sustainable development; a politically united continent; good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law; peace and security; strong cultural identity and common heritage; people-driven development; a strong, united and influential global player and partner. Although security is one of the major concerns, Agenda 2063 does not look in detail at community safety or violence and crime specifically in urban areas. However, it does state that by 2050 the continent “will witness improved human security with sharp reductions in violent crimes. There shall be safe and peaceful spaces for individuals, families and communities”.<sup>19</sup> Furthermore, it calls for an end to organised crime, the drugs and arms trade, human trafficking and gender-based violence. The joint declaration by the AU Assembly acknowledges the dynamic of urbanisation as an opportunity for transformation.

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<sup>18</sup> See Chapter 5 for a discussion of this initiative.

<sup>19</sup> Aspiration 4, page 7, <http://archive.au.int/assets/images/agenda2063.pdf>

**Figure 29:** Spheres of interaction at global, regional and national levels



## Urban Safety in South Africa: Policies and Implementation Gap

In South Africa, recent policies and frameworks show that national government bodies think progressively and share the concepts that are discussed and promoted at the global level. Adopted in 2016, the Integrated Urban Development Framework (IUDF) includes urban safety as one of three cross-cutting issues and streamlines issues of safety, violence and crime prevention in all nine policy levers. This indicates a progressive understanding of the role of safety in urban development. The emphasis on safe, open and accessible public spaces shows strong parallels to Goal 11 of the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development. While the implementation plan on the IUDF is developed broadly, it allows local governments to come up with their own suggestions and agenda for implementing the framework.

For the timeframe 2016 to 2019, three key actions relate to the creation of safe liveable cities in South Africa:

- i. Develop and implement norms and standards for municipal health and safety services and public spaces in all residential developments.
- ii. Strengthen capacity to enforce planning, health, safety and other land-use regulations and bylaws.
- iii. Develop and implement inner-city revitalisation programmes, including a special fund to support inner-city regeneration and urban renewal in the prioritised urban areas.

The White Paper on Policing and the recently revised White Paper on Safety and Security acknowledge the different global threats and the evolving local challenges deriving from transnational crime and violence (Civilian Secretariat for Police Service, 2016). The White Paper on Safety and Security underlines the importance of integrated approaches and emphasises the need for community participation. It also stresses the relevance of working on potential risk factors at different levels (individual, relationship, community and macro levels) and clearly identifies different groups at risk for violent and criminal behaviour. This is in line with approaches suggested by global organisations such as the World Bank, the WHO and UN-Habitat. It seeks to promote an integrated and holistic approach to safety and security, and to provide substance and direction to achieving the “Building Safer Communities” objectives of the National Development Plan (NDP). The White Paper also focuses on an evidence-based approach, with the collection of data and the generation of knowledge becoming a prerequisite before the implementation of interventions. Monitoring should (where possible) be conducted jointly with active citizens and with public participation.

The strategy in the White Paper is complementary to the Integrated Social Crime Prevention Strategy that was published by the Department of Social Development in 2011 (DSD, 2011). Both strategies promote an integrated approach to violence prevention and the need to bring together new and existing interventions implemented by government departments and civil society organisations.

While national departments try to work on complementary approaches instead of isolated strategies, what remains vague is how local governments could contribute and, more importantly, how the upcoming new tasks would be funded. The distribution of resources still follows different mechanisms and has not been adapted to the recent policies and strategies (see also SACN’s Urban Safety Brief no. 2016/3 in Chapter 3 and Annexure B).

Faced with these obstacles, local governments need to become more courageous and allocate adequate resources for preventative action in their integrated development plans (IDP). They also need to focus on community consultation and participation before setting up any specific programmes. Cities cannot manage such complex challenges on their own. Therefore, it is critical to develop jointly a multi-stakeholder approach, including the police and the departments of community safety, social development, education, housing and planning, as well as community representatives. Furthermore, for sustainable change, other stakeholders should be considered (e.g. institutions responsible for youth and sports), and local activists, civil society, and the business community should be approached and engaged.



What needs to be more clearly defined is how different spheres of government could (and should) cooperate and efficiently collaborate in practice to achieve effective results, especially when adopting an area-based approach. While many departments undoubtedly see the need for more concerted efforts, the existing coordination between departments and different levels of government remains a challenge.

**Figure 30:** South African frameworks, strategies and activities at the different levels of government







## CAPACITY AND LEARNING

A platform for structured engagement, the USRG focuses on local and international learning, exchange and cooperation around issues of urban safety and forms of crime and violence. While the core focus is on South African cities, as shown by the USRG site visits, the USRG also participated at regional and international events, including the UN Expert Group Meeting on Governing Safer Cities and the AFUS Inaugural Learning Exchange. This international participation will better position the USRG to raise the profile of urban safety locally.

### USRG Site Visits

In September 2016, at the 11th session of the USRG held in Msunduzi, participants took the opportunity to visit three local development and upgrading initiatives that have had significant safety benefits.

#### **Regeneration of the Berg Street swimming pool**

Led by the Msunduzi Public Safety Department, this regeneration project has created a safe public space that is accessible to all, and in particular to the youth who may otherwise become susceptible to violence, crime and substance abuse prevalent in the surrounding area. In addition, the community, in partnership with the municipality and the private sector, converted the public open space adjacent to the swimming pool into a park, which was launched on 18 July 2016 and aptly named Mandela Park. Today the Berg Street swimming pool precinct is popular with neighbouring communities and schools.

## Rehabilitation of Thwala Road

Thwala Road is an important node in the city's public transport plans, enabling communities to access the Mbalenhle Clinic, MehlokaZulu High School and future Imbali Library, with ease and safety. Supported by National Treasury and funded through the Neighbourhood Development Partnership Grant, the project included widening the road, to provide safe spaces for non-motorised transport (walkers, runners, cyclists).

## Msunduzi Integrated Rapid Public Transport Network (IRPTN)

Msunduzi Municipality's IRPTN is one of the city's flagship projects and is intended to provide safe public transport through the city. Still at an early stage, this development (like many other developments) is facing the challenge of land invasion. This is an interesting case that requires more in-depth analysis and research by the USRG.

## VCP Toolkit for Participatory Safety Planning

The Toolkit for Participatory Safety Planning, produced by the VCP Programme, is aligned to the principles of the NDP, the White Paper on Safety and Security and the Integrated Social Crime Prevention Strategy, and aims to support the work of community safety forums and the integration of safety into municipal Integrated Development Plans (IDPs). The toolkit was developed in cooperation with government and civil society partners. It is an open source product accessible to practitioners from across sectors and disciplines seeking to understand and plan systemic violence prevention and safety measures. All components of the Toolkit for Participatory Safety Planning in South Africa are hosted and fully accessible on the SaferSpaces website (<http://www.saferpaces.org.za>). The toolkit consists of five sections that provide tried and tested practical tools and methods that can be mixed and applied according to the user's specific context.

**Figure 31:** Participatory impact monitoring





From 4 to 8 July 2016, GIZ-VCP trained facilitators on using the toolkit as a systemic approach to building safer communities. The training enabled users and potential facilitators to determine the application and the components/sections most relevant to their contexts and needs, such as how to leverage community members as active agents of change rather than mere recipients of services.

## SaferSpaces

SaferSpaces is an interactive platform run by (and for) community safety and violence prevention practitioners in South Africa that has become an important source of knowledge about good practices and experiences. It is also a virtual meeting place where practitioners can connect, share knowledge, learn from each other and showcase their initiatives. Over the past year, SaferSpaces has profiled a number of projects and good practices, including the End Street North Park Upgrade Pilot, which is a partnership between Joburg City Parks and Zoo, the Johannesburg City Safety Programme, the Joburg Development Agency and GIZ-VCP.

SaferSpaces continues to champion the key messages of the urban safety agenda by highlighting the critical linkages between national policy (e.g. NDP and IUDF) and practical interventions that can be made at community level and by all stakeholders. It also continues to be a platform for disseminating the work of the USRG.

## Expert Group Meeting on Governing Safer Cities in a Globalized World: A Guide for Policy Makers

In March 2016, the UNODC in partnership with the University of Cape Town (UCT) hosted a two-day meeting to discuss the draft Guide for Policy Makers on Governing Safer Cities in a Globalized World. Like many other cities in the world, South African cities are grappling with urban safety and yet are poorly placed and resourced, often lacking control over dedicated resources. Forty experts in the field of urban safety reviewed the draft guide, which was subsequently presented to meetings of city and other officials in Latin America and Asia. After wide consultation, it has now been officially published and is available on the UNODC website at: <https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/SaferCities.pdf>

## AFUS Inaugural Learning Exchange

In July 2016, the African Forum for Urban Safety (AFUS) hosted its inaugural learning exchange in Durban, at which the USRG launched the first State of Urban Safety in South Africa Report. Learning exchanges are intended to create the space for African cities and local government to share local challenges and lessons learned from approaches used to prevent crime and violence.

The theme of the learning exchange was “Towards Collective Action for the Creation of Safer Cities Vision 2030”. Participants agreed to further cooperation and exchanges, and several specific actions were identified:

- To establish a database of cities and non-state actors (CBOs, NGOs, private sector and academia) working on the topics of safety and crime and violence prevention.
- To publish a compendium on good practices (AFUS and the UN-Habitat’s Safer Cities Programme).
- To document and review eThekweni’s process in formulating and implementing a city safety strategy (Durban Safer Cities), focusing specifically on a future framework for interdepartmental monitoring, evaluation and measurement.



## RECOMMENDATIONS

South African cities face a myriad of cross-cutting factors that drive violence and crime, including rapid population growth, social incoherence (family disruption), poverty, income inequality, (youth) unemployment and substance abuse.

The USRG advocates the need for integrated approaches to address the social, economic, spatial and political drivers of violence and crime in cities. Cities also need to have a clear mandate, adequate resources and appropriate policies that support integrated violence and crime prevention approaches.

In 2016, the State of Urban Safety in South Africa Report made the following recommendations.

- i. Develop long-term urban safety policies
- ii. Develop capacity within local government
- iii. Activate and resource communities to play their part
- iv. Design for cohesion and safety
- v. Promote adequate resources and capacity

This year's recommendations build on these recommendations, while offering some new suggestions for the future.



### i. Ensure that city planning and delivery is ‘crime wise’

This recommendation goes beyond last year’s recommendation of “design for coherence and safety” because all service delivery must take into account crime and safety issues. For example, cities must include safety considerations when conceptualising and planning integrated public transport networks.

### ii. Develop a multi-stakeholder approach

Last year’s recommendation was to “activate and resource communities”. While community involvement is crucial, a multi-stakeholder approach is more effective, especially in a low-growth and resource-constrained economy. Cities cannot manage complex challenges of urban safety on their own, and so must establish strong cooperation, integrated working methods and functional institutional relationships among local, provincial and national spheres and other stakeholders. These should include community representatives, civil society, the business community and youth/sports institutions.

### iii. Push for aligned boundaries

What emerged clearly from the research is the importance of quality, frequent local (city-level) data overlaid with other datasets. Aligning SAPS precincts with municipal boundaries will result in greater accountability and effective safety resource distribution, as well as more useful crime statistics. In addition, the use of metro police data and other data (such as household income, education level, quality of life and safety perception surveys) would enhance the readability and accuracy of national crime data when aggregated to city level.

### iv. Link research and policy making

To deal with drivers of crime, such as substance abuse, cities must ensure that their plans are coordinated and integrated, aligned to policy, have appropriate budgets and are evidence-based in approach. This requires strong engagement between research and policy making. The approval of the IUDF and the gazetting of the two white papers – into which the USRG gave significant input – have laid the foundations on which cities can build, and thereby achieve last year’s recommendation to develop long-term safety policies.

### v. Allocate resources and build capacity

The city IDP must include adequate resources to enable targeted crime prevention strategies, and to monitor and evaluate budgetary expenditure needs linked to policy outcomes. The need to leverage efficiencies is perhaps more important than that of additional allocations, especially given the current economic climate and constrained resources. The USRG has initiated a rapid diagnostic of their members, to identify support requirements for city safety-related functions. Linked to the resources issue is the need to develop capacity within local government. City officials and managers need to understand fiscal processes and resources, legal frameworks and city bylaws, as well as to promote participatory practices and cooperation between stakeholders and intergovernmental departments.

### vi. Align the USRG programme to these recommendations

This would involve linking the recommendations made in this report to the USRG’s knowledge generation/application workstreams for the coming year. Following up on recommendations made would form part of the monitoring and evaluation of the USRG’s work.





# Annexures

## ANNEXURE A: INDIVIDUAL CITY CRIME SITUATIONS

This section extracts the available data on the variables for each of the cities and briefly demonstrates the historical trends in their objective indicators of crime. This colour coding on the full indicator tables (Chapter 2) is relative to other cities, but understanding individual cities' trajectories over time is equally important for informing policy planning. Some of the indicators still need to be developed into continuous measures, so that their significance can be tracked over time.

CATEGORY		INDICATOR	JOHANNESBURG
<b>Objective indicators of crime</b>		1 Murder rate	30
		2 Assault rate	353
		3 Robbery rate	445
		4 Property-related crime rate	1140
		5 Sexual offences rate	72
		6 Public/collective violence rate	
		7 Police activity	380
<b>Subjective indicators of crime</b>		8 Experience of crime/violence	10%
		9 Feelings of safety/fear of crime	24%
		10 Perception of/satisfaction with law enforcement	
<b>Social/structural risk factors</b>	<b>Urbanisation factors</b>	11 Rapid population growth	3.2%
		12 Population density	2696
		13 Social incoherence/family disruption	26%
	<b>Marginalisation factors</b>	14 Poverty	0.72
		15 Income inequality	0.652
		16 (Youth) unemployment	32%
		17 Deprivation of services	18%
	<b>Social/physical environment factors</b>	18 Informal housing	18%
		19 Infrastructure	
		20 School conditions and violence	
		21 Access to alcohol, drugs, firearms	843
<b>City responses</b>		Non-quantitative	Received

City is doing relatively well compared to the other cities


City is about average compared to the other cities

City is doing relatively poorly compared to the other cities

Compared to the other cities, the City of Johannesburg’s crime rates are low to moderate, except for robbery where it ranks second. Therefore, robbery should be a key focus of city crime prevention efforts. It has the highest rate of police activity targeting people driving under the influence of alcohol or other drugs. Despite this, the subjective indicators show that residents experience relatively high levels of crime (second only to Cape Town), and have moderately high levels of fear of crime.

The previous State of Urban Safety Report (SACN, 2016) highlighted rapid urbanisation (and the related problems of homelessness and unemployment) as the most significant community safety challenge faced by the City of Johannesburg. The urbanisation indicators support this finding, as Johannesburg ranks first among the cities for rapid population growth, population density and social incoherence/family disruption. Johannesburg also has the highest level of income inequality. However, the city fares relatively well on measures of poverty and youth unemployment, as well as informal housing and service deprivation. These indicators suggest that the city should focus much of its policy attention on reducing the negative effects of urbanisation and inequality.

**Figure 32:** Long-term trend in selected crime rates per 100 000 in Johannesburg



Over the past decade (2005/06–2015/16), the City of Johannesburg has seen major improvement in its objective crime indicators, with a decline in all crime rates except for driving under the influence: murder down by 12%, sexual offences by 47%, assault GBH by 35%, aggravated robbery by 30% and property-related crime by 33%. In the absence of reporting rate data, it is unclear what to make of the large decrease in rates of sexual offences (which is the case for all the cities). The only crime to see an increase (of 460%) over the decade is that of driving under the influence, which is probably the result of increased police activity. However, of concern is the rise in both aggravated robbery and murder rates since 2011/12. Between 2011/12 and 2015/16, the murder rate increased from 25 to 30, while the aggravated robbery rate increased from 350 to 445. Johannesburg leads the other cities particularly in carjacking and residential robbery.

CATEGORY		INDICATOR	CAPE TOWN
<b>Objective indicators of crime</b>		1 Murder rate	62
		2 Assault rate	319
		3 Robbery rate	498
		4 Property-related crime rate	1805
		5 Sexual offences rate	105
		6 Public/collective violence rate	
		7 Police activity	207
<b>Subjective indicators of crime</b>		8 Experience of crime/violence	11%
		9 Feelings of safety/fear of crime	28%
		10 Perception of/satisfaction with law enforcement	
<b>Social/structural risk factors</b>	<b>Urbanisation factors</b>	11 Rapid population growth	2.6%
		12 Population density	1530
		13 Social incoherence/family disruption	22%
	<b>Marginalisation factors</b>	14 Poverty	0.73
		15 Income inequality	0.613
		16 (Youth) unemployment	32%
		17 Deprivation of services	12%
	<b>Social/physical environment factors</b>	18 Informal housing	18%
		19 Infrastructure	
		20 School conditions and violence	
21 Access to alcohol, drugs, firearms		1816	
<b>City responses</b>		Non-quantitative	

City is doing relatively well compared to the other cities

City is about average compared to the other cities


City is doing relatively poorly compared to the other cities

The City of Cape Town has the highest rates for murder, robbery and property-related crimes compared to the other cities. This is reflected in the subjective indicators, with residents being more affected by and fearful of crime than residents in other cities.

However, Cape Town's urbanisation indicators are moderately serious, with a lower rapid population growth than Johannesburg and Tshwane, and a lower population density than Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni. Its marginalisation factors also compare very well to the other cities: Cape Town boasts the lowest level of poverty (as measured by the Human Development Index), the lowest income inequality, and the second lowest youth unemployment rate.

So, what is driving the city's extremely high levels of crime? An answer may lie in the disproportionate access to alcohol, drugs and firearms, which is more than twice that of any other city. This suggests that access to alcohol, drugs and firearms is an important driver of the city's high crime levels, and therefore one of the most productive areas for crime reduction policy focus.

**Figure 33:** Long-term trend in selected crime rates per 100 000 in Cape Town



Over the last decade, crime rates in the City of Cape Town have been more mixed than in Johannesburg. Although property-related crime declined by 16%, assault GBH by 24% and total sexual offences by 41%, murders rose by 14% and aggravated robbery by 40%. Unlike Johannesburg, carjacking and residential robbery are less prominent, suggesting that the aggravated robbery problem is more street-based. Driving under the influence has increased by about 60%, perhaps indicating an increase in police activity.

The most dramatic increase has been in total police-detected crime (not shown in Figure 33), which includes drug-related crimes and illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. This has more than doubled and is twice that of the other cities. To the extent that this proxy measure reflects the real availability of drugs and illegal firearms, it may help to explain why the city is struggling to control crime despite having relatively good social/structural indicators that are known to have an impact on crime.



CATEGORY		INDICATOR	ETHEKWINI
Objective indicators of crime		1 Murder rate	42
		2 Assault rate	271
		3 Robbery rate	315
		4 Property-related crime rate	1080
		5 Sexual offences rate	81
		6 Public/collective violence rate	
		7 Police activity	164
Subjective indicators of crime		8 Experience of crime/violence	6%
		9 Feelings of safety/fear of crime	23%
		10 Perception of/satisfaction with law enforcement	
Social/structural risk factors	Urbanisation factors	11 Rapid population growth	1.1%
		12 Population density	1502
		13 Social incoherence/family disruption	21%
	Marginalisation factors	14 Poverty	0.63
		15 Income inequality	0.628
		16 (Youth) unemployment	39%
		17 Deprivation of services	17%
	Social/physical environment factors	18 Informal housing	13%
		19 Infrastructure	
		20 School conditions and violence	
21 Access to alcohol, drugs, firearms		860	
City responses		Non-quantitative	Received

City is doing relatively well compared to the other cities

City is about average compared to the other cities

City is doing relatively poorly compared to the other cities


Compared to the other eight cities, eThekwini is doing moderately well, ranking fourth for murder, sixth for robbery and recorded sexual offences, seventh for property-related crime and eighth for recorded levels of assault. This is reflected in its subjective indicators, which show that its residents are moderately fearful (ranking fifth) and have relatively low levels of exposure to crime (ranking eighth).



Interestingly, although the previous report (SACN, 2016) identified rapid urbanisation as a key community safety challenge, it does not appear to be the most serious problem for eThekweni compared to the other cities. eThekweni's social/structural risk factors for crime are average among the nine cities except for poverty – the city's HDI is the lowest of all nine cities apart from Msunduzi. However, only Cape Town rates higher on the access to alcohol, drugs, and firearms indicator.

eThekweni has 13 specific crime prevention programmes in place, including programmes around substance abuse education and prevention, outreach to drug users, education and outreach to taverns, at-risk youth recreation programmes, crime victim support, and dialogues to improve social cohesion. The focus on substance abuse appears particularly well-placed, given the city's relative position on this risk factor.

**Figure 34:** Long-term trend in selected crime rates per 100 000 in eThekweni



Between 2005/06 and 2015/16, eThekweni experienced a decrease in the selected crimes: murder rates declined by 33%, sexual offences rates by 47%, assault GBH rates by 23%, aggravated robbery rates by 35% and property-related crime rates by 16%. However, like Johannesburg, in the last four years, murder has increased significantly in eThekweni, from 39 per 100 000 in 2011/12 to 42 per 100 000 in 2015/16. Over the decade, driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs increased by about 60%, indicating more police activities (albeit from a low base), but has declined since 2012/13.

CATEGORY		INDICATOR	EKURHULENI
Objective indicators of crime		1 Murder rate	31
		2 Assault rate	279
		3 Robbery rate	318
		4 Property-related crime rate	993
		5 Sexual offences rate	72
		6 Public/collective violence rate	
		7 Police activity	192
Subjective indicators of crime		8 Experience of crime/violence	8%
		9 Feelings of safety/fear of crime	22%
		10 Perception of/satisfaction with law enforcement	
Social/structural risk factors	Urbanisation factors	11 Rapid population growth	2.5%
		12 Population density	1609
		13 Social incoherence/family disruption	23%
	Marginalisation factors	14 Poverty	0.70
		15 Income inequality	0.651
		16 (Youth) unemployment	37%
		17 Deprivation of services	21%
	Social physical environment factors	18 Informal housing	19%
		19 Infrastructure	
		20 School conditions and violence	
21 Access to alcohol, drugs, firearms		536	
City responses		Non-quantitative	

City is doing relatively well compared to the other cities

City is about average compared to the other cities


City is doing relatively poorly compared to the other cities

Ekurhuleni is in a relatively good position compared to the other cities, ranking fifth for robbery, sixth for assault, seventh for murder, eighth for recorded sexual offences and ninth for property-related crime. Although, like Johannesburg, robbery is a dominant crime, unlike Johannesburg the residents of Ekurhuleni experience relatively low levels of crime and have moderately low levels of fear of crime.

After Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni is the most densely populated city with the greatest income inequality. Among the nine cities, it ranks third for social incoherence/family disruption and fourth for rapid population growth and service deprivation.

Although the previous report (SACN, 2016) identified drugs and illegal taverns as among the most significant challenges for community safety in Ekurhuleni, the city scores well compared to the other cities. It is ranked seventh for recorded rates of drug-related crime, driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.

**Figure 35:** Long-term trend in selected crime rates per 100 000 in Ekurhuleni



Perhaps unsurprisingly, Ekurhuleni’s crime pattern over time has been broadly similar to that of neighbouring Johannesburg. Between 2005/06 and 2015/16, its murder rate declined by 5%, sexual offences by 35%, assault GBH by 20%, aggravated robbery by 15% and total property-related crime by 20%. However, Ekurhuleni’s pattern of aggravated robbery is different to that of Johannesburg, with lower levels of residential robbery but higher levels of non-residential robbery – in 2015/16 Ekurhuleni had the highest rates of non-residential robbery of the nine cities.

# City of Tshwane

CATEGORY		INDICATOR	TSHWANE
Objective indicators of crime		1 Murder rate	18
		2 Assault rate	268
		3 Robbery rate	346
		4 Property-related crime rate	1267
		5 Sexual offences rate	65
		6 Public/collective violence rate	
		7 Police activity	95
Subjective indicators of crime		8 Experience of crime/violence	9%
		9 Feelings of safety/fear of crime	19%
		10 Perception of/satisfaction with law enforcement	
Social/structural risk factors	Urbanisation factors	11 Rapid population growth	3.1%
		12 Population density	464
		13 Social incoherence/family disruption	24%
	Marginalisation factors	14 Poverty	0.72
		15 Income inequality	0.631
		16 (Youth) unemployment	33%
		17 Deprivation of services	16%
	Social/physical environment factors	18 Informal housing	17%
		19 Infrastructure	
		20 School conditions and violence	
		21 Access to alcohol, drugs, firearms	585
City responses		Non-quantitative	

City is doing relatively well compared to the other cities

City is about average compared to the other cities


City is doing relatively poorly compared to the other cities

The City of Tshwane has the lowest murder, assault and recorded sexual offences rates of all the cities. However, it has the third highest rate of non-violent property-related crime and the fourth highest recorded rate of robbery. This may explain why residents are the least fearful, although they have moderately high crime victimisation levels.

After Johannesburg, Tshwane has the highest rate of population growth and level of social incoherence/family, both second only to Johannesburg. Its population density, poverty levels and youth unemployment are relatively low. Ranked sixth among the nine cities for drug-related crime, driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, Tshwane does not appear to have a relatively marked problem in terms of access to alcohol, drugs, and firearms.

Overall, these indicators suggest that the city is doing relatively well in terms of its objective and subjective indicators of crime and violence, but should see further crime reduction through investing in improving the impact of rapid population growth on social incoherence/family disruption.

**Figure 36:** Long-term trend in selected crime rates per 100 000 in Tshwane



The City of Tshwane mirrors the positive pattern of the other Gauteng cities, with major reductions in murder (down 34%), sexual offences (down 57%), assault GBH (down 41%), aggravated robbery (down 30%) and property-related crime (down 38%). The city has made greater progress than Johannesburg on these crimes, despite in many cases starting from similar or even worse positions. It has seen a very slight increase in murder in the last three years, from 17 per 100 000 in 2012/13 to 18 per 100 000 in 2015/16.

CATEGORY		INDICATOR	NELSON MANDELA BAY
Objective indicators of crime		1 Murder rate	54
		2 Assault rate	338
		3 Robbery rate	403
		4 Property-related crime rate	1111
		5 Sexual offences rate	108
		6 Public/collective violence rate	
		7 Police activity	183
Subjective indicators of crime		8 Experience of crime/violence	8%
		9 Feelings of safety/fear of crime	26%
		10 Perception of/satisfaction with law enforcement	
Social/structural risk factors	Urbanisation factors	11 Rapid population growth	1.4%
		12 Population density	588
		13 Social incoherence/family disruption	19%
	Marginalisation factors	14 Poverty	0.67
		15 Income inequality	0.625
		16 (Youth) unemployment	47%
		17 Deprivation of services	9%
	Social/physical environment factors	18 Informal housing	7%
		19 Infrastructure	
		20 School conditions and violence	
21 Access to alcohol, drugs, firearms		656	
City responses	Non-quantitative		

City is doing relatively well compared to the other cities

City is about average compared to the other cities


City is doing relatively poorly compared to the other cities



Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality's murder rate is exceeded only by that of Cape Town. It has the third highest robbery rate (the highest among the slightly smaller municipalities), and fourth highest rates of assault and sexual offences. However, property-related crime is relatively low. Despite moderate levels of experiences of crime, its residents report among the highest levels of fear of crime (after Cape Town and Buffalo City).

Nelson Mandela Bay seems to struggle with the opposite challenges to Johannesburg. It has relatively slow population growth, low population density, and high levels of social incoherence/family disruption and inequality. The city compares well to the other cities across most social/structural risk factors, especially service deprivation and housing informality levels, and yet has high rates of murder and robbery. What may explain this is the city's youth unemployment, which is the highest of any of the nine cities.

**Figure 37:** Long-term trend in selected crime rates per 100 000 in Nelson Mandela Bay



Over the past decade, crime declined in Nelson Mandela Bay, by 15% for murder, 49% for sexual offences, 51% for of assault GBH and 42% for property-related crimes, but aggravated robbery increased by 14%. The city's short-term crime situation appears to be worsening faster than any of the other cities: between 2014/15 and 2015/16, murder and attempted murder rates increased sharply, by 23% and 17% respectively, while carjacking increased by 26%, truck hijacking by 57%, robbery at residential premises by 31% and robbery at non-residential premises by 6%. If this pattern continues, the levels of interpersonal violent crime may reach Cape Town levels.

# Mangaung



CATEGORY		INDICATOR	MANGAUNG
Objective indicators of crime		1 Murder rate	41
		2 Assault rate	493
		3 Robbery rate	241
		4 Property-related crime rate	1305
		5 Sexual offences rate	150
		6 Public/collective violence rate	
		7 Police activity	85
Subjective indicators of crime		8 Experience of crime/violence	6%
		9 Feelings of safety/fear of crime	21%
		10 Perception of/satisfaction with law enforcement	
Social/structural risk factors	Urbanisation factors	11 Rapid population growth	1.5%
		12 Population density	119
		13 Social incoherence/family disruption	19%
	Marginalisation factors	14 Poverty	0.65
		15 Income inequality	0.622
		16 (Youth) unemployment	37%
		17 Deprivation of services	23%
	Social/physical environment factors	18 Informal housing	12%
		19 Infrastructure	
		20 School conditions and violence	
		21 Access to alcohol, drugs, firearms	511
City responses		Non-quantitative	

City is doing relatively well compared to the other cities


City is about average compared to the other cities

City is doing relatively poorly compared to the other cities

Crime in Mangaung is largely dominated by interpersonal violence: compared to the other cities, Mangaung has the highest rate of sexual offences and second highest rates of serious assault and property-related crime. Yet this does not reflect in the subjective indicators of crime, with residents appearing to be disproportionately unafraid of crime, having lower fear and experience of crime than residents of Ekurhuleni.

Mangaung has the lowest population density of all the cities and ranks fifth for rapid population growth. Compared to the other cities, income inequality and housing informality is relatively low. The social/structural challenges are poverty, service deprivation and, to a lesser extent, youth unemployment.

**Figure 38:** Long-term trend in selected crime rates per 100 000 in Mangaung



Mangaung is the only city other than Cape Town to have seen an increase in the murder rate (by 6%) over the last decade, and the only city whose murder rate has fluctuated within a fairly narrow band. Although sexual offences have decreased by 27% over the decade, in the past four years has there been a marked steady decrease.

Although relatively high compared to most other cities, assault GBH decreased by 33%, while property-related crime also decreased, by 17%. Like many cities, it has fared relatively poorly in terms of aggravated robbery, which has decreased by just 3%.

# Buffalo City



CATEGORY		INDICATOR	BUFFALO CITY
Objective indicators of crime		1 Murder rate	48
		2 Assault rate	516
		3 Robbery rate	306
		4 Property-related crime rate	1147
		5 Sexual offences rate	147
		6 Public/collective violence rate	
		7 Police activity	239
Subjective indicators of crime		8 Experience of crime/violence	8%
		9 Feelings of safety/fear of crime	27%
		10 Perception of/satisfaction with law enforcement	
Social/structural risk factors	Urbanisation factors	11 Rapid population growth	0.7%
		12 Population density	298
		13 Social incoherence/family disruption	21%
	Marginalisation factors	14 Poverty	0.65
		15 Income inequality	0.642
		16 (Youth) unemployment	45%
		17 Deprivation of services	27%
	Social/physical environment factors	18 Informal housing	25%
		19 Infrastructure	
		20 School conditions and violence	
		21 Access to alcohol, drugs, firearms	464
City responses		Non-quantitative	Received

City is doing relatively well compared to the other cities

City is about average compared to the other cities


City is doing relatively poorly compared to the other cities

Crime in Buffalo City is also dominated by violent interpersonal crime: among the nine cities, it ranks first for assault, second for sexual offences and third for murder. However, property-related crime and robbery rates are relatively low.

Its subjective indicators of crime show moderate rates of self-reported victimisation but high levels of fear. The three cities with the highest levels of fear (Cape Town, Buffalo City, and Nelson Mandela Bay) are also the three with the highest levels of murder.

Buffalo City has relatively low population growth and population density, and is the lowest ranked city for access to alcohol, drugs, and firearms. However, the city has the highest level of service deprivation and the largest proportion of residents living in informal housing, the second highest level of youth unemployment, and the third highest income inequality.

**Figure 39:** Long-term trend in selected crime rates per 100 000 in Buffalo City



Over the past decade, most crimes declined in Buffalo City: murder decreased by 24%, sexual offences by 21%, assault GBH by 40% and property-related crime by 32%. However, aggravated robberies increased by 21%. It is one of only two cities that have seen an overall decline in their recorded rates of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, of 1%.

# Msunduzi

CATEGORY		INDICATOR	MSUNDUZI
<b>Objective indicators of crime</b>		1 Murder rate	38
		2 Assault rate	277
		3 Robbery rate	206
		4 Property-related crime rate	1078
		5 Sexual offences rate	99
		6 Public/collective violence rate	
		7 Police activity	76
<b>Subjective indicators of crime</b>		8 Experience of crime/violence	8%
		9 Feelings of safety/fear of crime	23%
		10 Perception of/satisfaction with law enforcement	
<b>Social/structural risk factors</b>	<b>Urbanisation factors</b>	11 Rapid population growth	1.1%
		12 Population density	976
		13 Social incoherence/family disruption	21%
	<b>Marginalisation factors</b>	14 Poverty	0.62
		15 Income inequality	0.636
		16 (Youth) unemployment	43%
		17 Deprivation of services	21%
	<b>Social/physical environment factors</b>	18 Informal housing	8%
		19 Infrastructure	
		20 School conditions and violence	
		21 Access to alcohol, drugs, firearms	706
<b>City responses</b>		Non-quantitative	Received

City is doing relatively well compared to the other cities

City is about average compared to the other cities

City is doing relatively poorly compared to the other cities




Compared to the other eight cities, Msunduzi has moderately low levels of interpersonal violent crimes, ranking fifth for sexual offences, sixth for murder and seventh for assault. Aggravated robberies are the lowest and property-related crimes are the second lowest of the nine cities. For most other crimes, Msunduzi has some of the lowest rates among the cities, with the exception of stock-theft – the city is ranked third, after Mangaung and Buffalo City.

However, these relatively good objective indicators are not reflected in the subjective indicators of crime. Msunduzi's residents experience higher levels of crime than residents in eThekweni, Nelson Mandela Bay, and Mangaung, but have moderate levels of fear of crime. This suggests a relatively low rate of reporting to the police, as a significant proportion of crime incidents do not appear in the official police crime statistics.

Msunduzi has the highest level of poverty of all the cities and the third highest youth unemployment rate (after Nelson Mandela Bay and Buffalo City). Yet, unlike the other smaller cities, it has moderately high population density and relatively easy access to alcohol drugs and firearms. The city's rate of police-detected crime is just below that of Cape Town, eThekweni and Johannesburg.

**Figure 40:** Long-term trend in selected crime rates per 100 000 in Msunduzi



In the last decade, Msunduzi has seen some reduction in all the crimes selected: murders have declined by 30%, sexual offences by 28%, assault GBH by 14%, aggravated robbery by 16%, and property-related crime by 3%. The rate of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs has declined by 44%. While this decrease could reflect a real decline, it could also indicate that the police have become less active in seeking out these crimes.

# ANNEXURE B:

## USRG MEMBERS

	NAME	CITY/PARTNER ORGANISATION	DESIGNATION
Mrs	Bhana, Sadhna	SACN	Programmes Coordinator
Mr	Brown, Shane	Nelson Mandela Bay	Executive Director: Safety and Security
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Mr	Khumalo, Kwenza	Msunduzi	Process Manager: Risk Management
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Mr	Mzolo, Goodman	Ekurhuleni	Deputy Chief of Police
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# ANNEXURE C: USRG SAFETY BRIEFS

# More bang for the buck?

## Effective budgetary investments for crime prevention

This first in a series of Urban Safety Briefs considers the evidence on whether increased budgetary allocations for crime fighting and crime prevention are effective investments and how they should be applied in order to be so.

The SA Cities Urban Safety Reference Group’s Briefs Series is designed to distil the state of current knowledge on urban safety-related topics for a policy and planning audience. It is presented quarterly to the City Budget Forum and other key stakeholders.

### BACKGROUND

Crime imposes a huge range of tangible and intangible costs on national and local governments, on taxpayers, victims and their families, offenders and their families, businesses, and so on. Fighting crime is understandably a priority for most governments and leaders. But how much should be spent on reducing crime and in what way?

The usual resort is to the police. Discussions around reducing crime often rely on increasing budgetary allocations for

the police, something that police bureaucracies are very effective at leveraging. The reality is more complex. The brief explores the state of current knowledge on the topic. It begins with a consideration of the costs of crime and the cost-effectiveness of prevention. It then moves to an assessment of the current knowledge of effective expenditure on crime prevention, and concludes with three general principles against which any crime control programme expenditure should be tested.

### DISCUSSION

#### 1. Getting Bang for your Buck

During the last three decades, there has been a growth in attempts to measure the costs of crime and weigh them up with spending on crime control and prevention in order to maximise fiscal ‘bang-per-buck’. Some iconic early work involved modelling the economics of spending on imprisonment versus spending on childhood intervention, education, and other social programmes. Many found that the monetary benefits of a range of crime prevention strategies outweighed their monetary costs. Early childhood developmental programmes in the United States have been estimated to save about \$16 for each \$1 spent, proving that even programmes that are barely effective at all can be highly cost-effective, because the costs of crime are so enormous.

#### 2. Costs of Crime

There has been relatively little comprehensive research on the costs of crime in the developing world generally and in South Africa specifically. Nevertheless, a few research projects illustrate the magnitudes involved. One 1995 project posited that the direct costs of crime to businesses in that year came to R15.8 billion, and another in 2000 estimated that direct medical costs and loss of income alone cost a victim of rape R1605 and a victim of attempted murder R3928.<sup>1</sup> Other research estimated that each homicide victim in the Western

<sup>1</sup> Brett Bowman and Garth Stevens, *Injury Costing in South Africa: The State of the Sector, 2002, 2002*, p. 7.



Cape in 1998 involved productivity and opportunity costs of about \$15,000.<sup>2</sup> More recently, one attempt at including direct financial losses as well as medical, emotional, institutional, and private security costs estimated that the aggregated cost of crime in South Africa amounted to \$22.1 billion or 7.8% of GDP in 2007.<sup>3</sup> Institutional (i.e. criminal justice expenditure) and health costs (especially the costs associated with crime-related disability adjusted life years as opposed to direct short-term costs) contributed most to this total.

### 3. Estimation is complicated

Methods of estimating the economic impact of crime have improved in nuance and sophistication over the years, for example extending to use self-reported offending rather than just official records, and to attempt to include the cumulative costs that criminal justice action can exert on already-marginalised communities. But they are more likely to be the subject of obscure academic journal articles than presentations to parliamentary committees debating the next budget. These quantitative approaches will always be beset by debates about the appropriate weighting of costs of various kinds and against different groups in society, about whether some crucial factors can be meaningfully translated into monetary terms, about whether it is wise to conflate crime prevention and social policy, and overall about how to take account of inevitably differing conceptions of fairness and equity.

### 4. Unsafety affects growth and development

What we do know is that the cumulative costs of crime also have a huge impact on development. In order for communities to prosper, their residents need to be assured of a certain level of security. It has been estimated, for example, that the cumulative effect of the 'lost growth' due to high levels of crime and violence in several developing countries is as much as 20%. Cities with high crime levels

discourage investment in physical and human capital, have reduced productivity, and lose out to other cities where there is less uncertainty and better quality of life. Crime also disproportionately affects those to whom it is most devastating: the poor. Those who have very little are most likely to be robbed of it, and to lack the resources to recover from the shock, worsening cycles of poverty and entrenching inequality.

### 5. Quantifying the growth impact of crime

This task is extremely difficult and requires considerable further research in South Africa, but the plausible mechanisms by which crime might restrain growth can be grouped under seven broad themes:

- a. Costs to business reduce profits and divert funds away from investment in productive capacity;
- b. Costs to government divert funds from spending that could stimulate growth;
- c. Costs to households divert funds from growth investments such as education;
- d. Human capital is eroded through injury, death, and flight of skilled workers;
- e. Workers are excluded from job market through, for example, fear of accepting jobs in off-hours and far from home;
- f. Foreign investment is discouraged; and
- g. The impact of spending on long-term growth investments (such as schooling and public transport) is blunted if they are disrupted by crime.<sup>4</sup>


### 6. Prevention is cheaper than reaction

As a result of the huge costs of crime, prevention is almost always a much more cost-effective strategy – for government at various levels, and for the economy and society as a whole – than reaction. Of course, there are a number of different approaches to crime prevention, and programmes

2 Deepali M Patel and Rapporteurs; Forum on Global Violence Prevention; Institute of Medicine Rachel M. Taylor, *Social and Economic Costs of Violence: Workshop Summary*, 2012, p. 37 <[http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record\\_id=13254](http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=13254)>.

3 Erik Alda and Jose Cuesta, A Comprehensive Estimation of Costs of Crime in South Africa and Its Implications for Effective Policy Making, 2011, *Journal of International Development*, 23 (2011), 926–35.

4 Christopher Stone, *Crime, Justice, and Growth in South Africa: Toward a Plausible Contribution from Criminal Justice to Economic Growth*, Economic Growth Working Papers, p. 9.



of varying effectiveness within each. Cost-effectiveness is easier to assess for short-term programmes than for example for developmental (early childhood) ones, even though the latter may be very promising and have cumulative positive effects beyond crime rates that are hard to quantify and measure over long periods.

## 7. Criminalisation of social policy

The literature on crime prevention and social policy does discuss a more general conclusion which is important to consider. That is, that expenditure on general social policies, health or education for example, which bring benefits in their own right, should not be reduced to their crime fighting potential only. That has been referred to as the ‘criminalisation of social policy’. Broader, more long-term initiatives can be successful at reducing crime, but they are probably best not labelled this way directly.

## 8. Effective Targeting

Determining effectiveness and cost-effectiveness is easier for more targeted programmes, which makes their expenditure easier to justify. They also turn out to be highly effective at reducing crime rates – much more so than generic policing approaches.

## 9. Highly focused resources

The question of what actually works in crime prevention is a widely debated one, but an increasing body of research is showing that although other approaches can have other broad positive effects, what works best for reducing crime rates is a high degree of focus. This is because crime and victimisation are highly concentrated among certain areas and people. One famous study found that half of all the calls to the police in a crime ridden American city came from less than 3% of addresses.<sup>5</sup> Focus can involve traditional law enforcement tools like high visibility patrolling in identified

hotspots, or it can make use of a wider array of techniques and actors to solve specific crime problems. Hot spots policing and problem-oriented policing are the approaches finding most success in recent crime prevention research.

## 10. Proactively target specific problems

Meta-analysis shows that some of the most reliable and significant reductions in crime can be brought about by policing that is not only highly geographically targeted and proactive, but also based on good understanding of the dynamics of the problem and focused on solving that specific problem through a range of actors and approaches. The fact that generic, reactive approaches to crime are less effective than ones that proactively target specific problems means that developing good knowledge of the dynamics at play in those crime problems and the record of the various intervention options available is more important than ever. Unfortunately, stations overwhelmed by their volume of calls can struggle to think strategically and creatively about preventing narrowly-defined problems, and budgets and bureaucracies can be slow to change. However, besides their internationally proven effectiveness, a key advantage of programmes based on this approach to policing is that they are relatively easy to monitor and cost.

## 11. Choose levers and places

Targeting means selecting specific categories of crime in crime-affected places and spending on a variety of ‘levers’ that contribute to reductions. Identifying the correct levers is of utmost importance and monitoring the results in as localised a way as possible is essential. Studies in South Africa have already demonstrated that much crime (particularly violent crime) is concentrated in a relatively few places. This raises the question as to why more concentrated crime prevention initiatives have so seldom been used in the country.

<sup>5</sup> Lawrence W Sherman, ‘Hot Spots of Crime and Criminal Careers of Places’, *Crime and Place*, 4 (1995), 35–52 (p. 86).





## CONCLUSIONS

Crime prevention can be highly cost-effective, because the cost of crime is so high. Expenditure on policing beyond a certain point brings few if any reductions in crime, unless it is highly targeted at specific types, specific places, and specific categories of victims and offenders. Highly targeted approaches also make it easiest to determine cost-effectiveness and redirect quickly. Social policies aimed at improving the life chances of people (like health or education) are very likely to reduce crime, but that is only one of their outcomes, and one that is hard to measure with any degree of precision. Broader key messages are that:

- The cumulative costs of crime are incredibly high, so even very expensive and marginally effective crime prevention can make financial sense.
- The way to achieve prevention is almost certainly not just more generic crime prevention spending or more police officers.
- The evidence suggests that resources must be highly

focused to get results. Targeting resources at high risk people (offenders and victims) and places has consistently been shown to be the most effective way to prevent crime.

- Effective targeting must be based on a proper understanding of specific problems – how those particular people, places, or circumstances work and why they make for such disproportionately high crime risk.
- Some crime prevention programmes are easier to cost and assess than others. The more direct and immediate the relationship between the expenditure and the crime reduction goal, the easier it will be to monitor impact and determine cost-effectiveness.
- Long term programmes like those targeting early childhood have been shown to deliver cost-effective crime prevention and other benefits, but they are difficult and expensive to track.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

A review of the literature suggests that funds allocated to crime control and prevention in the short to medium term therefore should focus on supporting interventions that:

- **More is not necessarily more:** Have a strong focus on the quality and appropriateness of the strategy in question, rather than simply its quantity;
- **Narrower is stronger:** Proactively target specific crime problems in specific places and/or among specific people;
- **Direct is nimbler:** Have strong capacity for monitoring and flexibility, which will tend to mean a fairly short, direct link between the expenditure and the expected policy outcome.

It is recommended that a rapid diagnostic is conducted to summarise the status quo of the 8 metros in respect of the 3 points above pertaining to strategy, targeting, and monitoring. This must be coupled with the identification of specific support requirements, particularly in relation to budget allocations as linked to cities' growing set of safety-related functions.

*This brief was compiled by the SA Cities Urban Safety Reference Group with support from the UCT Centre of Criminology.*

The Urban Safety Reference Group is a platform for peer-to-peer learning and knowledge sharing amongst practitioners from the SACN member cities as well as other key government role-players on urban safety and violence prevention. It is convened by the South African Cities Network (SACN) with the support of the GIZ-Inclusive Violence and Crime Prevention (VCP) Programme.

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# High time for policy rehabilitation

## Local government and substance use problems

This second in a series of Urban Safety Briefs considers the evidence on appropriate local government roles and responsibilities around substance use problems. It refers extensively to the SA National Drug Master Plan for 2013 to 2017, which is available at <http://www.gov.za/documents/national-drug-master-plan-2013-2017>.

The SA Cities Urban Safety Reference Group's Briefs Series is designed to distil the state of current knowledge on urban safety-related topics for a policy and planning audience. It is presented quarterly to the City Budget Forum and other key stakeholders.

### BACKGROUND

The misuse of mind-altering substances can have a range of negative consequences for communities. In South Africa, there have since 1994 been major changes in the profile of substances misused. Whereas once alcohol, cannabis and methaqualone (a sedative also known by brand names Mandrax or Quaalude) dominated, the political, economic and social changes since have seen the influx and spread of a number of others.<sup>1</sup> Alcohol remains the most misused substance, with binge drinking consumption patterns proven to be responsible for immense harms, including direct health effects, foetal alcohol spectrum disorders, increased sexual risk taking, and physical trauma and death due to interpersonal violence and accidents.<sup>2</sup> Alcohol use disorders account for more than twice the deaths nationally as other drug use disorders, so alcohol should be at the centre of policy thinking on substance use.<sup>3</sup> Data on the precise extent and impact of the problematic use of illicit substances are comparatively less available, but costs are also known to include damage to physical and mental health, to workplace productivity and educational outcomes, safety, public property, social stability and development, and so on.<sup>4</sup>

Substance misuse is widely believed to have risen considerably in South Africa in the last 20 years. The World Health Organisation (WHO) estimates that 15% of the

population has a substance use problem. The following statistics taken from a survey carried out between June 2010 and March 2011 by the Central Drug Authority (CDA) of South Africa put SA as one of the drug capitals of the world:

- Levels of marijuana, cocaine and amphetamine use in South Africa are twice as high as in some other countries worldwide.
- The social and economic costs of alcohol abuse are estimated at R130 billion per annum.
- The CDA estimates that around 7000 people die each year due to driving under the influence of alcohol.
- Some youths develop substance use problems as early as the age of 12.
- Substance use problems are associated with heightened levels of crime and sexual violence victimisation.
- The total social cost of illicit drug use is estimated at approximately 6.4% of GDP.

The country is now considered to host the largest and most diversified African market for illegal substances,<sup>5</sup> both for transshipment purposes and domestic use.<sup>6</sup> Getting reliable estimates of use prevalence is very difficult and different studies have had widely different results, but the main psychoactive drugs consumed are known to include:<sup>7</sup>



**Table:** Common SA drugs

PSYCHOACTIVE EFFECT	DRUG TYPE	SOME COMMON NAMES
<b>UPPERS</b> – have a stimulant effect on the central nervous system	Cocaine Crack (derivative of cocaine) Methamphetamines Ecstasy Nicotine Caffeine ADHD medication	Coke, blow, Charlie Rocks, freebase Meth, crystal, glass, ice, tik MDMA, e, Adam, Molly Tobacco, cigarettes Coffee, java, joe Ritalin, Adderall
<b>DOWNERS</b> – have a depressive or tranquilising effect on the central nervous system	Alcohol Heroin Methaqualone Tranquilisers Inhalants	Booze, dop Smack, gear, junk, unga, H Mandrax, buttons Benzos, Valium, Xanor Glue
<b>HALLUCINOGENS OR ‘ALL AROUNDERS’</b> – have a distorting effect on perceptions	Cannabis LSD Mushrooms	Marijuana, dagga, ganja, zol Acid, tabs, smarties Shrooms

These can also be mixed with each other and other components, for example in the heroin and cannabis mix known as **whoonga** or **nyaope**, and a new ecstasy-based pill called **Mercedes**.

Substance use policy is often conceptualised as falling under three broad categories: 1) attempts to reduce the **demand** for the relevant substances, 2) attempts to reduce its **supply**, and 3) attempts to reduce the impact or **harm** of its use.


These concepts can be described as:

**“Demand reduction**, or reducing the need for substances through prevention that includes educating potential users, making the use of substances culturally undesirable (such as was done with tobacco) and imposing restrictions on the use of substances (for example by increasing the age at which alcohol may be used legally);

**Supply reduction**, or reducing the quantity of the substance available on the market by, for example, destroying cannabis (dagga) crops in the field [or controlling the trade conditions of legal substances]; and

**Harm reduction**, or limiting or ameliorating the damage caused to individuals or communities who have already

succumbed to the temptation of substance abuse. This can be achieved, for example, by treatment, aftercare and re-integration of substance abusers/dependents with society.”<sup>8</sup>



**The three broad categories of approach to substance use policy.**

A balance between them is usually considered the most desirable and likely to be effective.



## DISCUSSION

### 1. Global policy context

Globally, the question of how best to regulate access to drugs is currently more hotly contested than ever before. There is a common perception that existing approaches that stress criminal justice methods have not only failed to reduce access to these substances, but have had a range of other negative consequences – for example, in hindering efforts reduce HIV transmission among very high risk populations. The ‘drug’ issue has a tendency to be highly emotive and polarised, especially as there is as yet very little evidence of what the outcomes of different approaches will be.

However, an increasing number of national and sub-national governments are experimenting with a range of alternative regulatory mechanisms, even including full legalisation of certain substances. This is accompanied by a growing sense that a one-size-fits-all model is unlikely ever to be successful, but instead that different places will likely need to adopt very different approaches depending on their different contexts of substance use and abuse, the nature of their existing markets, the local character of organised crime, and their regulatory and enforcement capacities.

### 2. The National Drug Master Plan

South African substance policy and practice are guided by the National Drug Master Plan 2013-2017 (NDMP), as formulated by the Central Drug Authority (CDA) in terms of the Prevention and Treatment of Drug Dependency Act (20 of 1992) and the Prevention of and Treatment of Drug Dependency Act (70 of 2008).<sup>9</sup> It is a broad and extensive policy that acknowledges that substance use problems cut across the different spheres of government and different considerations (including social, economic, health, legal, political, and ethical) and require interdisciplinary, interdepartmental, multi-level policy approaches.

**The targeted OUTCOMES of the NDMP are envisioned as:**

1. Reduction of the bio-psycho-social and economic impact of substance abuse and related illnesses on the South African population,
2. Ability of all people in South Africa to deal with problems related to substance abuse within communities,
3. Recreational facilities and diversion programmes

that prevent vulnerable populations from becoming substance abusers/dependents,

4. Reduced availability of dependence forming substances/ drugs, including alcoholic beverages,
5. Development and implementation of multi-disciplinary and multi-modal protocols and practices for integrated diagnosis and treatment of substance dependence and co-occurring disorders and for funding such diagnosis and treatment,
6. Harmonisation and enforcement of laws and policies to facilitate effective governance of the supply chain with regard to alcohol and other drugs, and
7. Creation of job opportunities in the field of combating substance abuse.

### 3. Local government responsibility

The NDMP aims to set out the role of national, provincial and local authorities towards achieving these outcomes. Local government is expected to take the lead in the establishment and functioning of Local Drug Action Committees (LDACs) to combat substance abuse on a local level, in keeping with Provincial Drug Master Plans, liaising with Provincial Substance Abuse forums.<sup>10</sup> There are a number of specific resolutions towards the goals above that LDACs are expected to contribute, such as through imposing restrictions on legal alcohol sale hours, regulating and controlling alcoholic home brews, and ensuring equal access to resources that can help prevent vulnerable populations from becoming substance dependent. Many of these resolutions are likely to be excellent methods of reducing some of the harms around drug and alcohol misuse.

However, a major shortcoming of the NDMP is that it is silent or vague on a number of questions of funding – that is, where exactly the budget is to be sourced and monitored for each project.<sup>11</sup> A second is that local policies and decision-making are overshadowed by the national level, a common problem in drug policy internationally.<sup>12</sup>

### 4. Challenges in municipalities

It appears that a few of the larger municipalities have substance abuse plans and committees in place, but many others have made little or no progress toward this end. According to the CDA, the functioning of the mechanisms



envisioned in the NDMP on the municipal level is heavily compromised. Reasons include that many municipalities have no dedicated people to deal with substance abuse matters, and/or have no dedicated budget, and/or are not coordinating their different programmes – and overall are not implementing the NDMP at all.<sup>13</sup> On a broader level, the CDA has struggled to make the NDMP a reality, partly because it has simply not been able to meet the costs of such an expansive and expensive national endeavour.<sup>14</sup>

## 5. Local government costs

Local governments have generally played a fairly limited strategic policy role, especially around illegal drugs, with most key decision-making happening at the national or international level. It is constrained in that it seldom has the legal, financial or practical capacity to influence such factors as legal drinking ages, regulation of alcohol marketing, or overall law enforcement approaches. Yet drug problems often emerge in urban spaces before spreading to other areas and certain urban environments play host to some of the most acute problems around harmful forms of drug and alcohol use.<sup>15</sup> The relative concentrations of disposable income as well as poverty, plus other infrastructure and social conditions in urban centres make them highly susceptible to the development of substance use markets and problems.

Many of the negative outcomes of drug or alcohol intoxication and dependence are borne at least partly on a local level. Just a few examples are:

- Damage to **workforce productivity** and the local economy,
- Damage to **perceptions of safety and reputation** of the local area,
- Damage to **public property**,
- **Sexual risk behaviour**: link between HIV and injection drug use (IDU) in South Africa, unintended pregnancy and sexually transmitted infections (STIs),
- **Crime & violence**: homicide, intimate partner violence, rape and abuse of children
- **Physical and mental health problems**: injury and death rates, lung and other cancers, heart disease, stroke, chronic respiratory disease and other conditions and mental illnesses such as depression,
- **Educational behaviours**: binge drinking, school dropout and low academic ambitions,
- **Economic and social costs**: national and local government budgets depleted

- Security costs related to anti-social behaviour,
- Cleaning up related litter and body fluids,
- Subsidising enforcement through metropolitan policing,
- Managing the alcohol licensing system,
- Providing mitigating infrastructure such as extra pedestrian barriers, and
- Providing treatment services.<sup>16</sup>

Properly understanding and estimating these costs should help local governments motivate for budgetary support for substance use policy measures.


## 6. SA policy position in global context

More and more countries are moving towards non-criminal justice approaches to drug policy, and South Africa has so far played an ambiguous role. During the recent United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Drugs, some South African representatives aligned the country with the highly punitive Russian position, while the Department of Social Development took a sharply different position, instead speaking in support of “comprehensive, accessible, evidence-informed, ethical and human rights based drug use prevention, dependence treatment and after care services”.<sup>17</sup> In the first week of June 2016, the Central Drug Authority also announced a major change in its policy approach.<sup>18</sup> It acknowledged the global and national debate around cannabis regulation, noted that there was little evidence that supply reduction through criminalisation was effective at reducing cannabis abuse, and recommended the decriminalisation of cannabis.

This is a dramatic shift and although the editorial of the prestigious South African Medical Journal lauded it, it stressed that it was not enough and that there was ample evidence supporting legal regulation of *all* psychoactive substances.<sup>19</sup> It seems likely that the South African position will in the long term move away from law enforcement responses and place ever greater emphasis on the ‘softer’ methods of reducing the harms around substance use, such as focusing on health, social development and education.

## 7. Movement towards city leadership

Drug policy that is focused on the criminality of drugs will necessarily be a largely national level responsibility. The further drug policy moves in the direction of legal regulation or



measures that are based on health, social development and education approaches, the closer city governments will have to come to taking central responsibility. City leadership will become increasingly important in setting the tone and direction. This will need to be accompanied by shifts in budgetary allocations.

## 8. City-driven harm reduction

Even in countries where the use of certain substances remains criminal, cities have been laboratories of an ever expanding range of demand reduction and especially harm reduction approaches. Harm reduction policies aim primarily to reduce the negative consequences of some of the use of psychoactive substances, *without necessarily attempting to reduce the level or extent of their consumption*. They are based on a respect for human rights, human dignity and health for all.

## 9. Examples from other cities

A number of cities especially in Europe have already tended to stress a range of ‘softer’ substance abuse policy approaches and have had considerable success at improving the lives and prospects of their communities.<sup>20</sup> The starting point is often the provision of needle and syringe exchange systems and opioid substitution treatment for people who inject drugs. Providing these high-risk users with shelter and clothing also helps with getting health and social services to

these hard to reach communities. These are often provided by mobile units. Interventions in recreational nightlife settings include ‘safe party’ initiatives, which for example give partygoers information about safer alcohol and other drug use and offer chemical testing services. Each city has its own unique substance use situation and must be given the policy room to explore such creative solutions.

## 10. Treatment centres

A key investment in reducing harm from alcohol and other drug use is the provision of quality treatment or rehabilitation centres in a range of different forms, to suit community members’ different needs. Local studies have shown that the available treatment services are perceived to be of poor quality and limited effectiveness, and there is an urgent need for an improved monitoring and evaluation system for these services.<sup>21</sup>

## 11. City-level data

In order for cities to understand and best respond to their substance use issues, they need to understand those problems. Cities can see dividends in research into for example, the current prices of different drugs, where they are purchased and why, what the range of substance usage patterns are, and how and where the substance use related costs are borne.

# CONCLUSIONS

The South African situation in terms of alcohol and other drug use is serious and has worsened and diversified over the last 20 years, although alcohol remains the primary driver of substance-related harm. Problems with substance use impose a range of costs to communities and to city governments.

The South African National Drug Master Plan has had limited impact nationally and especially on a municipal level. A number of its recommendations are yet to be taken up by cities. Cities are required to take the lead in developing and funding comprehensive substance use policy frameworks.

It has become clear on the global scale that one-size-fits-all approaches will not work, but that each place needs to develop a unique set of programmes to deal with substance

use issues. There is growing scope for local experimentation beyond or entirely in place of criminal justice methods.

South Africa’s Central Drug Authority has recently seemed to come to a similar conclusion and has recommended the decriminalisation of cannabis. Based on an accumulating body of research evidence and international practice, it is likely that policy around other drugs will also move further away from criminal justice methods.

Cities can increasingly be leaders in shaping their policies around illegal drugs. They should be creative and do so around harm reduction principles, which place a respect for human rights, dignity and health above ideals of drug-free cities. Access to quality treatment centres and good city-level understandings of substance use issues will be essential.





## RECOMMENDATIONS

The NDMP mandates Mayors to establish Local Drug Action Committees (LDACs).

- **Each municipal council must determine the status of its LDAC:** It must be determined whether such a body is in place, who participates in it, how often it meets, what its policy principles are, and what its budgetary allocation is.
- **Each municipal council must ensure that its LDAC meets NDMP recommendations:** LDACs must be composed of the municipal departments concerned, NGOs, CBOs, FBOs and any other local structure concerned. It is further recommended that young people be explicitly invited and integrated into LDACs.
- **Once/if in place and appropriately constituted, LDACs must:**
  - Commit to **evidence-based** policy measures.
  - Encourage **co-operation** between city leaders to understand and work towards global and national good practice in substance use policy. A good first step would be convening a national meeting or conference of LDAC representatives. National and international experts and civil society groups must be invited to contribute to this process.
  - Ensure that they have good and up-to-date **knowledge** about their unique local substance use situations. **Research** must be conducted into for example the ease of availability, purity and price of drugs, youth pathways to substance use and criminal drug market involvement, and the conditions of substance abuse treatment centres. Institutions such as universities should be invited to be knowledge partners.
  - Ensure that they use a **balanced policy** approach, including all three categories of drug policy options, namely *demand reduction*, *supply reduction*, and *harm reduction*.

LDACs should consider policy approaches including:

### **Demand reduction: reducing the need or desire for the substances**

1. creating alternative recreation spaces, diversion programmes, job creation opportunities and positive leisure activities for citizens, especially the youth.
  - *Specific example:* Support programmes that provide recreational and skills development resources to the youth, especially in vulnerable populations.


2. Promoting substance abuse awareness and responsible consumption of alcohol, information distribution, education, access and assistance for the public at various city information and service points.
  - *Specific example:* Develop accessible information resources (e.g. pamphlets and posters) on substance use problems and ensure that they are available in all city facilities.

### **Supply reduction: reducing the availability of the substances**

3. focusing much of their supply reduction effort on reducing alcohol-related problems, by ensuring that existing regulations are enforced.
  - *Specific examples:* Immediately implement and enforce current laws and regulations that seek to reduce the availability of alcoholic beverages and ensure that health and safety regulations are enforced at premises where alcohol is purchased.
  - Reduce accessibility of alcohol through bylaws, for example imposing restrictions on the times and days of the week that alcohol can be sold legally.
4. Ensuring that law enforcement operations around illicit drugs receive full co-operation from local agencies.
  - *Specific example:* Establish specific forums where the police can engage with metro police, businesses, and communities to work together to help reduce drug availability.

### **Harm reduction: reducing the negative impact of the substances already being used**

5. assessing the quality and needs of treatment centres within their areas and assist wherever possible.
  - *Specific example:* Complete an audit of local treatment centres to identify their most pressing needs in order to provide better services.
6. Promoting measures that allow for safer, less harmful use of alcohol and other drugs.
  - *Specific example:* Require venues and events with liquor licenses and/or that are known to host illegal substance use to provide customers with harm reduction measures such as free water, convenient public transport options, and medicines that help reverse drug overdoses.



## ENDNOTES

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4. Peter Streker, 'Under the Influence: What Local Governments Can Do to Reduce Drug and Alcohol Related Harms in Their Communities', *Prevention Research Quarterly*, 2012, 1–16 (p. 4).
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21. Bronwyn Myers and others, 'Identifying Perceived Barriers to Monitoring Service Quality among Substance Abuse Treatment Providers in South Africa', *BMC Psychiatry*, 14 (2014), 31.

*This brief was compiled by the SA Cities Urban Safety Reference Group with support from the UCT Centre of Criminology.*

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# Local government safety functions and the question of unfunded mandates

This third in a series of Urban Safety Briefs considers the question of whether the role of local government in the provision of safety and security services is an unfunded mandate.

The SA Cities Urban Safety Reference Group's Briefs Series is designed to distil the state of current knowledge on urban safety-related topics for a policy and planning audience. It is presented quarterly to the City Budget Forum and other key stakeholders.

## BACKGROUND

Local government in South Africa is under significant pressure to deliver services. The recent local government elections served to again highlight that as the level of state authority closest to ordinary people, local governments are expected to implement services across a wide range of areas. Surveys of voters before the election suggested that ordinary people were troubled by issues such as employment, education and crime<sup>1</sup> – yet local authorities only have some or limited influence on achieving outcomes in these areas. Such functions may be considered to be the primary mandate of other levels of government, even if citizens assume that local governments are responsible.

In determining effective responses, local governments are limited both by the mandates that they have but also by the fact that they only have limited financial capacity to deliver on an array of services – even if those are seen as a priority by communities. Such pressures raise a series of policy issues in respect of the fiscal capacity and mandates of local government to deliver in areas where ordinary citizens demand improvements – but where local government feels is constrained.

Sometimes, the governmental attitude seems to be that municipalities should not concern or distract themselves with functions that are not within their mandate. However, the centrality of local government's role in the area of

community safety is now widely advocated globally as an essential requirement for improving the lives of ordinary people (The New Urban Agenda, 2016). Furthermore, South African cities are regularly compared in terms of levels of violence and crime to other cities, particularly in the developing world, making mayors and senior metro policy makers ever more conscious of the requirement to determine an effective response.

The technical term sometimes associated with these pressures on local government – to deliver on wider mandates but without having the concomitant funds to do so – is that of **“unfunded mandates”**. Defining what exactly are and are not unfunded mandates has been the subject of much discussion and debate. The purpose of this brief is to consider the issue of unfunded mandates in relation to the provision of community safety services.

Four recent government policy documents contain significant policy pronouncements in this respect: the White Paper on Safety and Security, the White Paper on Policing and the National Development Plan (Chapter 12), and the Integrated Urban Development Framework (IUDF). While the these policy documents do not use or dwell upon the term “unfunded mandates” in their discussion of the role and functions of local government the conclusions they reach are of significant import for this evolving discussion.



## DISCUSSION

### Defining unfunded mandates

There is no exact agreement on a definition of unfunded mandates. The SACN itself reference a narrow definition that states that unfunded mandates occur when “cities perform the functions of other spheres of government and bear significant costs out of their own revenue sources”.<sup>2</sup> The IUDF states more broadly that “unfunded (or underfunded) mandate arises when municipalities carry out functions that do not form part of those allocated to them by the Constitution or legislation”.<sup>3</sup>

Drawing from this, the wider literature suggests that *two conditions* must be present for an unfunded mandate to be present:

1. that levels of government below the national level are tasked in terms of legal or policy pronouncements with taking on certain functions sometimes without consultation or agreement; and,
2. that lower levels of government do not have the capacity to raise additional funds or do not receive funding transfers from provincial or national government for these purposes.

An unfunded mandate in the respect of community safety would thus exist if local governments were *obliged* to deliver a set of safety services – such as policing or social crime prevention programmes – in addition to what has been legislated to be their functions and where they do not have the resources to do so.

This definitional discussion raises the question of whether the achievement of community safety at the local government level is, in the South African context, an unfunded mandate?

### Current local government community safety functions

While the overall responsibility of achieving safe communities in South Africa is generally considered to rest with the national government, which is controlled from national level, the position is in fact more complex. In fact, all levels of government have a responsibility for community safety:

what often remains unclear however is the different roles, responsibilities, and by implications sources of funding to support these efforts.


The Constitution emphasises the interdependent and interrelated nature of government and stipulates that all organs of state within each sphere must “preserve the peace” and “secure the well-being of the people of the Republic” (Section 41 (1)). In short, acting together, all levels of the state have a role in achieving citizen safety and wellbeing.

**Figure 1** provides a broad schematic of the roles of different levels of government as it is conventionally understood in South African policy making circles. There remain however some significant grey areas in the debate.



**Figure 1:** The South African inter-governmental safety hierarchy as it is conventionally understood

All levels of government contribute to safety through the performance of different functions. Local government, in line with relevant legislation and policy documents, is generally accepted as having four broad and overlapping functions:



1. The *enforcement of by-laws and the provision of traffic policing*. This can be done through the mandated establishment of metropolitan and municipal police services as stipulated in the Police Act (Section 64). The establishment of such a police service is *not* mandatory.
2. The provision of services that are focussed on achieving the *prevention of crime*. This in itself has two dimensions:
  - i. The **first** relates to the work of *visible policing* through municipal and metropolitan police or traffic services, which includes the arrest of suspects and the handing over to the SAPS and the response to emergencies where crimes are underway; a daily occurrence for most local government police or traffic services (see Section 64 H of the Police Act). The 2016 White Paper also argues for a regulatory framework to be developed to allow metropolitan police services to conduct investigations in relation to by-law and traffic infringements.
  - ii. The **second** relates to the *prevention of crime* more generally through the provision of local government services such as lighting, roads and related matters as well as being more generally “crime aware” in the context of local government planning and infrastructure development. It also however includes the opportunity for local governments to invest in social crime prevention projects of their own and to coordinate such local safety and crime prevention services. Significantly, however, there is not clarity across different government departments, despite the various policy pronouncements on the subject, as to what exactly constitutes “social crime prevention interventions”. While the White Paper on Safety and Security makes a start in this regard, it does not by any means resolve the current discussion.
3. The *securing of municipal property, systems and personnel for the purposes of crime prevention*. This includes guarding of municipal infrastructure and the protection of personnel and councillors where required. Such a function is arguably part of the day-to-day management of local government affairs, as indeed would be the case for individual households, who have a responsibility to ensure that basic precautions are present to ensure their possessions are secured.

Important to note here is that the 2016 White Paper on Policing specifically makes provision for metropolitan police services to conduct investigations on crimes “such as theft and tender irregularities” in respect of municipal business or carried out on municipal property (p. 31).


4. Finally, and generally overlooked, is that local governments themselves have important *accountability functions* given their elected nature. For example, local councillors have had a role in attending and representing their various constituencies on Community Police Forums (CPFs). In this respect, the 2016 White Paper on Safety and Security argues that local governments should “establish sustainable forums for co-ordinated, collaborative and on-going community participation” (p. 44). This suggests that local governments could take the lead in establishing systems of coordination for local stakeholders in respect of crime prevention.

### Do these functions constitute unfunded mandates?

Each of these four functions has been assigned to local government through legislative or policy processes. Although the 2016 White Paper on Safety and Security goes further than previous government policy documents in respect of the role of local government, the four functions that are outlined above have generally been accepted for some time. For example, the 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security included references to the role of local government and in 1998 the Police Act was amended to make provision for municipal policing.

For the purposes of the discussion here, it is worth clarifying that a wider definition of the term unfunded mandates could also be argued to include two other broad considerations. These are briefly:

- The **first** is cases where national or provincial government set minimum *standards for delivery resulting in significant and/or unintended costs at local level*. For example, in the case of the provision of safety services, setting standards for VIP protection or municipal policing at local level that are unrealistic for less well-resourced municipalities to achieve will have financing consequences. In response, however, it could



be argued that some minimum standards are required (for example around firearm training or management) to prevent poor performance and in the case of safety services the possibility of danger to lives and property. The issue of standard setting is directly addressed in the 2016 White Paper on Policing that emphasises the role of the SAPS in setting standards for local government policing.

- The **second** case is circumstances *where political or historical choices and/or requirements result in the provision of services that are beyond what is mandated for*. For example, in the case of several cities in the country, it could be argued that the provision of policing services stretches the mandate provided to local government in the Police Act. Given the wide ambit of the term “crime prevention” – which as we have seen above is given as a core ‘catch-all’ function for local government policing – this is a debate not easily resolved. In such cases, however, it would be difficult to justify these as unfunded mandates given that they are choices made by municipalities themselves, rather than being a clear requirement.

Discussions in these two areas by their nature have a political content. How any local government interprets the extent to which it provides safety services is to some degree an outcome of a series of political engagements and choices. In this reading then, achieving safer communities is not the *primary* responsibility of local government, BUT local governments, by performing a series of functions, the boundaries of which are subject to a degree of interpretation, given in particular the relatively woolly nature of the term “crime prevention”, can make a contribution to the overall objective of safe communities as envisaged in the Constitution. This role in fact may be a critical contribution given that no other level of government may provide social crime prevention functions in most areas.

There are thus strong arguments for a role for local government in crime prevention, not least being their constitutional responsibility to contribute to the wellbeing of citizens. The question then becomes what kinds of social crime prevention interventions is local government justified in spending *local* funds on. This is particularly the case

should they encounter gaps caused by other spheres of government/sectors departments not adequately fulfilling their mandates within the municipal space. Is the problem that there simply are these gaps and other actors don’t see the need to take responsibility for investments on these kinds of social crime prevention programmes, or is it more the problem of lack of joint planning or poor coordination horizontally and vertically across government?

The complexity of the discussion is clear from this question and it must be emphasised that the debate continues to evolve. As stated, the 2016 White Paper on Safety and Security suggests an important role for local government. Its wording also provides an opportunity for local government representatives and associations to lobby for a clarifying of their position within the safety and safety financing architecture.

### The 2016 White Paper on Safety and Security: Local is lekker?

The 2016 White Paper on Safety and Security is significant in several respects. Amongst others, it lays out the functions of local government. This includes, to:

- allocate budgets for safety and crime prevention;
- secure funding, presumably externally, for the implementation of safety and crime prevention programmes;
- capacitate and resource directorates for safety and crime and violence prevention; and,
- develop and implement local strategies and plans on safety and security, crime and violence prevention.

The language of the Safety and Security White Paper implies that local governments are compelled to take these steps, although without changes in legislation this is more likely to *remain a choice* rather than an obligation. It could be argued that if crime prevention is to be taken seriously as a policy principle then indeed legislation should follow stated policy.

However, the two 2016 White Papers are somewhat contradictory on the issue of resource allocation. Significantly, the White Paper on Safety and Security in Annex E concludes that: “Local government plays a key role [in] the safety,





crime and violence prevention needs of communities. In this regard, national and provincial governments are *legally obligated* (emphasis added) to equip municipalities with the resources and the capacity to plan, implement and monitor their services” (p. 6). In contrast, the White Paper on Policing begins its section on local government by stating that “[e]ach municipality is responsible for promoting a safe and healthy environment *within* (emphasis added) its financial and administrative capacity and in line with national and provincial priorities” (p. 40). Thus, the interpretation in both White Papers has a different emphasis policy and legislation on the subject, most particularly whether national and provincial government have a role in supporting local government in this sphere (including financially), thus remains somewhat ambiguous.

Within the context of tight fiscal constraints, the former statement from the White Paper on Safety and Security is unlikely to be enough to ensure the transfer of funds for safety programmes and initiatives at local level. While the functions of local government in respect of safety are relatively clear in terms of municipal by-law and traffic enforcement, spending on safety issues, specifically social crime prevention, while strongly encouraged by the White Paper, is not seemingly an obligation and must take into account the means of each municipality. Annex E of the Safety and Security White Paper in addition makes it clear that functions assigned (that is, obligated) to local government (in terms of Section 156 (4) of the Constitution) would require both an assessment of local government capacity, the “existence of sufficient funding and capacity building initiatives” and the promulgation of provincial legislation (p. 5). This has not occurred in the case of crime prevention or community safety discussions.


In addition, neither of the two White Papers addresses a series of key institutional issues that have close linkages with this discussion, but are seldom considered as related. This concerns less the issue of mandates and their funding and more the issue of the providing for effective forms and incentives for institutional alignment and cooperation in the local safety sphere. While inherently political in the South African context, changes in this regard would be in line with best crime prevention and policing practice.

## Strengthening the safety architecture

Particularly in relation to the country’s major cities, three aspects have mitigated against an effective alignment between national, provincial and local community safety functions. It is submitted that any future debate on mandates and the evolving national safety and crime prevention architecture of the country needs to address these. While in the cases of small municipalities these issues may be less of a concern, for larger metros (where most of the country’s crime occurs<sup>4</sup>) they are significant obstacles to an alignment of the available safety resources. While these have a strong focus on policing, they in fact also have considerable implications for social crime prevention and its alignment across levels of government.

The three interlinked aspects are as follows:

1. *Boundary misalignment*: The provision of policing services and that of local government services do not align. Thus, SAPS boundaries do not match those of major metropolitan areas or local governments. This reality is a significant stumbling block to a more effective alignment of national and local government policing and safety resources, including in respect of accountability. At the most basic level, for example, and this information being a key first step to determining policy responses, no South African city can present a complete picture of crime within its jurisdiction.<sup>5</sup>
2. *Weak local government accountability linkages to policing*: Partly as a result of the misalignment of boundaries, elected city governments are not in a position to work with the SAPS in determining priorities for the cities concerned. Police managers are also seldom called to account for performance by local councils – and can effectively refuse to do so. As a result, several local governments have begun to strengthen their own policing systems and social crime prevention programmes partly because they argue they have few options to express local government priorities to the SAPS. Giving local government a “coordination function” as suggested by the 2016 White Paper does not resolve the issue as the SAPS, or for that matter any other government department, is still not legally obliged to adjust their operations to meet the stated crime fighting priorities of city government or to attend coordination meetings arranged by city authorities.



3. *Poor coordination between local and national policing and community safety provision:* The literature on police policy repeatedly makes the point that effective coordination between agencies is the key to delivering safety.<sup>6</sup> The misalignment of boundaries and the weakness of accountability measures at local level in South Africa mitigates against achieving this and fuels a debate around mandates rather than one of effective coordination. Asking local governments to provide coordination of safety services (as envisaged in the 2016 White Paper on Safety and Security) might be useful, but its promise will remain unfulfilled in the absence of

a series of wider institutional and police accountability reforms. It should be noted here too that the 2016 White Paper on Policing makes the argument for a single national police agency, effectively suggesting greater control over and/or coordination with municipal police functions (although how this is to be done is not clearly stipulated). Any attempt to incorporate municipal police services into the SAPS will be challenged at the Constitutional Court, and likely successfully. In short, more innovative responses to developing coordination and improving accountability between the SAPS and local government are required.

## CONCLUSION

The role of local government in the provision of safety and security services is unlikely to be a debate that moves off the agenda in the near future. The question has been asked whether the role of local government in the performance of these functions is an “unfunded mandate”. However, this brief suggests that in fact it would be difficult in the current context to motivate that local government safety provision requires external funding from national or provincial level. Nevertheless, the issues involved remain somewhat blurred in the day-to-day policy discourse and the matter is far from resolved.

Local governments have four key safety functions mandated to them. They are not in fact obliged to establish municipal or metropolitan police services, but may have the discretion to do so. In this sense cities may stretch their mandates, also in terms of determining what such police services do, but this would not necessarily provide an argument for requesting external funding. Other functions relate to: the provision of crime prevention, both through being “crime aware” in the conduct of ordinary local government service provision as well as in the development of specific projects or programmes; the securing of municipal property and personnel; and, the provision of accountability resources through elected representatives engaging with the police and other stakeholders on safety issues. It must be emphasised that the issue of defining the role of different levels of government in relation to the provision of social crime

prevention (or different forms or types) remains relevant in the current discussion.

However, the 2016 White Paper on Safety and Security in particular raises the prospect of local governments taking a more proactive role in community safety and coordination functions. It also provides a much needed clarification on an issue that is now widely accepted: that local government has a key “accountability function” for policing and safety at local level. Nevertheless, such functions are being provided for in a context where the system is characterised by a number of misalignments, most notably in relation to overlapping geographical jurisdictions, weak accountability linkages and poor coordination between local and national safety provision. Local government should arguably be cautious in accepting too wide a mandate without a discussion on improving the safety architecture in terms of boundary alignment, stronger forms of accountability and better systems of coordination.

The Brief concludes that the debate on “unfunded mandates”, at least in the area of safety, might be better construed as a discussion around the lack of institutional coherence in the area of safety provision at local level. What may be termed the “national safety architecture” and its connection to, and inclusion of, local government safety functions requires further policy refinement.



## RECOMMENDATIONS

### Local government community safety policy makers should:

1. Seek to define more clearly the role of local government – in relation to national or provincial government – in the area of social crime prevention. This should include a clearer understanding of what *types* or *forms* of social crime prevention that must be emphasised by the different levels of government.
2. Engage with national and provincial policy makers on the issue of boundary alignment as a key prerequisite for local governments to effectively perform their designated functions in coordination with other levels of government.
3. Emphasise to national and provincial government that if local government is to take on a meaningful coordination role for community safety, it must rely on an acceptance that other entities, most notably the SAPS, must, within the framework of current laws, align with the designated community safety and crime prevention priorities as set out by elected local representatives.
4. Focus on costing the implementation and cost/benefits of current or future social crime prevention programmes, including by analysing current levels of crime in specific areas and seeking to target those determined to be most susceptible to local government intervention.<sup>7</sup>

## ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Survey data consistently shows that safety is one of the top priorities for South African citizens. See, for example, Afrobarometer, 'South Africans disapprove of government's performance on unemployment, housing, crime', Dispatch no. 64, 24 November 2015.
- <sup>2</sup> The Financial and Fiscal Commission, Appendix 2: The Impact of Unfunded Mandates in South African Intergovernmental Relations. Submission for the Division of Revenue 2012/2013.
- <sup>3</sup> *The Integrated Urban Development Framework*, Policy Lever 9: Sustainable Finances, p.108. Pretoria: Republic of South Africa, 2016.
- <sup>4</sup> *State of Urban Safety in South African Cities Report 2016*. Johannesburg: South African Cities Network, 2016.
- <sup>5</sup> For the process required to calculate city rates of crime in the current system see Anine Kriegler and Mark Shaw, *A Citizens Guide to Crime Trends in South Africa*, Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2016.
- <sup>6</sup> This for example was the conclusion of a series of UN expert consultations on improving urban security conducted during the course of 2016 with research in ten cities. See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
- <sup>7</sup> See discussion in Urban Safety Policy Brief No. 1: More bang for the buck? Effective budgetary investments for crime prevention. Johannesburg: Urban Safety Reference Group (SACN/GIZ), March 2016.

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# Improving crime statistics for local government

This fourth in a series of Urban Safety Briefs considers what local governments can do to improve the quality and usefulness of crime data, which can improve the effectiveness of all essential city services.

The SA Cities Urban Safety Reference Group's Briefs Series is designed to distil the state of current knowledge on urban safety-related topics for a policy and planning audience. It is presented quarterly to the City Budget Forum and other key stakeholders.

## BACKGROUND

In most parts of the world and for most crime types (but especially property crimes), urban centres suffer crime rates significantly higher than more rural areas. Theories about which are the key causal factors include cities' offers of greater anonymity (i.e. perpetrators and victims don't know each other), their higher financial returns to crime (there is more to steal), closer proximity of inequality (more poverty physically close to wealth), greater concentrations of already more crime-prone people (such as younger people and/or those with greater appetites for novelty and risk), and higher levels of family disruption (resulting in less surveillance and social control of the youth).

The current members of the South African Cities Network (SACN) are:

- City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality,
- eThekweni Metropolitan Municipality,
- Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality,
- City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality,
- Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality,
- Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality,
- Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality, and
- Msunduzi Local Municipality.

These municipalities plus the other major metropolitan municipality of the City of Cape Town between them host about 40% of the residents of South Africa, but record about 77% of the carjackings, 74% of the vehicle thefts, 64% of the aggravated robberies, 58% of the residential robberies, and 47% of the murders.

Safety is often considered to be primarily the responsibility of national authorities. Yet crime hamstrings all essential city services – obstructing their effectiveness, raising their costs, and slowing overall socioeconomic upliftment. This was discussed in greater detail in an earlier policy brief, on unfunded mandates<sup>1</sup>.

In order to better counter these effects, cities should also invest in developing and improving urban crime data. There are a number of initiatives that can support improvements in the quality and usefulness to cities of existing SAPS crime statistics.



## DISCUSSION


### The importance of local data

National crime statistics obscure the immensely skewed distribution of crime within a country, city, neighbourhood, and even household. For example, the current national murder rate per 100 000 people in South Africa is about 34. This is more than five times the global average of 6.2 and is higher than only a handful of countries worldwide (largely in Central and Latin America). This is the risk of murder for

the ‘average’ person in the country. However, there is major variation between people in different areas.

According to research conducted for the SA Cities Urban Safety Reference Group, murder rates in the major SA cities vary from almost twice the national level (in Cape Town) to almost half (in Tshwane). See the graph below.

### City murder rates per 100 000 residents in 2015/16




Cities need to be able to quantify their crime rate benchmarks and to track their relative and absolute progress over time. This allows for such insights as that Johannesburg’s crime profile is relatively dominated by robbery crimes while Buffalo City has a particular problem with serious assault, or that although eThekweni’s murder rate has declined by 33% over the last decade it has seen a significant increase in the last four years. Such knowledge can help cities better plan and prioritise their crime prevention and other programmes.


More importantly, cities need to know how crime problems are distributed within their boundaries. Most cities have a handful of areas that record crime rates well above the city average and many more areas that are far safer than

suggested by overall city crime statistics. In other words, a small number of neighbourhoods generally contribute disproportionately to overall levels of crime. Effective interventions in these areas will disproportionately benefit the city as a whole.


Differences in the severity of crime problems must be interpreted by comparing recorded crime figures – *and taking account of the number of residents in the area*. Ten crimes perpetrated in a population of 100 people represents a much larger problem than ten crimes in a population of 10 million. The following map gives an indication of disparities in murder rates in police stations in Gauteng, once population sizes are accounted for.



### Gauteng police station 2015/16 murder rates per 100 000 residents



### Precinct boundary misalignment in part of Buffalo City



### The boundary problem

There is a critical obstruction to cities’ and other interested parties’ productive use of the official crime statistics as they are currently provided on an annual basis by the South African Police Service (SAPS). This is that the geographical boundaries of the SAPS police station areas do not correspond with the boundaries of *any other official authority or existing source of other potentially relevant data*.

Municipal structures and boundaries have little or no relevance to the SAPS organisational structure, which acknowledges leadership and tracks performance only at the levels of individual stations, local clusters of stations, provinces and the nation as a whole. The SAPS are not even in a position to provide crime statistics on the city level. Police precinct boundaries are therefore often counterintuitive and cut arbitrarily across municipal boundaries, suburb boundaries and electoral ward boundaries.

This can be seen as on the following map of a section of Buffalo City (East London), where the **black** line indicates the 2011 municipal boundary, the **orange** lines indicate 2011 electoral ward boundaries, and the **green** lines indicate police station area (or precinct) boundaries. Other municipalities show a similar pattern.

Most crucially, this misalignment makes it very difficult to obtain estimates of the residential population within each police precinct, which in turn makes it impossible to meaningfully compare their crime situations.

In order to express crime figures as rates per 100 000 residents, it is currently necessary to use Geographic Information System technology to digitally overlay the boundaries of each of the over 1 000 national police precincts with the boundaries of the many tens of thousands of small geographic units enumerated by Statistics South Africa during census 2011.

### Estimating the population in Hillbrow precinct







In the map above, for example, in order to estimate the number of people resident within the boundaries of the Johannesburg police station of Hillbrow (shown in **green**), it was necessary to identify, obtain and sum population estimates for each of the 128 areas indicated in **blue**.

Without estimating population, one might observe that the police stations of Jeppe and Springs (in Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni respectively) each recorded 80 murders in 2015/16 and conclude that they have equally serious problems with this crime. However, determining their populations reveals that Jeppe is about half the size of Springs. This means that in 2015/16 the average resident of Jeppe in fact faced about twice the risk of murder as the average resident of Springs.

Accounting for population is an essential first step in making sense of recorded crime statistics. Currently, this is an extremely cumbersome and technical task.

### Boundaries of other data

the haphazard delineation of police station boundaries also makes it very difficult to link crime statistics to other data that could help the police, city authorities and others properly interpret them and put them to use in reducing crime levels.

There is a wide range of factors that have been demonstrated by international and local research to have an impact on crime. These include rapid population growth, population density, poverty, inequality, unemployment, deprivation of services, housing informality, school conditions, (illegal) possession of firearms, and alcohol and other substance abuse. These and multiple other factors combine to determine the extent and nature of crime within an area. There are a number of sources of these data produced on an ongoing basis, for example from Statistics South Africa or from government or academic research projects.

For any electoral ward in the country, there is now easy online access to such information as its electoral voting patterns, demographics, average household income, access to municipal services, and educational and employment levels. Other data is also available at the level of the neighbourhood or suburb. However, there is no easy way to link these with crime statistics.

Alignment between crime statistics and other data would make it much easier to determine which factors are likely contributing to crime in each area. For example, comparison between two precincts with different crime rates might reveal that the two were similar in all respects except that the one hosted a higher rate of unemployment among men between the ages of 29 and 35. This might suggest that employment initiatives for this particular group could be a particularly productive approach to crime prevention.

### Boundaries of accountability


A further challenge posed by the misalignment between police station boundaries and any others is that of accountability. Local political leadership and oversight is constrained by the fact that police precincts seldom fall clearly within any area of either official or intuitive community responsibility.



### Hillbrow precinct and multiple ward overlaps

In the map above, for example, the police station area (with boundaries shown in **green**) overlaps with at least eight different political wards (shown in **orange**). Many of the wards also extend into other neighbouring police station areas. This means that there is no single formally elected leader who can fully represent her/his community's interests with the leadership of this police station, or vice versa.

Indeed, the communities covered by the map above are vastly different, and may well have very different expectations and needs in terms of their policing. For instance one of the



wards within Hillbrow precinct, ward 63, has an average annual household income of R29 400.<sup>2</sup> Another ward that falls partially within the precinct, ward 73, has an average annual household income of R115 100.<sup>3</sup>

Although it would not necessarily be feasible or desirable to enact a perfect overlap between policing and formal political boundaries, a full assessment of police boundaries might result in significant gains for efficiency, accountability, legitimacy and trust.

### Blind spots in crime statistics


An additional difficulty in making good use of crime statistics is that they only refer to that share of crimes that have been reported to and recorded by the police. A significant proportion of some crimes never make it into the official statistics. For this reason, crime is often likened to an iceberg, with some portion of it visible in the official statistics ('above the water'), but some unknown and potentially much larger and variable proportion of it hidden from official view ('below the water').

The extent of the iceberg effect varies by crime type and by features of the community and the police. Surveys indicate that although a large and fairly steady proportion of murders and car thefts are reported to and recorded in the official statistics, the proportion is small and inconstant for sexual crimes and for theft of smaller personal items.<sup>4</sup>

The iceberg effect is particularly large in communities with poor relations with the police and where victims see little incentive to report. For example, victims who have access to and wish to claim from insurance are more likely to report thefts. Survivors of sexual crimes are more likely to report their experiences to the police if they believe that they are likely to be believed and treated with respect. Communities that trust and have high expectations of the police tend to see higher reporting rates. Developing countries also tend to see lower rates of reporting to the police than wealthier, industrialised countries.

The following graph shows that there is major variation in whether victims reported their recent crimes to the police. South Africa's reporting rate is relatively high among African countries.<sup>5</sup>

Percent in African countries who reported recent crime to the police





The problem with variation in crime reporting or recording behaviour is that it introduces unknown distortions into the data, making it unreliable. This means, for example, that when the recorded crime rate is higher in one place or time than in another, one can't be sure whether this is indeed the result of a difference in the real incidence of crime, or instead whether victims and/or the police in those places and times may be facing different incentives to report or to record.

The effect of improving relations between communities and the police can 'penalise' certain stations or areas, by making it seem as if their crime rates are increasing. In fact, this was possibly seen in SA in the decade after 1994, when there was a major recorded increase in some crimes. However, much of this can be ascribed to increases in crime victims' faith in the police and inclination to turn to them for justice.<sup>6</sup>

Regular, representative surveys are required, in which people are asked about whether they have recently fallen victim to crime, whether they reported those crimes to the police, and why. This is such an important counterpoint to the police's recorded crime statistics that in some countries (including the United Kingdom), the crime statistics are released together with the results of their national victimisation survey results. Statistics South Africa already conducts an annual Victims

of Crime Survey on a national level. Unfortunately this data reports only down to the provincial level, so city-level data is not available on an ongoing basis.

Another way to improve the accuracy of crime statistics is by working to reduce it (rather than just reveal its size and the reasons for it) by focusing on the crime victim side of the equation. This would involve measures to encourage reporting of crimes to the police.

A third method to improve crime statistics would involve working to reduce it by focusing on the police side. This requires a holistic approach involving improved oversight and monitoring of police practices and reporting as well as encouraging the police and all of society to reconceptualise the use of crime statistics. They must be understood much less as a form of assessment of police success or failure (which only encourages data manipulation), and instead as a vital public resource. In order to be truly useful, crime statistics should be made publicly and quickly available, should contain the maximum amount of detail that still affords appropriate anonymity, and should reflect case progress.

The following extract from the monthly release of the Cambridgeshire Constabulary may serve as an example.

### Example extract of crime statistics release from Cambridgeshire, UK

CRIME ID	LONGITUDE	LATITUDE	LOCATION	CRIME TYPE	LAST OUTCOME CATEGORY
000ee...	-0.278696	52.556687	On or near Oundle Road	Criminal damage and arson	Under investigation
001fb...	-0.245074	52.572655	On or near Church Street	Shoplifting	Investigation complete; no suspect identified
00295...	-0.136844	52.123831	On or near Whittlesford Road	Burglary	Under investigation
0054a...	-0.282634	52.433082	On or near Sapcote Way	Violence and sexual offences	Awaiting court outcome
00779...	-0.285824	52.223966	On or near Linclare Place	Bicycle theft	Investigation complete; no suspect identified



## CONCLUSION

As indicated in this brief, the management structures of South African cities do not have access to regular, reliable, context-specific and real-time crime data. Such a state of affairs has resulted in city authorities having to make decisions relating to the safety and security of their residents without accurate data. This has often undermined the effectiveness of policy decisions and interventions relating to crime reduction and prevention. Furthermore, it has made it almost impossible for such policies and interventions to be regularly monitored and evaluated.

It is possible for the SAPS crime data to be reconfigured and recalculated into a format that coincides with municipal boundaries of South African cities; however, this requires the support of the Minister of Police and the Statistician-General (StatsSA). Currently, StatsSA is working with the SAPS to convert the SAPS crime statistics into official statistics (in terms of the Statistics Act), and the SAPS have

recently moved towards releasing crime data on a quarterly basis. These developments provide the opportunity for the relevant city authorities to advocate for regular, city-specific crime data from the SAPS and StatsSA.

However, as indicated above, the SAPS crime statistics only indicate that proportion of crimes that were reported to, and officially recorded by the police. Consequently there is a fairly large and unknown proportion of unreported crime. Hence, in order to generate a more comprehensive picture of crime and safety at the city-level, city authorities need to implement their own data-gathering process that generates representative and reliable data on crime victimisation, perpetration and perception. Such data will also allow for robust predictive statistical models relating to crime prevention to be developed, which in turn will be highly beneficial with respect to crime and safety policies and interventions.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

- Relevant city authorities (preferably mayors) should write to the Minister of Police and the Statistician-General and request that city-level crime data is provided for each city (as well as for each ward within each city) on a quarterly basis.
- Relevant city authorities, in consultation with StatsSA and appropriate universities in South Africa, should develop data collection techniques and templates that will generate more detailed, regular and reliable ward-level data on crime and safety that complements the SAPS crime data.
- In order to generate such data, city authorities, including the Metro Police, should establish partnerships with reputable community organisations, non-governmental, hospitals/clinics and private security companies that either collect, or have the capacity to collect, crime-related data.
- Relevant city authorities should investigate the suitability of existing technology and software that may easily facilitate such data gathering, as well as the analysis thereof.
- City authorities should establish partnerships with appropriate academic departments at South African universities to develop predictive statistical models on crime and safety in South African cities based on the data gathered. Such model will facilitate more effective decision-making, as well as monitoring and evaluation in this regard.



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- <sup>3</sup> Wazimap: <https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/ward-79800073-ward-73-79800073/>
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The Urban Safety Reference Group is a platform for peer-to-peer learning and knowledge sharing amongst practitioners from the SACN member cities as well as other key government role-players on urban safety and violence prevention. It is convened by the South African Cities Network (SACN) with the support of the GIZ-Inclusive Violence and Crime Prevention (VCP) Programme.

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The State of Urban Safety in South Africa Report is a flagship publication of the South African Cities Urban Safety Reference Group (USRG). The USRG constitutes the first institutionalised forum in South Africa that enables practice-based learning on the theme of urban safety and violence prevention to inform urban policy, planning and management. It has proven to be a valuable platform for peer-to-peer learning and knowledge sharing amongst practitioners from the SACN member cities as well as other key government role-players on urban safety and violence prevention.

The USRG was established in early 2014. It is convened by the South African Cities Network (SACN) with the support of the Inclusive Violence and Crime Prevention (VCP) Programme.

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